

# Inspector General

United States  
Department of Defense



## Special Plans & Operations

Assessment of U.S. Government Efforts to Train,  
Equip, and Mentor the Expanded Afghan National  
Police

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# Inspector General

## United States Department of Defense

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INSPECTOR GENERAL  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE  
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704

March 3, 2011

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR  
PARTNERSHIP STRATEGY AND STABILITY OPERATIONS  
COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND  
COMMANDER, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE  
FORCE-AFGHANISTAN/UNITED STATES FORCES-  
AFGHANISTAN  
COMMANDER, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE  
FORCE JOINT COMMAND  
COMMANDER, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION  
TRAINING MISSION-AFGHANISTAN/COMBINED SECURITY  
TRANSITION COMMAND-AFGHANISTAN

SUBJECT: Assessment of U.S. Government Efforts to Train, Equip, and Mentor the Expanded  
Afghan National Police (Report No. SPO-2011-003)

We are providing this final report for review and comment. This is the tenth in a series of reports published by the Office of Inspector General's Special Plans and Operations Directorate that focus on the train and equip missions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. We considered client comments on a draft of this report when preparing the final report.


We request additional comments and information by April 4, 2011 as follows:

- Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia-Recommendation 5 (redirected recommendation).
- Commander, International Security Assistance Force/U.S. Forces-Afghanistan-Recommendations 12.a, 12.b, 13.a, 13.b, 13.c, 14.a, 14.b, 21.a, 21.b, 22.c, 28.
- Commander, International Security Assistance Force Joint Command-Recommendations 16.a, 18.a, 23.c.
- Commander, NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan-Recommendations 3.b, 4, 6.a, 6.b, 8, 10.a, 10.b, 17, 18.b, 19.a, 23.a, 23.b.

If possible, please send your comments in electronic format (Adobe Acrobat file only) to [spo@dodig.mil](mailto:spo@dodig.mil). Copies of your comments must have the actual signature of the authorizing

official for your organization. We are unable to accept the / Signed / symbol in place of the actual signature. If you arrange to send classified comments electronically, they must be sent over the SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET).

We appreciate the courtesies extended to our staff. Please direct questions to Mr. Stanley E. Meyer (703) 604-9130 (DSN 312-664-9130) or [Stanley.Meyer@dodig.mil](mailto:Stanley.Meyer@dodig.mil) or [Stanley.Meyer@dodig.smil.mil](mailto:Stanley.Meyer@dodig.smil.mil).

  
Kenneth P. Moorefield  
Deputy Inspector General  
Special Plans and Operations





# Executive Summary – Assessment of Efforts to Train, Equip, and Mentor the Expanded Afghan National Police

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## Who Should Read This Report?

Personnel within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) and its subordinate commands in Afghanistan, the Military Departments, and Agencies responsible for and engaged in training, mentoring, equipping, and other aspects of the development of the Afghan National Police (ANP)<sup>1</sup> should read this report.

## Synopsis

In late 2009, President Obama re-emphasized the importance of building the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) as a priority objective of U.S. national security and military strategy in Afghanistan. Previously, the Coalition's primary focus had been to expand the Afghan National Army (ANA). With additional resource support, the major thrust of the train and equip efforts over the past year has been development of the ANP, which is recognized by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Coalition as essential to success in the counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign. Since he assumed command of ISAF in 2010, General Petraeus has organized and implemented an aggressive COIN strategy, which includes an accelerated build-up of the ANSF.

Under ISAF, two new sub-commands have been created within the past 18 months--North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (NTM-A/CSTC-A) and the ISAF Joint Command (IJC), both of which have important responsibilities and capabilities with respect to growth of the ANP.

NTM-A/CSTC-A has the lead responsibility for managing the use of Title 10, U.S.C., fiscal resources, training and equipping the police forces, and Ministry of Interior (MoI) capacity building. IJC is responsible for improving the effectiveness of the ANP through partnering with U.S. and other Coalition combat forces. It is of course essential that the respective contributions of these two commands in support of ANP development be fully integrated.

As of July 2010, NTM-A/CSTC-A had exceeded the milestone set for expanding ANP forces, reaching 109,000 personnel three months ahead of schedule. In contrast to the previous police development model, which was based on the urgency of quickly recruiting and assigning police personnel, the command has adopted a new model to build a more professional personnel base by requiring all newly recruited ANP to be trained before being assigned. This new concept has also avoided contributing to the legacy challenge posed by several tens of thousands of Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP) currently serving who have never received basic training. In addition,

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<sup>1</sup> For purposes of this DODIG report, the ANP consists of the Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP), the Afghan Border Police (ABP), and the Afghan Civil Order Police (ANCOP).

NTM-A/CSTC-A has made an important commitment to improving the quality of training, not just the quantity of personnel graduated and fielded.

The new recruit-train-assign force generation model is being reinforced by additional programs aimed at improving retention. New recruits are now required to make a contractual commitment to three years of service, or longer if they will be non-commissioned officers (NCOs) or officers. Literacy training has been made mandatory for the police forces beginning in basic training. Potential recruits are screened for illicit drug use and drug screening is periodically implemented across the police forces. To further bolster recruitment, retention, and morale, additional provisions have been made with respect to pay reform and quality of life initiatives.

IJC has been accelerating the professional development of the ANP through its partnering with Coalition combat units and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Police Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (POMLTs). With the deployment of additional U.S. Brigade Combat Teams to Afghanistan in 2009 and 2010, it became feasible to partner U.S. tactical units more widely with the Afghan police. Some U.S. Army and Marine tactical units are “embedded” partners with ANP organizations, sometimes down to the precinct level with the AUP. This has enabled intensive mentoring and training full time, and also demonstrated its effectiveness by providing ANP personnel an every-day model of professional conduct and leadership to emulate. Complementing this U.S./Coalition force partnering capability has been the recent deployment of Law Enforcement Professionals (LEPs)-teams of civilian policing experts-who have joined the partnered military units to improve ANP community policing skills.

There are still significant challenges that ISAF must address to be able to continue the momentum of ANP force generation, development, and sustainment, so as to ultimately create a sufficiently robust professional police force capable of independent operations. Given the current state of ANP development, it will take time, sufficient resources, and strategic patience to succeed in this endeavor.

One specific challenge is that of the nascent state of ANP logistical development, which, by operational necessity and design, has lagged the overall growth of the ANP, making these forces still heavily reliant on Coalition logistical support. Senior U.S. commanders recognize that the current lack of this capability is untenable over the long-term and that the ANP requires an intensive support effort by ISAF to build an ANP logistics system able to support the operational needs of its forces. This will take a sustained effort by the Coalition, given the complexity of building security force logistics systems, especially in a country at war. We note that, given the mission to generate operational police forces, development of the ANP logistics capability is proceeding according to established plans.

ISAF has taken the initiative to close the ANP logistics capability gap. Specifically, NTM-A/CSTC-A has implemented a logistics infrastructure development plan that is building supply depots across the regional commands, down to provincial level, that are closer to forward deployed police units. Institutional capacity building of the MoI is proceeding on numerous lines of development. Under new MoI leadership, it is expected to be capable of providing more effective management support for the ANP including in the area of logistics. In addition, IJC

intends to deploy its Support Battalions as partners in support of ANP logistical development; a similar mentoring effort in Iraq achieved impressive results.

Progress in developing ANP logistical capacity cannot be maintained, however, without establishing a more effective system of accountability and control with respect to ANP equipment, supplies, and installations. The ability of the ANP to provide this oversight is fundamental to being able to sustain the operational readiness of its forces, prevent fraud, waste, and abuse of ANP materiel and infrastructure; and reduce corruption. Such a system would also contribute to instilling a new cultural ethos of stewardship within the police forces. ISAF recognizes the need to strengthen oversight capacity of the MoI and ANP and is taking proactive measures to achieve that goal. ISAF has also identified a parallel need to improve its own internal oversight capability with respect to U.S. appropriated funds used to supply equipment and supplies to the ANP, but lacked adequate qualified personnel to do so.

ANP performance is also inextricably linked to the development of governance and rule of law in Afghanistan. In a number of districts determined by ISAF to be critical to COIN operational success, the AUP have been the only meaningful government presence. ANP effectiveness in upholding the Rule of Law relies on the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) having in place an effective system of justice, whether it operates under formal or informal legal procedures. For the government to gain the loyalty and support of the population, it has to be able to provide protection for its citizens and prompt justice. Also key to building an enduring, professional police force in Afghanistan is growing a base of competent, non-corrupt leaders. Where strong leaders exist among the ANP, superior performance of their forces is also evident. Additionally, it takes responsible, honest leaders to suppress police corruption, which remains a problem at the level of the local police, who directly interface with the population and impact support for GIROA.

U.S. commanders have made leadership development within the ANP a top priority. They have strongly supported MoI efforts to remove the incompetent and corrupt among the ministry and the ANP, to promote MoI and ANP personnel based on performance, and to expand police training programs focused on creating the next generation of police leaders. Continued success in this endeavor will require a determined and protracted commitment from GIROA, supported by ISAF and the U.S. interagency, as well as continued progress with respect to the other key challenges to police development.

## **Notable Progress**

There are many noteworthy areas of progress identified in this report under four distinct focus areas, discussed in detail in part one. To summarize, ANP development towards a transition to lead security responsibility has advanced. This includes development of improved training and mentoring strategies, increased recruiting, curbing attrition, establishing logistics infrastructure, mentoring/training through partnering with U.S. forces, and the design of improved metrics to track and guide ANP development.

### ***Force Generation***

There were 11 observations associated with the generation of forces. These observations focused on improvements needed in the areas of force structure and equipping requirements and



processes, support for more effective training/mentoring at the Ministry level and training centers, as well as more intrinsic oversight of materiel provided to the ANP.

### ***Force Development***

Under this heading, there were nine observations associated with challenges to the development of forces once recruited, trained, and assigned to units. They address areas such as logistics weaknesses, Afghan security services cooperation and support, governance and rule of law, and corruption. The need for additional personnel to provide oversight of Afghan Security Forces Fund contracting was also addressed.

### ***Force Sustainment***

There were eight observations associated with the need to develop an ANP capable of self-sustainment of its forces. These observations address areas that will assist in future sustainment of newly generated and operational forces or, conversely, degrade them, if not properly managed or developed. Specific issues raised include lack of effective oversight of U.S.-provided equipment and other supplies, AUP personnel needs at the District/Precinct level, and pay issues in the Afghan Border Police (ABP), among others.

## **Recommendations Table**

<b>Office of Primary Responsibility</b>	<b>Recommendations Requiring Additional Comment/Information</b>	<b>No Additional Comments Required at This Time</b>
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia	5	
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations		7
Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff		15.b
Commander, ISAF/U.S. Forces-Afghanistan	12.a, 12.b, 13.a, 13.b, 13.c, 14.a, 14.b, 21.a, 21.b, 22.c, 28	1.a, 1.b, 2, 13.d, 15.a, 22.a, 22.b, 27
Commander, ISAF Joint Command	16.a, 18.a, 23.c	
Commander, NTM-A/CSTC-A	3.b, 4, 6.a, 6.b, 8, 10.a, 10.b, 17, 18.b, 19.a, 23.a, 23.b	3.a, 9, 11.a, 11.b, 16.b, 19.b, 20.a, 20.b, 22.d, 22.e, 24.a, 24.b, 25, 26

**Please provide comments by April 4, 2011.**

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## **PART I – NOTABLE PROGRESS**

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## Introduction

We found that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (NTM-A/CSTC-A) and the International Security Assistance Force Joint Command (IJC) together had made significant progress with the growth and development of the Afghan National Police (ANP) since our review of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and ANP in 2009. Although improvements are still needed in many areas of the ANP train and equip mission, as highlighted later in this report, there were also many noteworthy areas of progress identified.

## Working Towards Transition

An important goal of the international security assistance force in Afghanistan is to successfully transition security responsibility to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA). Through the efforts and leadership of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), IJC and NTM-A/CSTC-A working at all levels of the Ministry of Interior (MoI) and ANP, much progress has been made leading to the transfer of security responsibility:

- MoI took the lead in the annual, Solar Year (SY)<sup>2</sup> 1390 *Tashkil* Commission review for the first time. (The *Tashkil* is the ANP document authorizing personnel and equipment, similar to a U.S. Army Modified Table of Organization and Equipment [MTOE].) This important step forward is a testament to the quality of mentorship provided by NTM-A/CSTC-A advisors and an indication that the ministry's leaders are gaining both confidence and capability.
- The 22 Bunkers national munitions depot was once completely run by the Coalition Force (CF) and there was a minimum presence of ANP onsite. Since our last review, ANP now leads the effort and has primarily assumed operational control with assistance from CF personnel. During the teams visit to 22 Bunkers, the tour and briefings were conducted by the onsite ANP officials through



Figure 1. Connex Boxes at the Afghan National Police 22 Bunkers Depot

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<sup>2</sup> <http://www.answers.com/topic/tropical-year--a> SY is the period of time required for the earth to make one complete revolution around the sun, measured from one vernal equinox to the next and equal to 365 days, 5 hours, 48 minutes, 45.51 seconds. <http://scienceworld.wolfram.com/astronomy/VernalEquinox.html>--the SY begins on the vernal equinox date (near March 21 in the northern hemisphere) when night and day are nearly the same length and the sun crosses the celestial equator.



interpreters. Questions on procedures and processes were successfully answered and demonstrated by local ANP.

- 1/10 MTN (Regional Command-North [RC-N]) Brigade Support Battalion, recognizing ANP challenges with getting supplied, formed a Logistics Military Training Team (LMTT) in April 2010 to work with ANP counterparts on MoI supply requisition processes. The LMTT developed a process to track logistics requests at each node of the supply system, and developed ANP confidence in its capability to manage effectively its own supply requests.
- Regional Command-Southwest (RC-SW) (1 Marine Expeditionary Force [MEF]) was aggressively implementing an ANP training sustainment and transition plan focused on an effort to unify activities and consolidate Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) development. Broader than just force generation, this plan covered all aspects of ANSF development that would lead to a successful and enduring transition of local community security responsibilities to ANP lead.
- The Regional Command-East (RC-E) Commander has prioritized efforts to support building capable and functioning district governance. He is building and upgrading district centers in key terrain districts using a strategy that concentrates CF and GIRoA resources, to include ANP resources, at key points of the counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign and which focuses on meeting the needs of the people.

## **New Training/Mentoring Strategies**

ISAF Joint Command has successfully implemented new training/mentoring strategies to better support ANP growth and focus toward the COIN campaign:

- Coalition Forces (CF) unit partnering is energizing ANP development; Police Mentoring Teams will now provide civil policing dimension with an additional emphasis on COIN to ensure a force that can defend itself and support the needs of the population. The European Gendarmerie Force (EGF) mission within Afghanistan, along with the Law Enforcement Professional program under the modified ANP training program, is having a significant impact on the training and quality of force.
- NTM-A/CSTC-A is organizing ANP Officer Candidate School training in Turkey; the program will send up to 500 ANP personnel to Turkey to train for six months. A second group of 500 ANP will follow based on success with the first group. CSTC-A, Japan, and Turkey will pay for the first group of ANP officers. It has not yet been determined who will pay for the second rotation. The objective is to expose the ANP to a working police force in a democratic Muslim country. Regional Command-Central (RC-C) is also working to establish a program to train ANP officers in Turkey for a year at a time.
- The Regional Training Center (RTC) in Regional Command-South (RC-S) exemplifies the value of outstanding U.S./Coalition partnering supporting impressive Afghan leadership. The 404th Zone Commander, with the support of RC-S mentors, has

embraced the training concept, working effectively with the regional police chiefs to grow instructors and police leaders and to improve the literacy rate.

## **Progress in Recruiting and Curbing Attrition**

NTM-A/CSTC-A has curbed attrition by making fundamental changes in the force generation mode with respect to pay, and other quality of life incentives. In addition, recruits are required to contractually commit to a set length of service. These initiatives had enabled the Afghan Government to both recruit and retain a more professional police force.

Progress has been made also by changing the force generation model from the previous “Recruit-Assign” approach to a “Recruit-Train-Assign” methodology. This revised method ensures new policemen receive formal training before performing their duties. To support this concept, NTM-A/CSTC-A modified the basic training course to reduce the overall length by two weeks to gain the required “glide slope” output for ANP force generation, but increased the intensity of the training program. To ensure the training quality they extended the training day and added literacy instruction for every policeman.

NTM-A/CSTC-A also worked with MoI to create pay incentives to increase the quality and quantity of ANP. Under these programs, the MoI provided a living wage and monetary incentives such as retention bonuses and hazardous duty pay.

ANP’s most difficult retention problem has been with the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP). The capability of this force diminished due to continuous deployments to high threat areas. To ease the burden and improve retention, NTM-A/CSTC-A in coordination with MoI developed a deployment cycle of six weeks deployment, six weeks of rest, followed by six weeks of training, preparation and redeployment. Attrition has declined and additional brigades are being formed.

## **Improved Metrics**

The Commander’s Unit Assessment Tool has provided an improved capability to assess Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) performance. This newer version has added narrative description and expanded assessment areas to qualify capability. Notable key areas added recently to this assessment tool were with respect to Non-commissioned Officer professionalism and anti-corruption.

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## **PART II – FORCE GENERATION**

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## Observation 1. Process for Coordinating Operational Issues During *Tashkil* Development

The annual NTM-A/CSTC-A/MoI *Tashkil* planning process for determining and authorizing additional ANP forces lacks a formally established mechanism to ensure IJC mid-to long-term operational considerations are jointly planned and incorporated into the NTM-A/CSTC-A force development model. Nor is there a formal mechanism for making timely adjustments during the *Tashkil* execution year in response to near-term COIN operational resource needs. (The *Tashkil* is the ANP document authorizing personnel and equipment, similar to a U.S. Army Modified Table of Organization and Equipment [MTOE].)

This occurred because there was no formalized process or doctrine developed to ensure that operational requirements of the IJC and ANP are fully incorporated by the institutional planners at the MoI and NTM-A/CSTC-A during the annual force development planning process. Furthermore, there is no formalized process to address IJC near-term operational issues that develop within the force generation execution year.

The result has been a process that generally addresses IJC requirements for additional ANSF support on an ad hoc basis when they arise during the annual Command Plan cycle. This could lead to delay or failure at a critical decision point in the operational aspects of the counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign as key NTM-A/CSTC-A planners rotate out of country and does not ensure that all interim operational needs can be met during the *Tashkil* year.

**Applicable Criteria** (See Appendix C, Number 9 and 13, for additional details.)

- Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan, “Campaign Plan for the Development of Afghan National Security Forces,” September 20, 2008.
- DOD Instruction 3000.05, “Stability Operations”, September 16, 2009.

### Discussion

In several instances, operational leaders in both the IJC and the ANP shared their perception that the MoI/NTM-A/CSTC-A annual Command Plan review process for force generation had not been sufficiently synchronized with IJC multi-year operational planning and was not able to quickly adjust to meet developing situations in the battle space. Examples included:

- The perception of an Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP) regional commander in RC-E, supported by his U.S. military mentor, that the *Tashkil* did not reflect the reality of the security situation on-the-ground, with relatively peaceful provinces and districts authorized the same number or more AUP than areas have recently become heavily engaged in the COIN fight.
- The opinion of several senior officers in the IJC that the established *Tashkil* for ANCOP brigades was overstated, monopolizing the ANP recruiting and training effort, when the more immediate operational requirement was to have more trained AUP in Key Terrain Districts (KTDs).
- The concern of both IJC and ANP commanders that the recent decision to largely eliminate private security companies in Afghanistan would generate an immediate requirement for more authorized ANP to protect government officials, key infrastructure,



and international aid organizations—a requirement not planned for in the annual *Tashkil* review process.

- A developing near-term requirement to provide the Afghan Border Police (ABP) heavier weapons than they were currently authorized.
- Disagreement between IJC and NTM-A/CSTC-A on the advisability of establishing a personnel category for trainees, transients, holdees, and students (TTHS).

The view shared by a senior NTM-A/CSTC-A official is that the process to address out-of-cycle personnel and equipment requirements needed to be formalized. The NTM-A/CSTC-A official noted that, in coordination with MoI, they had generally been able to address validated out-of-cycle operational requirements brought to them by IJC and/or the ANP and were developing the procedures for IJC participation in the annual force development planning process. While that assertion appeared to be correct, success to date was brought about on an ad hoc basis, driven by IJC and NTM-A/CSTC-A action officers who were intent on “making this happen,” despite the lack of an institutionalized written process/doctrine that would preclude discovery learning every time personnel rotate in and out of country.

## Recommendations

1. Commander, International Security Assistance Force/U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, in coordination with the International Security Assistance Force Joint Command and North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan:
  - a. Develop a formal process to ensure that International Security Assistance Force Joint Command operational considerations are incorporated, as appropriate, into the annual requirements generation/force development/contracting process.
  - b. Establish a systematic process for identifying, prioritizing, and approving significant resource requests from the International Security Assistance Force Joint Command at regular intervals during the annual *Tashkil* resource planning process.

## Management Comments

ISAF concurred. ISAF has a process in place to ensure IJC operational considerations are incorporated into the annual requirements generation. This is accomplished through the Solar Year Command Plan Review (CPR) that is planned coordinated and executed by the Afghan MoI with assistance from Coalition partners and mentors. This annual process is complemented by a Program Management Review Process (PMR) that addresses emergent needs driven by operational requirements in a dynamic and fluid COIN environment.

## Our Response

ISAF comments were responsive. We believe that the current CPR and PMR processes meet the intent of our recommendations. We will consider further evaluation of the effectiveness of these processes during follow-on assessments of ANSF progress. No additional comments are required.

## Observation 2. Requirement for Additional Afghan National Police

The need for additional ANP has been identified as a priority requirement in some regional commands to stem current or future increases in insurgent influence. Senior ANP officers at the zone and provincial levels in RC-E and RC-N identified a pressing need for additional AUP personnel to be assigned to their districts. This concern has been voiced in other regional commands.

Numerous conditions can contribute to the existence and growth of an insurgency, to include an overall shortage of effective police. The current *Tashkil* was short of the recommended ratio of six policemen per 1000 population, as developed through ISAF analysis, in a country facing a persistent COIN fight. NTM-A/CSTC-A calculations using regional population estimates indicated a need to increase in three of the six zones country-wide which would require an additional 34,000 police. Ongoing operations in RC-S and RC-SW, as well as the priority to secure Kabul, have diverted the new force allocations, but the shortages in other region's zones remain.

As a result, police to population ratios were as low as 1.6 to 1,000 in the eastern region, 2.3 to 1,000 in the north, and 3.6 to 1,000 in the west, well below the six to 1,000 ratio developed by ISAF. The reduced ratio allows insurgent groups in these regions to grow in force and in influence, undermine security, and damage confidence in the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA).

***Applicable Criteria*** (See Appendix C, Number 4, 13, 21, and 22, for additional details.)

- Army Field Manual 3-24, "Counterinsurgency," December 2006.
- DOD Instruction 3000.05, "Stability Operations," September 16, 2009.
- MoI Affairs, Department of Strategy, "Police Plan for SY 1389," March 2010.
- MoI Afghan National Police Strategy, March 2010.

### ***Discussion***

Although ANP are now the force generation priority for NTM-A/CSTC-A and ISAF Joint Command, AUP regional/zone police commanders in RC-E and RC-N informed the DODIG team that they required more police in order to accomplish their COIN mission within their respective zones.

Although police to population ratios are nearing the ISAF-developed six to 1,000 in RC-S and RC-SW, the rest of the country varies from 1.6 to 1,000 to 3.6 to 1,000. Furthermore, this ratio of police to population is only a portion of the recommended ratio of 20 to 25 per 1,000 for all security forces (ANA, CF, and ANP) in the COIN environment<sup>3</sup>—a ratio being met only in selected areas of the country.

In response to pressure placed by U.S. and other ISAF forces on insurgents in RCs-East, South, and Southwest, insurgent activity has been redirected to other regions. For example, IJC reports

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<sup>3</sup> Army Field Manual 3-24, "Counterinsurgency," December 2006, p. 1-13, para 1-67.

increased insurgent activity in RC-West (RC-W), the region of Afghanistan that has the lowest police to population ratio.

Given the expanded threat posed by insurgent groups beyond their traditional strongholds in the South and Southeast and without sufficient ANP forces, the ability of ISAF and the GIROA to protect the population and marginalize the insurgency groups that threaten the legitimate government is in jeopardy.

## **Recommendation**

2. Commander, International Security Assistance Force/U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, in coordination with the International Security Assistance Force Joint Command, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, and the Ministry of Interior, develop Solar Year 1390 *Tashkil* requirements for appropriate increases in Afghan National Police strength to counter and roll back insurgent advances, especially in Key Terrain Districts and Area of Interest Districts.

## **Management Comments**

ISAF concurred. This recommendation was recently implemented during the Solar Year Command Plan Review where the MoI approved an additional 10,000 Afghan Uniformed Policemen in response to IJC and Afghan Zone Commanders request.

## **Our Response**

ISAF comments were responsive; no additional comments are required.

### Observation 3. Programs of Instruction at Afghan National Police Regional Training Centers

The training staffs at various ANP Regional Training Centers interpret and implement the ANP basic training Program of Instruction (POI) differently.

The complex challenge of executing ANP training at 39 training facilities across Afghanistan, supported by training cadres from multiple countries and policing backgrounds, a number of whom were recently inserted to support ANP expansion and upgrade the quality of training, has led to differing interpretations and implementation of the ANP basic training POI.

As a result, AUP officers reported to their assignments trained to different standards with inconsistent understanding and expectations, and differing opinions about their roles as police officers. Consequently they required retraining by the assigned units to become effective police officers.



Figure 2. Afghan National Police Receive First Responder Training at the Central Training Command

**Criteria** (See Appendix C, Number 1, 9, and 12, for additional details.)

- Afghanistan National Development Strategy Secretariat, “Islamic Republic of Afghanistan – Afghanistan National Development Strategy 1387-1391 (2008-2013) – A Strategy for Security, Governance, Economic Growth & Poverty Reduction.”
- Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan, “Campaign Plan for the Development of Afghan National Security Forces,” September 20, 2008.
- DOD Inspector General Report No. SPO-2009-007, “Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the Afghan National Security Forces,” September 30, 2009.

### Discussion

**Multiple Trainers.** During our September 2009 assessment of the Afghan Security Forces, we observed that the ABP received a different POI from two different contractors. In that report, we recommended standardization of ABP training across Afghanistan. CSTC-A concurred with this recommendation, reporting they had adopted and implemented a single, standardized POI for the ABP. In July 2010, the AUP were being trained at 39 different training facilities by several countries and different contractors. Based on the OIG Team’s interviews and observations, different interpretations of the standard NTM-A/CSTC-A POI continues to be an issue.

The Coalition AUP trainers themselves come from many countries with diverse backgrounds, including, but not limited to:

- Germans were teaching and mentoring at the National Police Academy,
- Italian Carabinieri were teaching and mentoring at the Central Training Center in Kabul,
- Canadians were training at the RTC in Kandahar,
- U.S. Marines were training AUP at Camp Leatherneck in RC-SW, and
- DynCorp and Xe contract personnel were providing training at almost all of the training facilities.

Each one of them brought different policing backgrounds and training methodologies to the table, often based on their experience and organization/procedures/responsibilities of varying police cultures in their home countries. Among the concerns identified were that some of the mentors and trainers taught weapons and others did not. Some ANP recruits were trained alongside ANA recruits, and received their personal weapon in basic training, while the rest did not train at all with ANA, and received their personal weapon at their first assignment. In one specific case, the POI being used by the contractor had not been vetted by NTM-A/CSTC-A at all.

**Afghans Concerned.** Three different Afghan Generals from three different regions reported non-standardized training was occurring. The MoI Admin and Support Chief of Staff said he knew specifically that the ANP were not being trained with the same curriculum everywhere and requested standardized training be implemented. The Commander of the Central Training Center in Kabul repeated the same concerns, and the Commander of the RTC in Kandahar stated that the ABP training in Spin Boldak was not appropriate at all and was more akin to militia training rather than that required to create a professional police force. He wanted to have the entire POI redone – “Start from zero.”

**North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan Efforts.** NTM-A/CSTC-A reported that achieving unity of effort in support of common training standards was one of the challenges of working with so many international partners. Although an International Police Coordination Board had been established to discuss major policy and training issues, it had met infrequently.

NTM-A/CSTC-A officials said they were aware of the standardization challenge and that the Commander made addressing the problem a priority. When DOD assumed responsibility for the new training contract, it intended to create an improved program that would include a revised POI. The new contract would enable the command to enhance its ability to achieve a standardized, consistent teaching methodology. While acknowledging the ongoing effort in this area, the OIG Team notes the process of adjusting and standardizing POI inputs into the ANP training system is not yet complete.

## Recommendations

3. Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, in coordination with the Ministry of Interior:
  - a. Standardize and improve, where necessary, the Program of Instruction across all Afghan National Police training facilities.
  - b. Conduct regular oversight visits to ensure compliance.

## Management Comments

NTM-A/CSTC-A concurred. A new Afghan-centric and student-focused program of instruction (POI) for Basic Training has been produced and will commence national roll out in January 2011. This new POI will address the pre-existing issues with inconsistent curriculum content, methods of delivery, and provide a common national standard for police training.

## Our Response

NTM-A/CSTC-A comments were partially responsive. Our review of the new POI, sent as an attachment to its management comments, has led us to the conclusion that development of a standardized POI has been completed at the NTM-A/CSTC-A/MoI level. However, we ask that NTM-A/CSTC-A provide a copy of the plan for NTM-A/CSTC-A/MoI oversight that will ensure compliance and standardized implementation.



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## Observation 4. Untrained Afghan Uniformed Police

The high percentage of assigned but untrained AUP in RC-N and RC-E negatively impacts the ability of Coalition Force (CF) and GIRoA to achieve COIN objectives, and enables insurgent influence to increase.

AUP force generation initiatives initially concentrated on rapidly fielding police to respond to the insurgent threat. The concept of “Recruit, Assign, and Train” was necessary but flawed in that it was difficult to get AUP personnel trained once they were assigned to operational police organizations. The situation was compounded by the fact that:

- Many of AUP from the legacy force (pre-2001) had never been trained,
- Previous priority was on building and training the ANA,
- Current emphasis has been on building and training the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), and
- Insufficient training capacity for both the current untrained and newly recruited AUP.

AUP elements are often unable to maintain institutional standards and may well lack the skills and training necessary to fully understand and effectively enforce the law, which may undermine Afghan public confidence in the Afghan government.

***Applicable Criteria*** (See Appendix C, Number 4, 13, 21, and 22, for additional details.)

- Army Field Manual 3-24, “Counterinsurgency,” December 2006.
- DOD Instruction 3000.05, “Stability Operations,” September 16, 2009.
- MoI Affairs, Department of Strategy, “Police Plan for SY 1389,” March 2010.
- MoI Afghan National Police Strategy, March 2010.

## Discussion

“I’d rather have no police than bad police, because bad police destroy local faith and confidence in their government and push the locals to the Taliban. No matter how hard the Marines and Afghan Army work to earn the public trust, bad police can unhinge those efforts in a heartbeat.”<sup>4</sup>

A confirmation of the actual number of untrained AUP has proved elusive. However, NTM-A/CSTC-A’s current estimate of untrained AUP across Afghanistan is 40 percent of the total, which varies across regions.

NTM-A/CSTC-A has a number of institutional challenges to overcome. It seeks both balanced development and growth concurrently. However, inefficiencies repeatedly enter the training paradigm based upon available students, course loads, course delays, facility shortfalls, and lack of qualified trainers. Lack of cooperation between MoI and Ministry of Defense (MoD) regarding training centers often makes ‘dual-use’ school allocations/attendance difficult to manage.

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<sup>4</sup> E- mail to the Washington Post reporter Greg Jaffe: Marine Brigadier General Lawrence D. Nicholson: <http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/blog/blogs/reflectionsfromfront/archive/2010/03/12/the-afghan-national-police-restoring-confidence.aspx>.

Two existing programs currently attempt to address the issue of untrained AUP in the force. The Focused Police Development Program is a six week training program for high threat areas that



**Figure 3. DODIG and NTM-A/CSTC-A Personnel with Afghan Cadre at the Afghan National Police Academy**

requires Provincial police units, under the direction of the Provincial Chief of Police, to perform the police functions in the District/Precincts while the untrained AUP are being trained. It usually brings the untrained AUP to an established training center. The Directed Police District Development Program is another six week training course conducted in two cycles within the district, but does not require backfill, as half of the AUP are trained at a time. This training option brings the trainers to the untrained AUP in their local area, usually a district.

To mitigate shortfalls in untrained AUP, IJC has reportedly identified plans to organize two more Focused Police Development Program cycles in addition to those already scheduled. IJC has identified three more Directed Police District Development cycles in addition to those already scheduled.

This remains a considerable challenge, and NTM-A/CSTC-A is organizing a reformed training program that involves integrating several courses of action to address the untrained police conundrum.

The NTM-A/CSTC-A plan, although not yet complete and executed, involves:<sup>5</sup>

- Apportioning up to 50 percent of available training slots for reform training until December 2010, when the training base will have to revert back to training new ANP personnel to meet police growth targets. This course of action applies to RC-E and RC-N.
- RC-S and RC-SW police elements are being given credit for ‘experience’ already gained during assignment/deployment; the plan is to provide only the 28 hours of AUP uplift training identified as critical to their professional development and mission.
- All Focused District Development (FDD) training will be considered reform training.
- The introduction of Mobile Training Teams using an off-cycle *Tashkil* process to accommodate benign situations where trainers can embed themselves in local communities. Mobile Training Team requirement: 34 provinces x 20 trainers = 680 trainers. These teams will supposedly consist of Afghan trainers, but it was unclear how the MoI would provide them or prepare them to train other policemen.

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<sup>5</sup> Briefing to LTG Caldwell on Untrained AUP: 9x .Power Point Slides o/a 27 Oct 2010, Camp Eggers, Kabul Afghanistan.

Initiation of the pending Mobile Training Team plan may not occur until January 2011, with implementation/execution sometime thereafter. Furthermore, it is not clear that this plan, if executed, will be sufficient to expedite basic training of the untrained Afghan Uniformed Police at a rate consistent with Afghan National Police Commanders' and Regional Commanders' needs, the insurgent threat, and International Security Assistance Force transition plans/projections.

## **Recommendation**

4. Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, in coordination with the Ministry of Interior, develop a strategy and supporting plans to expedite basic training of the untrained Afghan Uniformed Police at a rate consistent with Afghan National Police Commanders' and Regional Commanders' needs, the insurgent threat, and International Security Assistance Force transition plans/projections.

## **Management Comments**

NTM-A/CSTC-A concurred with comments. Training untrained and already assigned policemen has proven difficult and corrective efforts have had limited effect. NTM-A/CSTC-A and MoI will continue to conduct reform training of already assigned policemen by using Provincial Training Companies organized under the Afghan National Police Training General Command (ANPTCG), excess capacity within the Afghan National Police training institutions, and supporting the IJC-led Focused District Development program.

## **Our Response**

ISAF comments were responsive. While having an estimated 40,000 untrained policemen in the active force may prove problematic with respect to establishing a COIN capable professional security force, we are aware of the challenges reform training is presenting to the Afghan leadership and to ISAF. The multi-faceted approach presented by ISAF, complemented with the Recruit-Train-Assign strategy, should eventually address this challenge. We request that NTM-A/CSTC-A provide OIG with a copy of the ANPTCG reform training plan being developed in conjunction with the SY1390 *Tashkil*.

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## **Observation 5. Shortage of Institutional Trainers**

NTM-A/CSTC-A does not have sufficient institutional trainers/mentors to keep pace with current and anticipated ANP expansion. A significant percentage of the current and projected shortfall relates to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) country obligations through confirmed pledges that have not been met or not been made.

The expansion of the ANP has driven a requirement to expand commensurately institutional training capacity, with an associated increase in the requirement for NTM-A/CSTC-A trainers. This increased personnel requirement has not yet been met by new trainers/mentors provided by NATO partner nations or from other Coalition country sources. In addition, at the time of the team's visit there was already a significant institutional trainer/mentor shortfall.

Until the issue is addressed, the ability to sustain the growth of the many training and logistical centers, medical support organizations, accession schools, and other institutions that will require additional trainer/mentor personnel remains uncertain; this could impact timely generation and development of a quality police force.

### ***Applicable Criteria***

- NTM-A/CSTC-A training requirements: Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR) V.10 (Request for Forces [RFF] Plan B) Confidential NOFORN, Titled: Analysis of Unfilled Requirements, 12 Oct 10 (classified document).

### ***Discussion***

Growing the ANSF forces requires an ever-expanding and dynamic landscape of training and development programs from NTM-A/CSTC-A. The personnel expertise to provide the necessary training and mentoring skills have been primarily provided by the U.S., but NATO and Coalition partner countries have also played a significant resource role.

The requirement for ANP training/mentoring personnel has increased with the ongoing and planned expansion of ANP training infrastructure and fielding of enabling organizations necessary to continue building the police forces. Within recent months, construction was completed on four of seven planned Regional Logistics Centers, and 17 new Provincial Supply Point (PSP) were in various stages of development. More construction of PSPs was planned for the coming fiscal year to provide depots in each of the 34 Provinces across Afghanistan.

Currently, there are 39 police training centers country-wide with a capacity to train 10,371 police students at one time. Approximately 640 Coalition trainers and mentors support the police training initiative. The goal for the near future is to double ANP capacity to train over 20,000 students simultaneously and to produce 134,000 trained police by October 2011.

NTM-A/CSTC-A has four ways to request/source additional required personnel:

1. Joint Manning Document (U.S. military process),
2. Request for Forces process (U.S. military process),
3. Crisis Establishment (CE) (NATO manpower document) , and
4. NATO Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR).



NTM-A/CSTC-A staff and institutional trainers and mentors have been sourced through the CE and CJSOR, and CSTC-A through the Joint Manning Document (JMD) and RFF. There is also an ability to get commitments for trainers outside of these formal processes, such as, bilateral agreements and non-NATO contributing sources.

There are four ANSF categories of additional trainers/mentors required by NTM-A/CSTC-A over the next 18 months to build the ANSF:

1. Police
2. Air Force
3. Medical, and
4. Army.

The mix and availability of specialized skills required complicates obtaining forces from Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs), which do not have them in abundance. In addition, NTM-A/CSTC-A needs personnel with the right experience to ensure these training and mentoring programs succeed.

The current gap in NTM-A/CSTC-A trainers was created by a shortfall in the personnel contributions of TCNs managed through the NATO Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR) process, exacerbated by the increasing requirement for institutional trainers. In October 2010, the command was short 573 CJSOR trainers<sup>6</sup> and projected a shortage of 920 CJSOR trainers by March 2012.<sup>7</sup>

This forecasted shortfall is based on several factors:

- The scheduled completion of training facilities now under construction/expansion,
- The opening of new ANP training institutions, such as NCO and staff officer colleges, the Armed Forces Medical Academy of Science, the Wardak ANCOP national training center facility, and,
- The building of logistics centers country-wide to support the ANP.

NTM-A/CSTC-A was pursuing all options to meet its training/mentoring personnel needs through the CJSOR process, as well as from non-NATO contributing nations, in order to achieve its goal of strengthening the quantity and quality of the ANSF. One avenue to mitigate the future training/mentoring shortfall being pursued was to obtain commitment from NATO countries to convert their combat forces being withdrawn into mentoring/training force pledges.

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<sup>6</sup> NTM-A/CSTC-A Command Update Brief, CJ1, slide 1, 2 Oct 10.

<sup>7</sup> "Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan – Report to Congress in accordance with sections of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181), as amended," November 2010, p. 20, Table 1.

## Recommendation

5. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia, in coordination with the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and Commander, International Security Assistance Force/U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, develop a Department of Defense/Department of State coordinated plan to revitalize the Combined Joint Statement of Requirements process to fill trainer/mentor gap crucial to sustain Afghan National Police force generation plans.

## Management Comments

This recommendation was originally written with the Commander, ISAF, as the office of primary responsibility. ISAF non-concurred, noting that they had exhausted all in-country/in-theater capability to address the shortfall of international trainers.

## Our Response

We redirected the recommendation to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia. This recommendation is similar to one made by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) in report GAO-11-66, “Afghan Army Growing, but Additional Trainers Needed; Long-term Cost Not Determined.” DOD concurred with the GAO recommendation. We ask that the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia respond to Recommendation 5, specific to the ANP, in this final report.

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## Observation 6. Ministry of Interior Inspector General Personnel Resources

The MoI Inspector General (IG) Directorate strength has not been adjusted to provide an oversight capability consistent with the responsibilities of the MoI and growth of the ANP.

This occurred because the increase in the number of authorized/assigned personnel at the MoI IG Directorate has not kept pace with the expanding number of personnel in the ANP. In addition, the MoI IG has been assigned new responsibility for subordinate MoI IGs at the regional headquarters.

As a result, the MoI IG Directorate has not been able to develop its capabilities in line with its overall mission function and responsibilities, most importantly fighting fraud, waste, abuse, and other types of corruption.

**Applicable Criteria** (See Appendix C, Number 9 and 12, for additional details.)

- Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan, “Campaign Plan for the Development of Afghan National Security Forces,” September 20, 2008.
- DOD Inspector General Report No. SPO-2009-007, “Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the Afghan National Security Forces,” September 30, 2009.

### Discussion

**IG Progress.** Over the last year, the MoI IG Directorate has made notable progress. Representatives from the Directorate served as a member of the Law Enforcement and Corruption Commission, which meets twice a week to discuss problems and priorities and includes members from the European Union Police, the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation. The MoI IG Directorate investigated approximately 2,400 cases, with more than 450 of them resulting in a fine or disciplinary action against police officers and government officials. Of the 2,400 plus cases, 64 of them came from the six Mobile Anti-Corruption Teams, which were stood-up in November 2009. Furthermore, government auditors at the AUP regional headquarters have been realigned under the IG Directorate to improve the independency of audits they perform. Reportedly, the MoI IG Directorate auditors and inspectors discovered \$86M in missing funds of which \$61M had been recovered. During our assessment in 2009, the MoI IG indicated he could not provide oversight to all 34 provinces. As of October 2010, the MoI IG reported that he had at least a limited capability in all provinces.

**Personnel Strength.** The MoI IG Directorate has grown from approximately 131 positions in September 2009 to approximately 225 positions on the current Tashkil in October 2010, with 131 on staff at MoI. The rest perform audits and investigations in the districts and provinces. Although the MoI IG Directorate’s strength has grown, it has not kept pace with the expanding ANP force and the prevalent levels of corruption. The MoI IG indicated he still required an additional 300 inspection/evaluation personnel. The SY 1389 *Tashkil* authorized 300 professional standards inspectors for nation-wide inspections, but they had not yet been filled. An Afghan MoI initiative to employ 300 former generals to conduct nation-wide inspections could provide reinforcements but not on a permanent basis.

The ANP has grown from 95,000 in October 2009 to 107,000 in July 2010 and is expected to be at 134,000 by October 2011. Although MoI IG Directorate manpower has grown significantly since October 2009, it still has not been adequately adjusted to provide an effective oversight capability consistent with the greater than anticipated expansion of the ANP.

**Mentors and Trainers.** In the DODIG September 2009 report addressing the Afghan National Security Forces, it was noted that CSTC-A then provided the MoI IG Directorate one full-time civilian mentor and a part-time O-5 (Lt. Colonel) from CSTC-A. The report recommended that the Commander, CSTC-A provide sufficient additional mentors to enable MoI IG Directorate to cope with its demands. The CSTC-A Commander concurred with this recommendation.

In August 2010, the MoI IG Directorate had seven mentors in place, including the NTM-A/CSTC-A IG, plus two civilians and four contractors.

## Recommendations

6. Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, coordinate with and assist the Ministry of Interior to:

- a. Conduct a manpower study of the Ministry of Interior Inspector General Directorate to determine the personnel necessary for the office to accomplish its mission.
- b. Include the results of the manpower study, as appropriate, in developing the Solar Year 1390 *Tashkil* for the Ministry of Interior Inspector General office.

## Management Comments

NTM-A/CSTC-A concurred with comments. NTM-A/CSTC-A does not have the capability to perform a manpower study at this time. The CJ7 and CJ1 are expecting additional personnel in the next few months that will provide this capability. NTM-A/CSTC-A requested OIG provide expert advice on proper size of the IG organization in ANSF. NTM-A/CSTC-A will provide manpower adjustment during the next CPR which will begin in April 2011.

## Our Response

OIG involvement as a subject matter expert for the manpower study would be inappropriate under the Quality Standards for Inspections and Evaluations. This direct involvement would impact the independence of our organization for follow-on assessments of the command in this area. We recommend that the command request assistance from CENTCOM, Joint Staff, or OSD Staff to work with the CJ1 and CJ7 when conducting the study or that expertise is obtained using existing advisor contracting vehicles. OIG requests a copy of the manpower analysis once it is completed for the NTM-A/CSTC-A staff.

## Observation 7. Ministry of Defense Advisor Program

Commander, NTM-A/CSTC-A requires additional DOD/OSD personnel resource support from the Ministry of Defense Advisors (MoDA) program to fortify the MoD and MoI institutional development mission.

NTM-A/CSTC-A lacks the required subject matter expertise to develop key Afghan security ministerial functions, which is a priority mission focus. The number and type of unique skills necessary to develop basic MoD and MoI functional capability has not been available, in general, from the U.S. military services. Neither has the expertise provided by contractor services been sufficient to build quickly enough MoD and MoI effectiveness in certain critical areas.

Without additional MoDA support, the command will be delayed in the capacity development of the MoD and MoI, which could jeopardize timely accomplishment of key COIN objectives.

***Applicable Criteria*** (See Appendix C, Number 11, 13, and 16, for additional details.)

- DOD Directive 1404.10, “DOD Civilian Expeditionary Workforce,” January 23, 2009.
- DOD Instruction 3000.05, “Stability Operations”, September 16, 2009.
- DOD Instruction 5000.68, “Security Force Assistance (SFA),” October 27, 2010.

### ***Discussion***

U.S. government expertise in the area of building the capacity of the MoD and MoI generally lies with civil service professionals on the staff of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. This has been fortified by NTM-A/CSTC-A with contractor services and military personnel who often do not possess the unique institution building skill sets required.

The Ministry of Defense Advisor (MoDA) program is specifically designed to forge long-term relationships that strengthen the defense or interior ministry of a host nation and partner state. This program matches senior U.S. Department of Defense civilians to mentor foreign counterparts in similar defense specialties.

In this way, the MoDA program helps partner countries, consistent with U.S. national security objectives, build core competencies that enable effective and accountable defense and interior ministries. The initial personnel support provided by the program to the NTM-A/CSTC-A command has been highly effective in supporting capacity building with respect to MoD and MoI. The extensive seven week pre-deployment training cycle provided volunteers in the MoDA program has reportedly enabled them to arrive with the necessary capability to adjust quickly and perform well the various ministerial mentor responsibilities assigned them, according to the Commander, NTM-A/CSTC-A.

MoDA advisor expertise includes:

- Defense Policy and Strategy,
- Force Planning and Resource Allocation,
- Personnel and Readiness Management,
- Civil-Military and Interagency Operations,

- Doctrine, Training and Education,
- Acquisition and Procurement, and
- Logistics and Infrastructure Management.

NTM-A/CSTC-A regards their MoDA subject matter experts as invaluable augmentation assets to be able to achieve more rapid and successful MoD and MoI capacity development. Based on their already demonstrated mentoring contributions, the command seeks to build upon this success by acquiring additional personnel, which do not count against the Authorized Force Management Level established by the Secretary of Defense for U.S. Forces in Afghanistan. CSTC-A CJ-3 is actively working coordination issues to request approximately 100 additional MoDA personnel to support key mentoring positions within the MoD and MoI. This request will require the approval of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations.

## Recommendation

7. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations, provide additional personnel to support the Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan's, request for a significant reinforcement of Ministry of Defense Advisor personnel.

## Management Comments

The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations concurred with the recommendation to provide additional MoDA Advisors to NTM-A/CSTC-A as needed. They have agreed to support the NTM-A/CSTC-A request for 100 advisors and are providing them on an expedited basis.

## Our Response

The comments from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Partnership and Stability Operations were responsive. No other additional comments are required.

## Observation 8. Afghan Uniformed Police and Afghan Border Police Armament

AUP in districts and precincts and ABP in border posts were reportedly unable to defend themselves against better armed and well-organized insurgents.

AUP and ABP commanders and their advisors indicated that their forces were generally unable to stand-up to insurgent firepower, delivered during well-planned and executed light infantry type assaults. Their *Tashkil*-authorized AK-47 rifles and 7.62 mm Kalashnikov PKM machine guns, and rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) often do not provide the necessary capability to match insurgent arms, which include heavier, long-range machine guns, more RPGs, and mortars.

As a result, the AUP and ABP are unable to adequately defend themselves when attacked. The ANP as a whole have been incurring three to four times the killed in action of the ANA, while some of their headquarters facilities and field positions have been overrun several times.

Knowing they are outgunned reinforces the tendency among both the AUP and ABP to remain in their station houses, fixed outposts, and border posts, rather than to proactively patrol their battle space, effectively ceding territory and influence to the enemy.

**Applicable Criteria** (See Appendix C, Number 4, 16, and 26, for additional details.)

- Army Field Manual 3-24, “Counterinsurgency,” December 2006.
- DOD Instruction 5000.68, “Security Force Assistance (SFA),” October 27, 2010.
- “Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan – Report to Congress in accordance with sections 1230 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181), as amended,” November 2010.

### Discussion

In the latter stages of the COIN clear, hold, and build strategy, once the security environment is stable, the AUP function as community police, or beat cops, and the *Tashkil*-authorized AK-47s weapon and light machine guns issued to them will be sufficient armament. Currently, however, the AUP in many districts operate in a fluid security environment in which they have to be prepared to defend themselves in the kinetic fight--sometimes in the latter part of the COIN strategies’ clear phase and definitely in the hold stage when they are the only security force left.

When they are attacked by insurgents, the AUP often cannot defend themselves, or the population they are supposed to protect. The ABP face a similar situation along the border, often operating in geographically isolated border posts, especially in the very difficult terrain in the northeast and east. For example, the ABP unit at Barg-e-Matal in RC-E, unable to be quickly reinforced because of distance and terrain, has been overrun several times, suffering significant casualties.

The ANP forces cannot rely on timely support from the ANA. The AUP may benefit from Army kandak (Afghan equivalent of a battalion) reinforcement in the initial hold phase of an operation in their districts, but the ANA will not remain for long, according to a number of reports. Based



on numerous reports and interviews, it appeared that ANA units do not generally commit themselves to defending fixed positions, preferring a more mobile operational role, and may not be committed to supporting the AUP long enough to secure a police district. Neither does the Army appear to be playing a significant role supporting ABP units.

AUP are authorized AK-47s as their personal weapon and are receiving training and qualification on it at basic training. A few RPG launchers are also authorized at the District and Precinct level, but, based on interviews and observations by the OIG team, there is a shortage of actual RPG rounds at those levels. ABP kandaks were similarly equipped. However, the enemy insurgents they have encountered have been more heavily armed with better quality AK-47s, robustly supplied rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), heavy machine guns, mortars, and other weapons. The insurgents also benefited from the advantage of executing well-designed and coordinated surprise attacks against fixed police positions and an inferior police force presence.

While plans have been made to provide a heavy weapons company to each ABP zone commander, it is not clear yet whether they will be able to quickly enough reinforce isolated ABP outposts under attack across the broad front of territory that an ABP zone encompasses.

While additional training and ammunition would prove useful, every AUP and ABP commander with whom we consulted believed that they required greater firepower and range to defend against insurgent attacks and be able to contribute to the defeat of the enemy.

## Recommendation

8. Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, in coordination with International Security Assistance Force Joint Command and the Ministry of Interior/Afghan National Police, determine if additional heavy weapons should be added to the *Tashkil* of the Afghan Uniformed Police, especially in Key Terrain Districts and Area of Interest districts, and to the Afghan Border Police along the borders.

## Management Comments

NTM-A/CSTC-A concurred with comments. NTM-A/CSTC-A and IJC have already begun developing this capability through material and organizational solutions in the command plan review process for fielding of heavy weapons companies in SY 1390. However, the core issue of this observation is joint ANA and ANP operations. The guidance already exists that directs ANSF joint operations and NTM-A/CSTC-A is working to refine and further develop joint doctrine. NTM-A/CSTC-A and IJC are conducting a complementary effort to hedge more joint cooperation by working with the fielded forces, as well as the ministerial and general staff leadership.

## Our Response

NTM-A/CSTC-A comments were responsive. We agree that the core issue revolves around ANA and ANP cooperation and joint operations. Please provide the OIG with existing

guidance/doctrine that covers joint ANA/ANP operations. When refined/additional joint ANA/ANP doctrine is developed, we request a copy of that documentation, as well.

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## Observation 9. Machine Gun and Rocket Propelled Grenade Training for Afghan Uniformed Police

AUP basic training does not include firing PKM<sup>8</sup> machine guns and RPG's, even though those weapons are in the *Tashkil* inventory at provincial, district and precinct police stations.

This results from several issues:

- Some AUP RTCs do not have ranges that can support RPGs or PKM live fire,
- There is no PKM or RPG ammunition available at the RTC to support live fire, and
- The *Tashkil* does not authorize those weapons at all districts and precincts.

As a result, the AUP in most provinces, districts, and precincts are not trained on these weapons, even though they are in the inventory at most AUP locations. The police may have to fire them for the first time while in a combat situation. As a consequence, AUP are unable to use effectively *Tashkil* authorized and provided weapons that would enable more effective defense against insurgent attacks.

**Criteria** (See Appendix C, Number 3, 4, 16, and 26, for additional details.)

- Army Field Manual 3-07.1, "Security Force Assistance," May 1, 2009.
- Army Field Manual 3-24, "Counterinsurgency," December 2006.
- DOD Instruction 5000.68, "Security Force Assistance (SFA)," October 27, 2010.
- "Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan – Report to Congress in accordance with sections 1230 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181), as amended," November 2010.

### Discussion

When asked about RPG and PKM live fire training, Afghan and U.S./ Coalition trainers at the RTCs cited the issues above as the reason this training was not conducted. The Afghan trainers often stated that the RPG and PKM live fire training was not provided until the new policeman arrived at his posting. However, AUP commanders in the field report that they have insufficient or no ammunition supplied their command or ranges available to support this training.

While it may not be appropriate to qualify all AUP on the RPG and PKM machine gun, it is imperative that AUP at least have the opportunity to conduct familiarization live fire training before they have to use the weapon in combat for the first time. This type of training becomes more critical the smaller the organization. Not only would live fire training on these weapons increase AUP confidence, proficiency, and defensive capability, but it would likely reduce casualties.

While several options could be developed for conduct of RPG and PKM live fire training for the AUP, the RTCs may offer the best solution, where it could be accomplished under a standardized program of instruction by qualified Afghan instructors. Follow-on training could be included at the district level as part of ongoing sustainment training for the AUP.

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<sup>8</sup> This is a Cyrillic acronym for a Russian-made Pulemyot Kalashnikova Machine Gun.

## Recommendation

9. Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, in coordination with the Ministry of Interior/Afghan National Police, develop a plan to provide familiarization training/firing on these weapons in basic training, especially for Afghan Uniformed Police in Key Terrain Districts and Area of Interest districts.

## Management Comments

NTM-A/CSTC-A concurred with comments. Incorporation of formal PKM training in the Basic course would require an extension to the overall training schedule, which is not possible at this time if AUP growth requirements in critical portions of the country are to be met. RPG familiarization to provide defensive capability represents more significant challenges with finding suitable sites and qualified instructors. There may be other familiarization tasks that can be incorporated into training POIs in the future without impacting cost and schedule, such as loading and unloading the weapons and safety manipulation.

## Our Response

NTM-A/CSTC-A comments were responsive. We understand that management agrees with this recommendation in principle, but, due to physical constraints, such as suitable range facilities and time limitations, are unable to comply in the near-term. Management has accepted the associated risks inherent in this course of action in order to meet higher priority, immediate goals for development of the ANP. No further comments are required.

## Observation 10. Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Training and Equipment

Afghan Police Commanders at the RTCs recommend more Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) training be included in the POI, and ANP Commanders in the field lacked C-IED equipment.

Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) produce the largest number of ANP casualties. The ANP primarily travel in Light Tactical Vehicles (LTVs—Ford Ranger pickup trucks) and do not have sufficient training and equipment to defend against the IED threat.

This degrades ANP operational effectiveness and morale in the field, reinforcing a tendency to maintain a defensive posture rather than patrolling their communities.

**Applicable Criteria** (See Appendix C, Number 4 and 16, for additional details.)

- Army Field Manual 3-24, “Counterinsurgency,” December 2006.
- DOD Instruction 5000.68, “Security Force Assistance (SFA),” October 27, 2010.

### Discussion

Basic police training currently provides 18 hours of training on the various types of mines and IEDs. This training consists of eight hours of classroom instruction and ten hours of practical exercises. ANP non-commissioned officers are provided an additional eleven hours of training on these subjects.

Afghan commanders at all three RTCs visited requested more anti-mine and C-IED training in the POI. In addition, RTC Commanders and ANP forces in the field requested more anti-mine and C-IED equipment and Up-Armored High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) (UAH) for better protection.

Due to the high ANP illiteracy rates, police personnel would probably benefit more from additional anti-mine or C-IED training that focuses on practical exercises and hands-on training rather than classroom instruction.

In addition, U.S. officers reported that ANP units did not have sufficient C-IED capability, which increases the risk of casualties. This is a *Tashkil* equipment issue for SY 1390 planning.

The Coalition is in the process of providing additional UAHs to augment/replace the ANP fleet Ford Ranger pickup trucks. The addition of the UAHs, along with additional anti-mine/C-IED training and equipment, should increase ANP effectiveness in protecting their personnel. Consequently, their morale and retention will improve, increasing retained experience to further C-IED capability.

## Recommendations

10.a. Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/ Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, in coordination with the Ministry of Interior, review Regional Training Command Programs of Instruction to ensure appropriate and sufficient counter-improvised explosive device training is provided to Afghan Uniformed Police during basic training.

10.b. Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/ Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, in coordination with International Security Assistance Force Joint Command and the Ministry of Interior, determine what Afghan National Police units would benefit from additional Counter-Improvised Explosive Device/Explosive Ordnance Disposal equipment, prioritize the requirement, and develop a procurement plan to provide the equipment.

## Management Comments

NTM-A/CSTC-A and IJC both concurred with the recommendations, noting that efforts are already underway to develop a staff cell under CJ7 to focus on C-IED force development, training and equipment. The C-IED cell will work in coordination with IJC to review and synchronize both training and equipment.

## Our Response

NTM-A/CSTC-A and IJC comments were responsive. When the CJ7 C-IED staff cell is operational, we ask for a copy of its organization chart and mission statement.

## Observation 11. Shortage of ANP Medical Personnel at the Regional Training Centers

RTCs do not have enough of their authorized medical personnel assigned and present for duty to support the medical needs of their trainees and staff.

This shortfall of medical personnel occurred because the MoI/ANP are not successful in recruiting sufficient medical personnel to meet the authorization, or because those hired will not deploy to the RTCs because of security concerns. This is especially true for high threat or remote areas.

Aside from the issue of combat casualties, many policemen and their families do not receive routine medical care. Policemen and police candidates who become sick or ill at the RTCs are often not treated for minor illnesses in a timely manner which could result in:

- Missing unnecessary days of work or training,
- Spreading communicable diseases or illnesses,
- Illness or injury becoming worse, which may require evacuation for long term care, and
- Lower morale.

**Applicable Criteria** (See Appendix C, Number 24, for additional details.)

- MoI Surgeon General, “ANP Medical Support Doctrine.”

### **Discussion**

“The failure to receive basic health care services reinforces the perception among many policemen that they are not appreciated and has a negative effect on morale.”<sup>9</sup>

The ANP is authorized 3,352 medical personnel, including 289 medical doctors, 230 nurses, and 2,833 medical technicians.

Specific medical authorizations for the RTCs are as listed below:

- Central RTC: 17 Doctors, 25 Nurses, 5 Medical Technicians,
- North RTC: 25 Doctors, 32 Nurses, 1 Medical Technician,
- East RTC: 9 Doctors, 27 Nurses, 1 Medical Technician,
- South RTC: 5 Doctors, 17 Nurses, 1 Medical Technician,
- Southwest RTC: 7 Doctors, 11 Nurses, 1 Medical Technician, and
- West RTC: 13 Doctors, 27 Nurses, 1 Medical Technician.

NTM-A/CSTC-A was unable to obtain reliable data from the MoI regarding the number of ANP medical personnel available and assigned country-wide.

According to NTM-A/CSTC-A’s Surgeon General Medical Mentor, the ANP medical mandate, as established by the ANP Surgeon General, is to ensure health care is provided to policemen and their families. However, the ANP medical system is incapable of doing this. The extent of

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<sup>9</sup> AUP zone commander interview on October 5, 2010.



ANP medical capability consists of the ANP hospital in Kabul and a small clinic with a surgeon in each region. Outside of Kabul, ANP medical support from the clinics is largely outpatient. ANA regional hospitals are authorized to treat ANP personnel, assuming accessibility. However, one AUP zone commander stated that the ANA hospital in his region is strictly used for ANA personnel and his police personnel are refused service.

The MoI/ANP are not able to recruit sufficient medical personnel to meet authorized strength, primarily because there are insufficient medical personnel in the society at large. Additionally, the vast majority of the medical personnel the MoI is able to hire are reluctant to leave the Kabul area for assignments in the regions and provinces due to safety, security and quality of life concerns. NTM-A/CSTC-A and MoI/ANP have recognized the need to rectify the shortage of medical personnel and have implemented a plan to this end which includes increasing enrollment and graduation from the ANSF medical schools and an increase in pay and benefits.

It is important to note that, theoretically, the policemen and police candidates at the RTCs can be sent to the local ANP clinics, if manned, and also use the Ministry of Public Health hospitals or nearby regional ANA 50 bed hospitals. Unfortunately, this is not the situation on-the-ground. The local Ministry of Public Health hospitals are not capable of providing timely medical care to the surrounding population and adding the care of police personnel was reportedly beyond their capabilities.

Although a Memorandum of Understanding for mutual support exists between the ANA and the ANP Surgeons General, it means little since it has not been signed by the ministers. Likewise, there is little evidence of ANA/ANP medical cooperation in the field. However, the former NTM-A/CSTC-A Surgeon General stated that the *Tashkil* authorizes a 0-6 grade ANP liaison officer for each zone commander to facilitate ANP personnel care at ANA regional hospitals. They were not evident in the regional commands visited. The former NTM-A/CSTC-A Surgeon General also noted that he had reviewed a recent ANA Surgeon General report to the MoD noting that ANA medical facilities had handled 11,000 cases “last week.” However, the ANA Surgeon General report only identified two as ANP cases.

## Recommendations

11. Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan:

a. Mentor the Minister of Interior to develop and execute a plan to recruit and ensure assignment of authorized medical personnel to the Regional Training Centers and to determine if an increase in the *Tashkil* authorization for Afghan medical personnel at the Regional Training Centers is appropriate.

b. Mentor the Minister of Interior and the Minister of Defense to develop and sign a Memorandum of Understanding/Agreement that will allow Afghan National Police personnel to be treated at Afghan National Army medical facilities.

## Management Comments

NTM-A/CSTC-A concurred. In conjunction with the MoI, they have recently stood up a recruiting cell to develop policy and address/improve the ANP medical recruiting process. Also,

a Memorandum of Understanding/Agreement to allow Afghan National Police to be treated at ANA medical facilities was recently signed by the MoD and MoI.

## **Our Response**

NTM-A/CSTC-A comments were responsive. NTM-A/CSTC-A provided a copy of the MOU/A signed by the MoD and MoI; no additional comments required.

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## **PART III – FORCE DEVELOPMENT**

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## Observation 12. Afghan National Army Support of the Afghan National Police

The ANP cannot rely on tactical assistance from the ANA in the “hold” phase of the COIN strategy.

This occurs because the role of the ANA in support of ANP COIN operations is not clearly defined in MoD and MoI doctrine, policy, and planning for COIN operations.

As the ANA returns to their Forward Operating Bases to await the next large-scale clearing operation, the enemy often infiltrates back into recently cleared areas to overrun lightly armed and unmanned ANP checkpoints, station houses, and patrols.

***Applicable Criteria*** (See Appendix C, Number 4 and 5, for additional details.)

- Army Field Manual 3-24, “Counterinsurgency,” December 2006.
- Army Field Manual 3-24.2, “Tactics in Counterinsurgency,” April 21, 2009.

### ***Discussion***

There is a fundamental lack of joint doctrine, policies, and procedures to integrate the efforts of the ANA with those of the ANP. One consequence is that ANP forces often cannot rely on timely support from the ANA. The AUP have benefited from ANA reinforcement in the initial hold phase of an operation in their districts, but ANA units do not generally commit themselves to support the AUP long enough to secure a police district or supporting ABP unit.

In various provinces and districts across Afghanistan, the police have experienced difficulty holding areas that have been cleared by Coalition and ANA forces. In RC-N and parts of RC-W, insurgent groups armed with RPGs and heavy machine guns have begun operating in areas that had historically been relatively secure. They have been able to establish new shadow governments in areas that were once cleared by Coalition and ANA units and have intimidated the population into supporting them.

The Provincial Reconstruction Team 15 and POMLT in Meymaneh in RC-N asserted that more support from the ANA would be required to successfully clear and hold the three provinces they cover where insurgent forces have established a strong presence including a shadow government. These groups have destroyed the ANPs LTVs (Ford Ranger pickup trucks) with relative ease and have heavier and more effective weapons. Therefore, the police have tended to stay in their more secure checkpoints and station houses for their safety, rarely conducting patrols in their communities.

The ANA is equipped with heavy machine guns and up-armored HMMWVs that make them more effective than the police in holding still contested areas, especially at night. If the ANA were partnered with ANP units, as Coalition military units are deployed with ANP in KTDs, their combined ANA-ANP capability would be able to better defend and hold contested terrain, thereby improving GIRoA’s ability to achieve stability and support establishing local governance and development.

As another example, the RC-N commander stated there have been reported instances of ANP checkpoints, in the immediate vicinity of ANA Forward Operating Bases, being attacked and

engaged in extended firefights resulting in their positions being overrun. But, the ANA would not leave their nearby Forward Operating Base to assist. In many instances these firefights occurred during the night.

There is generally no policy, doctrine, or Standard Operating Procedure that requires the ANA to assist the ANP with hold operations. Reportedly, ANA forces unilaterally decide when to withdraw their forces, preferring to remain at their Forward Operating Bases, until engaged in large-clearing clearing operations.

## Recommendations

12.a. Commander, International Security Assistance Force/U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, in coordination with International Security Assistance Force Joint Command and North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, mentor the Minister of Defense and Minister of Interior to develop and execute a joint strategy for unified and mutually supporting Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police counterinsurgency operations.

12.b. Commander, International Security Assistance Force/U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, in coordination with International Security Assistance Force Joint Command and North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, mentor the Minister of Defense and Minister of Interior in the development of doctrine, policy, and planning to support joint Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police operations.

## Management Comments

ISAF concurred. The MoD COIN policy is approved and supports unified ANA and ANP operations. ANSF has to do a better job to communicate, understand, coordinate, and implement this strategic policy. Both NTM-A/CSTC-A and IJC are working to assist ANSF to develop tactical level COIN doctrine and practices which are understood and followed by both ANA and ANP. The guidance exists for planning and support of joint ANA and ANP operations. However, a greater effort is required in promulgating these documents and developing further concepts of operations and tactical plans that support operations derived from national strategy.

## Our Response

NTM-A/CSTC-A comments were responsive. We request that ISAF send the OIG a copy of the tactical level COIN doctrine and practices supporting joint ANA/ANP operations when they are developed and published.

## Observation 13. Governance/Rule of Law in Key Terrain Districts

In many districts, to include KTDs, the AUP are not linked to a functioning RoL/justice system. District governors and justice system officials are not resident full-time, if at all. In such instances, the local police are effectively the only GIRoA presence which complicates their COIN mission.

As a consequence, the AUP in these districts were unable to provide security and support justice in the COIN campaign, which depends on implementation of an integrated strategy in which governance/RoL, economic development, as well as security measures, combine to gain the confidence and support of the people.

Consequently, insurgents have exploited this void in GIRoA governance, RoL, and policing by providing their own version of these services, strengthening their influence with the population.

***Applicable Criteria*** (See Appendix C, Numbers 4, 13, and 16, for additional details.)

- Army Field Manual 3-24, “Counterinsurgency,” December 2006.
- DOD Instruction 3000.05, “Stability Operations”, September 16, 2009.
- DOD Instruction 5000.68, “Security force Assistance (SFA),” October 27, 2010.

### ***Discussion***

In the execution of the “hold” and “build” phases of the COIN campaign in Afghanistan, the AUP have a key role to play at the district level as part of an integrated strategy in which the effects of security, governance/RoL, as well as economic development, serve to mutually reinforce gaining the trust and confidence of the populace in support of GIRoA.

The AUP depend upon a functional system of governance and justice in their districts to perform their policing duties. However, previous DODIG reporting found that, “The professional connection...between the ANP and the criminal justice system/RoL system was tenuous at best.”<sup>10</sup> This is especially problematic with respect to the inability of the police throughout the country to assist meeting the people’s need for prompt justice through either formal or informal legal measures. Polls and interviews with the Afghan people indicate that addressing crime and resolution of disputes are actually more important to them than fighting the Taliban.<sup>11</sup>

Yet, effective GIRoA governance and RoL did not exist in twenty-three KTD and AOI districts in RC-E, a high threat region which encompasses the border with Pakistan and extends to the Capitol Region. Consequently, the AUP were often the only government presence in these priority districts. This situation threatened accomplishment of a key goal of the COIN strategy—implementing an integrated strategy in which governance/RoL, economic development, and security measures combine to protect and gain the support of the population.

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<sup>10</sup> DODIG Report No. SPO-2009-007, “Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the Afghan National Security Forces,” September 30, 2009, pg 117.

<sup>11</sup> Royal United Services Institute for Defense and Security Studies (London) and the Foreign Policy Research Institute (Philadelphia) “Reforming the Afghan National Police.” RUSI 10 Sep 2009, pg 14.



There are a number of factors that could be contributing to lack of a government presence:

- Insufficient security, leading to assassinations/kidnappings of government personnel,
- A general shortage of qualified/non-corrupt civic administrators and RoL officials,
- Desire to live near/in a provincial population center, and
- Corruption, which enables government officials to buy their position of choice.
- Lack of a sustained commitment by the government to establish local governance/RoL.

Reportedly, another factor is that Ministry of Justice personnel receive insufficient compensation to incentivize them to reside in insecure districts where they could become an insurgent target. Qualified district prosecutors receive about \$86 per month, much less in Afghan economic terms than the \$165-245 per month paid to AUP personnel.

The AUP will not be able to stand alone in their districts without strong support from the central government and the Coalition to establish effective governance, especially RoL. Since it may take many years to build a formal justice system nation-wide that extends down to the district levels, it may be expedient, if not necessary to increase reliance on the traditional informal system of justice.

Afghans have traditionally relied primarily on an informal justice system based on Jirga and Shura traditional councils. Their decisions were not accepted as consistent with the Afghan Constitution and international legal standards, although they were generally perceived by the populace to be fair and prompt.

A recent Ministry of Justice draft special law will, if implemented, provide a legal basis for the informal traditional justice system in Afghanistan.<sup>12</sup> For the first time, legal sanction would be given to the decisions of tribal councils, which could fill the void created by the absence of the formal legal institution. This promises to strengthen the RoL most critically at the district and sub-district levels, and thereby support police execution of their responsibilities and be more responsive to the priority justice needs of the Afghan people.

The RC-E commander has made addressing the problem of weak or non-existent district governance a top priority and has committed his command to a “district centric” operational approach.

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<sup>12</sup> <http://www.pajhwok.com/en/2010/10/26/informal-justice-system-have-legal-cover-video>.

## Recommendations

13. Commander, International Security Assistance Force/U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, in coordination with the U.S. Chief of Mission:

- a. Support the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in identifying districts in which governance/Rule of Law representatives are not effectively present, especially in key terrain districts and area of interest districts.
- b. Support the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in the implementation of a strategy to address the lack of governance/Rule of Law in these districts.
- c. Support the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in reforming pay for prosecutors employed by the Ministry of Justice/Attorney General.
- d. Assist the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in engaging the informal traditional system of justice in support of local police development and counterinsurgency operational objectives.

## Management Comments

ISAF concurred with all four recommendations. The U.S. Embassy is the lead agency for pay reform for prosecutors and is currently heavily engaged with the Attorney General's office to enact pay reform. Also, NTM-A/CSTC-A supports the USG RoL Strategy for Afghanistan which has, as one pillar of support, support for traditional (vice tribal) judicial reform to support dispute resolution at the local level.

## Our Response

ISAF comments were responsive. We ask that ISAF, in coordination with the U.S. Embassy and GIRoA, provide a list of KTDs and AOIs that lack effective governance/RoL representatives, along with a plan to strengthen them; also provide an update on U.S. Embassy efforts to enact pay reform in the Attorney General's office.

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## Observation 14. Corruption in the Afghan Uniformed Police

Corruption is a significant impediment to ANP effectiveness and ability to gain trust at local governance levels where the police are often the face of the government.

A professional culture of accountability and responsibility has generally not yet taken hold among the AUP, which is still in an early stage of its development, and there are insufficient police leaders to set an appropriate example for more junior police to follow.

Corrupt AUP practices that exploit the people, rather than protect them, undermines the COIN strategy in affected areas and enable insurgents to expand their influence.

**Applicable Criteria** (See Appendix C, Number 4, 13, and 16, for additional details.)

- Army Field Manual 3-24, “Counterinsurgency,” December 2006.
- DOD Instruction 3000.05, “Stability Operations”, September 16, 2009.
- DOD Instruction 5000.68, “Security Force Assistance (SFA),” October 27, 2010.

### Discussion

“Marjah’s previous police force was so corrupt and abusive that residents warned the Marines prior to the invasion that “if you bring in the cops, we will fight you till death.”<sup>13</sup>

Afghanistan was ranked 179 of 180 countries surveyed in Transparency International’s Annual Corruption Index for 2009.<sup>14</sup>

Corruption has been identified by the Afghan people as a primary concern, one that significantly impacts their view of their government. Approximately 81 percent of Afghans stated that government corruption affected their daily lives.<sup>15</sup> Reportedly, according to polls, three times as many people today believe that corruption is a greater problem now than it was under the Taliban.<sup>16</sup>

GIRoA officials that have taken bribes reportedly included:<sup>17</sup>

- Police Officers ~25%
- Provincial Officers ~25%
- Judges ~18%
- Prosecutors ~14%

Police corruption is perceived and judged within the context of corrupt actions by other government representatives, and therefore addressing the issue of the impact of corruption on the

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<sup>13</sup> Jeffrey Dressler, “Marjah’s Lessons for Kandahar,” Institute for the Study of War, Jul 9, 2010 quoting C. J. Chivers, “With Marja largely won, Marines try to win trust,” *New York Times*, March 1, 2010

<sup>14</sup> I. Livingston, H. Messera and M. O’Hanlon. Brookings, Afghanistan Index, 29 Jun 2010, Fig. 2.15.

<sup>15</sup> “Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan – Report to Congress in accordance with sections of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181), as amended,” November 2010, p. 62.

<sup>16</sup> IJC Briefing, “Enemies of the People,” 1 October 2010. Slide 7.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid, Slide 7.

credibility of governance requires measures taken on a broader front than with just the police. The newly established Combined Joint Interagency Task Force (CJIATF) Shafafiyat seeks to plan and implement ISAF anti-corruption efforts, including a focus on ANSF as a function and the face of governance.

Nonetheless, addressing the problem at the local AUP police level is now more feasible with the deployment of U.S. and other Coalition military forces and civilian police advisors to priority COIN districts. Through their day-to-day mentoring and demonstration of how an effective security force performs, and by setting a high standard of professionalism, they have begun to raise the standard of AUP behavior with respect to the population. Progress in this regard is now monitored in the Commander's Unit Assessment Tool (CUAT) report issued every six weeks.

A related approach under IJC consideration is to work with local Afghan informal leaders and their organizational structures to support the anti-corruption initiative by using their own influence. Promoting local solutions to the problem of corruption, supported by the new Combined Joint Interagency Task Force on anti-corruption, could have a beneficial sustained impact.

In the past year, the MoI has removed a number of senior police officials from the national down to the provincial levels. While this is a very encouraging trend, the perspective in the field among Coalition mentors/trainers was that in too many cases the police officials involved were just moved to another position.

The reported extent of the corruption problem at the local police level of Afghan governance puts the government's very legitimacy at risk with the Afghan people. ISAF and its subordinate commands, NTM-A/CSTC-A and IJC, are working closely with the U.S. interagency and its international partners to reinforce government efforts to change the culture of corruption to one of accountability. This will take time but deserves a determined, sustained effort.

## Recommendations

14. Commander, International Security Assistance Force/U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, in coordination with the International Security Assistance Force Joint Command and North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan:

a. Ensure International Security Assistance Force organizations, including U.S. military units and their embedded civilian advisors, and Police Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams partnered with the Afghan Uniformed Police at provincial, district, and precinct levels, work with the informal Afghan leaders present in support of a coordinated anti-corruption initiative.

b. Commander, International Security Assistance Force/U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, in coordination with the International Security Assistance Force Joint Command, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, and the U.S. Embassy, implement a joint outreach strategy with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to mobilize support among local Afghan informal leadership--district and local councils, tribal and village elders, et al.--in support of anti-corruption objectives.

## **Management Comments**

ISAF concurred with Recommendations 14.a and 14.b.<sup>18</sup>

## **Our Response**

We ask that ISAF provide comments in response to the final report on how these recommendations will be implemented.

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<sup>18</sup> The management comments from ISAF, dated 16 January 2011, made no reference to recommendations 14.a and 14.b. When queried, the USFOR-A IG responded, noting that the Command concurred with recommendations 14.a and 14.b.

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## **Observation 15. Oversight Related to Afghan Security Forces Fund Contracting**

NTM-A/CSTC-A cannot accomplish its responsibility for “stewardship” of Afghan Security Force Fund (ASFF) resources because it lacks adequate specialized personnel resources to initiate, manage, and oversee a rapidly expanding contracting environment.

See Management Letter at Appendix E for a detailed discussion.

### **Recommendations**

15.a. Commander, International Security Assistance Force/U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, in coordination with North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, request an increase in authorized/assigned subject matter experts consistent with the expanding Afghan Security Force Fund-related oversight needs and responsibilities.

15.b. Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, take appropriate action to provide North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan the personnel required to execute its oversight mission. (This recommendation previously provided in the Management Letter at Appendix E.)

### **Management Comments**

ISAF concurred with Recommendation 15.a. noting that ISAF cannot provide oversight of ASFF investments without assignment of additional personnel to oversee contracts and affect other stewardship actions. A recent manpower study led to the requirement for increased personnel to manage/oversee ASFF contracting that is documented in the command’s JMD modification request and in RFF 1216.

Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, concurred with Recommendation 15.b, noting that the recommendation had facilitated the staffing of USCENTCOM RFF 1216, requesting 272 personnel to assist in oversight of ANSF force development tasks.

### **Our Response**

ISAF and the Vice Chairman comments were responsive. No further comments are required.



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## Observation 16. Afghan National Police Logistics System

The ANP logistical system is in a nascent state of development and lags operational needs. ANP operational commanders and their logistics personnel lack confidence in the supply process, which does not provide visibility of the status of their MoI 14 request in the supply chain. (A MoI Form 14 is the document used in the MoI logistics system to request supplies and equipment.)

Developing the ANP logistics system has only become a U.S. military command priority within the past year.

As a result, ANP forces are not motivated to trust and use the supply system, which has not adequately supported them with the supplies and equipment required to maintain operational readiness and performance, which affects and the willingness to perform their mission.

**Applicable Criteria** (See Appendix C, Number 7, 17, and 23, for additional details.)

- Center for Army Lessons Learned Handbook 10-08, “Partnership: Development of Logistics Capabilities,” November 2009.
- DOD 4140.1-R, “DOD Supply Chain Material Management Regulation,” May 23, 2003.
- MoI Logistics Management Directorate, “Process for the Management of Logistics,” January 6, 2009.

### **Discussion**

The relative ineffectiveness of the ANSF logistics system, to include the ANP system was noted by DODIG in the September 30, 2009 Report No. SPO-2009-007, “Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the Afghan National Security Forces.” CSTC-A advisors reported during that assessment that, because there was no transparency in ANSF supply distribution, each step in the requisition and distribution process was vulnerable to significant inefficiency, as well as outright blockage of supplies due to corruption from bribes or loss from pilferage.

Since that assessment, NTM-A/CSTC-A has made developing an ANP logistics capability a priority. Although progress has been made, there are many challenges yet to be addressed. Senior IJC officers commented during this assessment that the logistics system supporting the ANP was dysfunctional and must be fixed if the ANP were to endure over time as an effective national police force.

An updated MoI logistics policy was still in draft form and had not been fully instituted within the police force; the forward deployed regional and provincial supply depots were not yet established or at full operating capacity.

The cause of ANP commander’ distrust of the logistics system has been its lack of transparency. The process by which equipment and supplies are requested from MoI, which controls the supply depots, does not enable commanders to track the status of their MoI 14 supply requests.

To address this problem, the 1<sup>st</sup> Brigade, 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division’s Brigade Support Battalion (BSB) in RC-N formed a Logistics Military Training Team (LMTT) to train their ANP logistics

counterparts on how to track and reconcile all ANP supply and equipment requisitions using the MoI 14 process. When necessary, the BSB works through U.S. military/Coalition/ contract civilian counterparts at each level of the ANP logistics process to find and eliminate bottlenecks and enable ANP visibility over the supply system processes. The LMTT also advises U.S. Forces on ANP logistics procedures and coordinates with adjacent U.S./Coalition units tasked with logistics mentoring in order to unify efforts and gain visibility over supply processes and requests.

Expanding the LMTT concept would accelerate ANP logistical development, which significantly lags the immediate operational needs of ANP forces and could fall further behind as the ANP continues to grow. IJC was considering deploying BSB units from its Theater Sustainment Command to partner with ANSF units, including the ANP. This approach proved highly successful in Iraq in accelerating logistics capability of the Iraq Security Forces.

The LMTT experience also indicates that a process of monthly reconciliation of MoI 14 supply requests made by ANP operational commands would be beneficial. This could identify logistical bottlenecks and projected fill dates, and identify any disappearance/diversion of shipped equipment and supplies from their intended organization or purpose.

To further advance and improve MoI/ANP logistics development, NTM-A/CSTC-A has organized a joint working group with MoI/ANP that will meet regularly to identify and resolve issues.

## **Recommendations**

16.a. Commander, International Security Assistance Force Joint Command, utilize Theater Sustainment Brigades and Brigade Support Battalions to support logistical development of the Afghan National Police.

16.b. Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/ Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, in coordination with the International Security Assistance Force Joint Command and the Ministry of Interior, develop a process for a monthly joint Coalition Force/Afghan National Police reconciliation of Ministry of Interior Form 14 supply requests from operational Afghan National Police commands and districts, providing a status of each request and projected date of fill.

## **Management Comments**

ISAF concurred with Recommendation 16.a, noting that IJC would explore additional partnering by Sustainment Brigades deployed in theater as a means to support logistical systems in the Afghan National Police. Additionally, IJC will continue to explore areas to create logistic synergy between Army and Police.

NTM-A/CSTC-A concurred with Recommendation 16.b. The MoI Form 14 supply reconciliation will be conducted at the nearest RLC for all associated units in their area of

responsibility. NTM-A/CSTC-A has also created a centralized customer service help line and centralized tracking process that gives feedback to the RLCs.

## **Our Response**

ISAF comments to Recommendation 16.a were responsive. We request an update on IJC efforts to explore additional partnering by Sustainment Brigades deployed in theater as a means to support logistical systems in the Afghan National Police. NTM-A/CSTC-A comments to Recommendation 16.b were responsive. No further comments are required.

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## Observation 17. Civilian Personnel Shortages at Afghan National Police Regional Logistics Centers

Regional Logistics Centers (RLCs) are having difficulty filling their authorized civilian positions in RC-E and RC-S, which could prevent them from reaching Full Operating Capability and performing their important ANP supply mission.

Based on the observations of the OIG team and reports from CF mentors/trainers, uniformed and civilian police personnel authorized in the *Tashkil* for the RC-E and RC-S RLCs have not been recruited or assigned in sufficient numbers.

This has occurred because:

- Qualified local personnel are afraid to work for GIRoA or with the Coalition because of insurgent intimidation,
- There are not enough qualified people in the local population, and
- Pay is insufficient to attract qualified people.

As a result, the RLCs in RC-E and RC-S were depending on Coalition mentors and trainers to perform this MoI supply facility mission, and the RLCs were not on track to be fully operational with ANP personnel in the lead by the target dates established.

**Applicable Criteria** (See Appendix C, Number 26, for additional details.)

- “Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan – Report to Congress in accordance with sections of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181), as amended,” November 2010.

### Discussion

**Mol Regional Logistics Centers.** NTM-A/CSTC-A has been building seven RLCs, regional supply hubs for the MoI and the ANP. The RC-E and RC-S RLCs were scheduled to be fully operational by January 1, 2011. RLCs are the equivalent of forward supply depots for the ANA. Other than initial issue gear provided to ANP recruits who have completed their basic training, all follow on equipment will be supplied by the RLCs or from Provincial Supply Points (PSPs).

The RLC in RC-E at Gardez and the RLC in RC-S in Kandahar are at initial operational capability. However, they are dependent on Coalition mentors and trainers to manage the respective facilities. In Gardez, the RC-E RLC is authorized 86 government civilians and 51 ANP personnel, but only had three civilians and 30 ANP working to support operations. The 505<sup>th</sup> Zone Commander was using several of the ANP assigned for his personal security detachment. The RLC in RC-S at Kandahar is authorized 90 civilians and 47 ANP personnel, but only had 10 civilians and 10 ANP personnel working at the facility.

**NTM-A/CSTC-A Plans.** Personnel at NTM-A/CSTC-A stated they were aware of the deficiency of civilian personnel at the RLCs in the East and in South. They were also aware that those RLCs would probably not reach fully operational capability by the end of the year. An

NTM-A/CSTC-A contract was being developed to hire contract personnel to bridge the shortfall of MoI civilian employees/ANP.

## **Recommendation**

17. Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, in coordination with the Ministry of Interior, determine if salary adjustment incentives or other personnel hiring measures, such as contracting, must be implemented to provide the necessary Afghan workforce at Regional Logistics Centers/ Provincial Supply Points.

## **Management Comments**

NTM-A/CSTC-A concurred. NTM-A/CSTC-A has developed two courses of action to address RLC civilian manpower shortages. The first course of action is using the CPR process to convert the GIRoA civilian positions back to AUP; and later, after civil service reform makes civilian hiring more feasible, revert the positions back to GIRoA civilians. The second course of action is to contract out the positions in the interim and then later convert the positions back to GIRoA civilians.

## **Our Response**

NTM-A/CSTC-A comments were responsive. Please provide an update memorandum to OIG describing the course of action to implement the decision made.

## Observation 18. Regional Logistics Centers/Provincial Supply Points

RLC authority, roles, and responsibilities, and by inference those of the PSPs, are not clearly understood by ANP senior commanders at operational levels or, in some cases, their U.S./Coalition counterpart mentors.

Senior ANP commanders misunderstood their authority with respect to RLCs, believing that the RLC was their subordinate organization since it was located in their battle space, rather than under direct MoI authority. Their U.S. military mentors were not able to advise their counterparts because the command and control relationships were not clear to them either.

This resulted from lack of guidance/orders/procedures from MoI, NTM-A/CSTC-A, and IJC clearly establishing the RLCs and Provincial Supply Points (PSPs) as national assets controlled and operated by the MoI, not under the authority/purview of the ranking ANP commander in the area of the RLC's physical location.

Lacking such guidance, there have been instances in which ANP senior commanders, on their own volition, have redirected issue of vehicles, weapons, and other supplies from the RLCs to police organizations other than those intended or demanded issue of supplies without documentation of the transfer with a MoI 14. This included the diversion of a recently constructed weapons maintenance facility for use as private quarters. This is disruptive to functioning of the supply system and field operations, and contrary to MoI regulations.

***Applicable Criteria*** (See Appendix C, Number 7 and 23, for additional details.)

- Center for Army Lessons Learned Handbook 10-08, "Partnership: Development of Logistics Capabilities," November 2009.
- MoI Logistics Management Directorate, "Process for the Management of Logistics," January 6, 2009.

### ***Discussion***

At the RLC in RC-S, the RLC commander was reporting the status of shipments and authorized stockage levels to the ANP regional commander, as opposed to the Chief of Logistics at MoI. The team observed that the Afghan RLC commander did not understand that he worked for the Chief of Logistics at MoI, not the senior ANP commander in the region. At this same RLC, the senior ANP commander had redirected weapons bound for ANCOP kandaks (Afghan equivalent of a battalion) to his AUP units. The RLC commander allowed this to happen in deference to the ANP senior commander, who was a General, and consistent with the belief of the ANP commander that he owned the RLC and everything in it because it was in his battle space.

U.S./Coalition mentors did not know whether they had the authority to interfere. The DODIG team could not locate any NTM-A/CSTC-A guidance to their mentors/trainers specific to issues such as this. The U.S. deputy commander in RC-N noted the same problem with both ANP and ANA units in his area. "Supplies are going to the wrong guy" because the ANP battle space owner also believed that "it is in my battle space, so I own it and will decide what to do with it." The impact is that NTM-A/CSTC-A and MoI fielding of equipment and supplies, and their



resupply plans, are being disrupted. Furthermore, these unpredictable supply procedures interfere with IJC and MoI operational plans.

## Recommendations

18.a. Commander, International Security Assistance Force Joint Command, in coordination with North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/ Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, ensure U.S. and other Coalition Force mentors understand the presence, capability, and role of Regional Logistics Centers/Provincial Supply Points, and clarify with the mentors/trainers the Ministry of Interior procedures for police units to submit Ministry of Interior Form 14 supply requests to Regional Logistics Centers/Provincial Supply Points, and the approval and issuance process.

18.b. Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/ Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, in coordination with the Ministry of Interior, assist in development of Ministry of Interior guidance/orders/procedures for Afghan National Police forces (Afghan Uniformed Police, Afghan Border Police, Afghan National Civil Order Police) that clarify/define the role and responsibilities of the Regional Logistics Centers/Provincial Supply Points vis-à-vis the Afghan National Police, and the Ministry of Interior procedures for requesting supplies from Regional Logistics Centers/Provincial Supply Points.

## Management Comments

ISAF concurred with Recommendation 18.a. NTM-A/CSTC-A has initiated three complementary efforts to meet the intent of the recommendation: 1) hosting a monthly training meeting with all RLC and PSP advisors to synchronize training efforts, to include MTTs and contractors, 2) the first RLC/PSP Commander and Advisor Conference was held in December 2010 to educate on logistic policies, and 3) stood up a new Office of Professional Development to manage training of Afghan logisticians.

NTM-A/CSTC-A concurred with Recommendation 18.b. The existing MoI guidance for logistics management is under revision to add content. Transportation and munitions initial policy concept papers have been prepared and are awaiting approval.

## Our Response

ISAF comments to Recommendation 18.a were partially responsive. While efforts are on-track to educate/inform the logistics trainers/mentors controlled by NTM-A/CSTC-A about the roles/functions of the RLCs/PSPs, we request further details from IJC regarding plans to educate/inform the trainers/mentors/Brigade Combat teams under IJC control about locations/roles/functions of the RLCs/PSPs so they can more effectively perform their respective missions.

NTM-A/CSTC-A comments were responsive to Recommendation 18.b. We request that NTM-A/CSTC-A provide copies of updated MoI logistics policy guidance, once it is approved and published.

## Observation 19. Stockage Levels at Regional Logistics Centers

NTM-A/CSTC-A and MoI have not established planning factors and goals with respect to the RLC/PSP supply distribution system, to include establishing stockage level objectives.

This resulted from the expeditious fielding of the regional and provincial supply depots and a lack of planning within MoI and mentoring by NTM-A/CSTC-A.

This has caused confusion at the RLCs in RC-N, RC-E, and RC-S. Neither the ANP personnel nor the Coalition mentor/trainers at the RLCs had clear understanding of command and control responsibilities for their operations. Neither did they know what supplies were inbound or what stock levels they were supposed to receive and maintain.

This lack of transparency and clarity has impeded the development of a sustainable ANP logistics system and could also result in diversion of equipment and supplies or theft.

**Applicable Criteria** (See Appendix C, Number 7, 23, and 26, for additional details.)

- Center for Army Lessons Learned Handbook 10-08, “Partnership: Development of Logistics Capabilities,” November 2009.
- MoI Logistics Management Directorate, “Process for the Management of Logistics,” January 6, 2009.

### Discussion

The ANP logistics system is immature and two of the five planned RLCs are new. Currently, only the Helmand Province PSP is fully operational. Of the three RLCs visited, none had written guidance explaining their command and control responsibilities. In one instance, the RLC commander did not know that he was supposed to report to MoI Director of Logistics, not the regional police commander.

None of the RLC personnel knew their stockage level objectives.



Figure 4. Regional Logistics Center Stocked with Construction Supplies

The MoI logistics policy, “Process for the Management of Logistics,” January 6, 2009, states what criteria are used to develop a MoI Authorized Stockage List/stock level. If the Authorized

Stockage Lists for the RLCs exist, they need to be published and sent to both ANP and Coalition personnel mentoring each RLC/PSP.

Personnel at each RLC/PSP needs to know what equipment and supplies they are supposed to stock, what levels of stock they are expected to maintain, and when these supplies and equipment will be delivered. They can then complete warehousing plans, establish re-order points, and also tell their supported units what supplies and equipment the RLC will be able to provide and when.

## Recommendations

19. Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/ Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, assist the Ministry of Interior to:

a. Develop and issue command and control guidance for each Regional Logistics Center/Provincial Supply Point commander and Afghan National Police operational commanders in which these depots reside.

b. Prepare and issue authorized stockage levels for each of the Regional Logistics Centers/Provincial Supply Points.

## Management Comments

NTM-A/CSTC-A concurred. The MoI recently signed a Decree directing that RLCs and PSPs be removed from under Regional Headquarters Commanders and will now fall under the Deputy Minister for Administration and Support in the MoI. With the national logistics system under the direct command and control of the Support Command Commander, the Chief of Logistics will have unified control of national logistics. Also, Class VIII medical logistics policy is currently in draft. The approved policy will standardize Class VIII processes for RLCs and PSPs.

NTM-A/CSTC-A has already developed an Authorized Stockage List for each RLC and PSP and this is currently in operation.

## Our Response

NTM-A/CSTC-A comments were responsive. We request that NTM-A/CSTC-A provide a copy of the recently signed Decree directing that RLCs and PSPs be removed from under Regional Headquarters Commanders and will now fall under the Deputy Minister for Administration and Support in the MoI, as well as a copy of the MoI Class VIII medical logistics policy to OIG, once the policy is approved.

## **Observation 20. Equipment/Supplies Shipped to Regional Logistics Centers/Provincial Supply Points**

ANP equipment and supplies have been shipped to RLC/PSP logistics depots without prior coordination and have arrived without the required MoI Form 9 documentation attached to the shipping container/connex identifying its contents. (A MoI Form 9 provides an inventory, by type and quantity, of equipment/supplies in a shipping container/connex.)

This has occurred because the MoI has not enforced established procedures for communicating shipment information or providing documentation of equipment and supplies in transport.

Without shipment data, the depots cannot prepare for what supplies will be arriving when, preventing effective management of their resources.

Furthermore, for lack of an attached inventory list, personnel at the RLC/PSP have had to open the container and conduct a complete inventory. Even then, RLC/PSP personnel have been unable to determine if theft or diversion has occurred, as they were unsure of what types/quantities of supplies or equipment were supposed to be in the shipment.

***Applicable Criteria*** (See Appendix C, Number 7, 17, and 23, for additional details.)

- Center for Army Lessons Learned Handbook 10-08, “Partnership: Development of Logistics Capabilities,” November 2009.
- DOD 4140.1-R, “DOD Supply Chain Material Management Regulation,” May 23, 2003.
- MoI Logistics Management Directorate, “Process for the Management of Logistics,” January 6, 2009.

### ***Discussion***

Connex containers filled with various equipment and supplies are arriving unexpectedly at the RLCs. Moreover, there are instances in which no MoI Form 9 is attached to or inside the connex specifying the contents and quantity.

The MoI Logistics Policy is clear on the requirement for using MoI Form 9s. A Form 9 is a Materiel Issue Order that authorizes and accompanies equipment issued. It performs the following functions:

- Establishes what equipment/supplies are being issued,
- Documents receipt of equipment, by type and quantity, from stock record accounts, and
- Provides a basis to verify serial numbers during the receiving inventory.

This issue has been a problem during the recent emphasis on moving supplies and equipment from ANP warehouses/depots in Kabul to the newly established RLCs/PSPs. The RLC/PSP personnel often do not know that a shipment is inbound until it arrives and are unprepared to receive the shipment. The shipment often does not have the appropriate documentation (MoI Form 9) available to determine the type and quantity of equipment and supplies in the shipment. Without documentation, RLC/PSP personnel have to open up the container to conduct a detailed

inventory. Even then, it is difficult to determine if any part of the shipment has been diverted or stolen during transport since there is no record of what was supposed to be in the container.

## Recommendations

20. Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, assist the Ministry of Interior to:

- a. Develop a system to ensure that Afghan National Police/Coalition personnel at the Regional Logistics Centers/Provincial Supply Points know what type and quantity of equipment and supplies are in-bound, and when.
- b. Ensure compliance with current policy/procedure to maintain proper documentation with each shipment.

## Management Comments

NTM-A/CSTC-A concurred. A system to let RLC/PSPs know what type and quantity of equipment and supplies are in-bound and when they will arrived has been developed and fielded. The ANP Distribution Tracker capable of listing and tracking shipments from the MoI Material Management Center. This tracker is distributed to each RLC/PSP weekly via email. Several initiatives have been implemented to insure that Form 9s are received and signed at the destination, to include driver copies and container package documentation. There are future initiatives to use the internet to send and sign Form 9s, pending IT infrastructure.

## Our Response

NTM-A/CSTC-A comments were responsive. No further comments are required. We will follow-up to assess the effectiveness of this system during future ANSF assessments.

## **PART IV – FORCE SUSTAINMENT**

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## Observation 21. Plan to Develop Afghan National Police Logistics Capability

ISAF does not have an integrated plan to ensure unity and success in their efforts to address the challenge of building ANP logistics capability consistent with ANP operational support needs.

This occurred because the IJC is a relatively new command, tasked with developing fielded ANP organizations and executing the operational aspects of the COIN strategy, respectively. Since their stand-up, the commitment to establish an ANP organic logistics sustainment capability has been made a priority, for which IJC and NTM-A/CSTC-A share responsibilities.

Without an integrated plan to build ANP logistical capability, it has been difficult to coordinate the efforts of the respective commands and define where their roles end, intersect, or overlap.

Current efforts do not reflect sufficient unity of effort, as a result of which ISAF resources are not effectively leveraged to accomplish the mission, and gaps in coordination and execution occur. Mentors at all levels of the NTM-A/CSTC-A and IJC are not sufficiently synchronized in their various efforts to build ANP logistical capability.

***Applicable Criteria*** (See Appendix C, Numbers 4, 7, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, and 22, for additional details.)

- Army Field Manual 3-24, “Counterinsurgency,” December 2006.
- Center for Army Lessons Learned Handbook 10-08, “Partnership: Development of Logistics Capabilities,” November 2009.
- DOD Instruction 5000.68, “Security Force Assistance (SFA),” October 27, 2010.
- DOD 4140.1-R, “DOD Supply Chain Material Management Regulation,” May 23, 2003.
- IJC Operation Order OMID 1390 001-2010, “ISAF Joint Command Operations in Afghanistan” – Annex G, Appendix 2 (Classified).
- Joint Publication 3-07.1, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense,” 30 April 2004.
- MoI Affairs, Department of Strategy, “Police Plan for SY 1389,” March 2010—priority 4.
- MoI Afghan National Police Strategy, March 2010.

### ***Discussion***

While IJC and NTM-A/CSTC-A each have responsibilities for development of the ANP logistics sustainment capability and have published orders and documents to that effect, ISAF has not developed a plan to ensure that the efforts of both commands to develop a sustainable ANP logistics capability are fully coordinated and integrated. Without such a plan, there is no way to ensure that unity of effort is achieved in the use of ISAF resources and that they are leveraged effectively.

U.S. Army doctrine in FM 3-24 requires a thorough mission analysis of logistical requirements to determine the scope of effort for logistics operations and support. The ANP Plan of 2010 recognizes a requirement for coordination and interoperability with both the ANA and Coalition



organizations for logistical sustainment. IJC and NTM-A/CSTC-A are each working to accomplish this, yet their actions are not yet fully integrated and coordinated with each other or with MoI/ANP via a published ISAF ANP logistics development plan. This occurred because IJC is a relatively new command, only recently gaining responsibility for development of the fielded ANP forces. Furthermore, initial emphasis was on developing the operational capability of the ANP. ANP logistics development has only recently become a priority for NTM-A/CSTC-A and IJC as fielding plans proceeded to the point where enabling organizations and issues could be addressed.

It was not unusual to find U.S./Coalition logistical mentor/trainers from both IJC and NTM-A/CSTC-A mentoring the same ANP commander and staff, especially at national headquarters levels and at MoI in Kabul. ISAF, ICW IJC and NTM-A/CSTC-A, has not published any guidance, which would flow from having a logistics plan, regarding how mentors/trainers are to jointly coordinate and develop ANP logistics capability from the MoI level out through the logistics infrastructure in the fielded ANP organizations.

## **Recommendations**

21. Commander, International Security Assistance Force/U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, in coordination with the International Security Assistance Force Joint Command, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, and the Ministry of Interior:

- a. Develop and publish an integrated plan to develop the logistics capability of the Afghan Uniformed Police forces at the region/province/district, the Afghan Border Police at zone/brigade/kandak, and the Afghan National Civil Order Police at brigade/kandak.
- b. Issue guidance to Coalition logistics mentors/trainers as to how the plan should be implemented.

## **Management Comments**

ISAF concurred. ISAF recently requested, and the Joint Staff approved, deployment of a team to assess the ANP strategy and assist in the development of a comprehensive three year plan, in coordination with the MoI. This effort will include implementation direction.

## **Our Response**

ISAF comments were responsive. We request that ISAF provide a copy of the three year plan to OIG once it is developed and approved, along with a copy of the implementation directives.

## **Observation 22. Oversight of U.S. Supplied Equipment**

ISAF, including IJC and NTM-A/CSTC-A, does not have a reliable system to ensure oversight of U.S.-supplied equipment and supplies, including weapons.

This occurred primarily because the MoI does not have a viable property accountability system established across the ANP. ISAF oversight of this system has been insufficient to know whether it is achieving its purpose or not. Additionally, the mentoring/training of ANP counterparts at all levels of the logistical system on effective accountability and control measures has been insufficient. Moreover, NTM-A/CSTC-A and IJC only have mentors/trainers embedded/partnered with 97 of the 365 ANP police districts who can assist/teach/enforce property accountability.

This has resulted in a loss of visibility over a significant number of U.S. supplied weapons, vehicles, and other supplies and equipment. Lack of an effective oversight system could also lead to unnecessary loss and corruption, reduced operational readiness, and undermines the integrity and capability of the ANP logistical system.

***Applicable Criteria*** (See Appendix C, Number 7, 10, 14, 15, 17, 18, 23, 27, and 28, for additional details.)

- Center for Army Lessons Learned Handbook 10-08, “Partnership: Development of Logistics Capabilities,” November 2009.
- CSTC-Fragmentary Order 09-043, DTG 081403ZMAR 09, SUBJ: Verification of Monthly Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) Compliance With 100 Percent Weapons Serial Number Inventory.
- DOD Instruction 4140.66, “Registration and Monitoring of Defense Articles,” October 15, 2009.
- DOD Instruction 5000.64, “Accountability and Management of DoD-Owned Equipment and Other Accountable Property,” November 2, 2006.
- DOD 4140.1-R, “DOD Supply Chain Material Management Regulation,” May 23, 2003.
- IJC Operation Order OMID 1390 001-2010, “ISAF Joint Command Operations in Afghanistan – Annex R-Logistics; Appendix 1-Summary of Logistics Sustainment.
- MoI Logistics Management Directorate, “Process for the Management of Logistics,” January 6, 2009.
- Title 22 U.S.C. § 2403: U.S. Code--Section 2403: Definitions. Defines "defense article" in subsection (d) (3).
- Title 40 U.S.C., section 524, requires accountability and control over U.S. Government property.

### ***Discussion***

IJC and NTM-A/CSTC-A have not developed an integrated system that provides for oversight and accountability across the institutional and operational spectrum of the ANP with respect to U.S./Coalition provided equipment, to include weapons.

Accountability and control requirements for distribution of U.S. provided material to Afghanistan encompasses multiple levels of the Coalition and MoI supply chain, including in-country distribution to the national level ANSF supply system and final distribution and issue to the Afghan army and police end users.

Annex R-Logistics, of Commander, IJC operations order OMID 1390 001-2010, states the end-state is “ANSF performing all material and logistical needs on their own....” and tasks ANSF to “improve the accountability of their assets and supplies.” Appendix 1-Summary of Logistics Sustainment states, “ANSF equipment fielding will be closely coordinated with IJC and CSTC-A”.

The MoI Logistics Management Directorate, “Policy for the Management of Logistics,” signed 6 January 2009, includes the following key accountability statements:

- All leaders and commanders will develop procedures and check sheets that provide visibility and accountability of resources within their unit or organization,
- All materiel, except real property, will be classified for accounting purposes as equipment or supplies--equipment will require formal property book accounting at the user level,
- Equipment and materiel must be inventoried at least annually,
- Inventories must be reconciled with property records and discrepancies resolved,
- Asset visibility is established through the use of stock records and property books,
- In addition to unit and activity property books, logistics managers will establish Stock Record Accounts for property in storage at warehouses and supply points awaiting issue to organizations/units and staff departments,
- Equipment and supplies in storage awaiting issue to supported units or turn-in to higher level supporting units will be completely inventoried quarterly, and
- At the user level, all on hand materiel carried on property book records and/or hand receipt records will be inventoried quarterly, or upon change of primary hand receipt holder.

In addition, the MoI “Policy for the Management of Logistics,” dated 6 January 2009, requires a monthly serial number inventory of ANP weapons and reconciliation with property books. CSTC-A issued FRAGO 09-043, DTG 081403ZMAR 09, SUBJ: “Verification of Monthly Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) Compliance With 100 Percent Weapons Serial Number Inventory,” issued in parallel with the MoI decree, directed CJTF Phoenix (an organization now deactivated) mentors/trainers to verify that the 100 percent serial number inventory of weapons was completed by their ANSF counterparts and to then ensure that they conduct a separate monthly 10 percent inventory of ANSF weapons thereafter.

However, NTM-A/CSTC-A and IJC only have enough trainers to partner with approximately one third of the 365 police districts and associated zones/regions/provinces, complicating the equipment accountability issue. Furthermore, disregard of accountability and control procedures by senior ANP commanders/police chiefs and lack of sustained MoI enforcement of these procedures has led to loss/theft/diversion of U.S.-supplied material and equipment.

NTM-A/CSTC-A has a spread sheet that identified all of the weapons and equipment issued to the ANP in Kandahar Province. However, this documented only type and quantity of weapons

and equipment issued and did not identify who on the part of the ANP received/signed for the weapons and equipment. The Command understood that further adjustments were necessary in order to provide effective oversight of U.S-supplied material and equipment.

NTM-A/CSTC-A, with IJC assistance, has recently conducted inventories of ANP equipment in RC-S and was working with MoI to establish a new inventory baseline, documented in property books.

In addition, this effort is being broadened to establish baseline accountability for all U.S.-procured equipment transferred to the ANP. Based on previous OIG/SPO visits and reporting, the OIG team noted recent significant progress by NTM-A/CSTC-A and MoI at 22 Bunkers, the ANP national weapons and ammunition depot. The Afghan-ran system at 22 Bunkers provides an example of effective national level accountability and control procedures for issuance of weapons to the ANP, stored in regularly cross-checked automated property books, documented by serial number and tracked down to province level.

## Recommendations

22. Commander, International Security Assistance Force/U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, in coordination with the International Security Assistance Force Joint Command, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, and the Ministry of Interior:

a. Develop a plan for a 100 percent joint U.S./Afghan inventory of U.S.-procured equipment issued to the Afghan National Police in order to establish baseline accountability documented in U.S. and Afghan property books.

b. Develop and implement a plan to ensure that Coalition Force and the Ministry of Interior/Afghan National Police have visibility over the transfer of equipment and weapons down the supply chain; establish a clear chain of custody and accountability--by serial number, especially in the case of sensitive items such as weapons.

c. Re-issue as an International Security Assistance Force FRAGO the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan FRAGO 09-043 requiring mentors/trainers to conduct monthly 10 percent inventories of Afghan National Police weapons.

22. Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan:

d. Mentor/support the Ministry of Interior to organize and deploy survey teams to districts where Coalition Force partners are not established to conduct a baseline inventory of U.S.-provided equipment, especially weapons, and ensure property book accountability is maintained on an ongoing basis.

e. Mentor the Minister of the Interior to reissue and enforce previous instructions to the Afghan National Police requiring 100 percent monthly inventories of weapons by serial number and quarterly inventories of sensitive and pilferable items, such as vehicles, radios, generators, rations, and clothing.

## Management Comments

ISAF concurred with Recommendations 22.a, b, and c. ISAF is working with IJC and NTM-A/CSTC-A on several inventory efforts with the Ministry of Interior, which are focused on achieving baseline accountability through documented U.S. and Afghan property books. The ability to have complete and full visibility over the transfer of equipment and weapons down the supply chain and establish clear chain of custody and accountability by serial number is at risk. This is due to key logistics billets not being filled with correct skill-sets, as stated in our personnel requirements and authorization documents.

NTM-A/CSTC-A concurred with comments to Recommendations 22.d, and e. NTM-A/CSTC-A lacks adequate resources to implement this recommendation with the biggest challenge being lack of connectivity and automation tools to quickly reconcile property books. Automation is currently being addressed, to include MoI network connectivity to the RLCs and PSPs. Additionally, the MoI Logistics Advisor Team has developed a new Logistics Readiness Tool (LRT) that is to be fielded in the next 45 days to automate all move, shoot, and communicate asset inventory and status reporting. The Logistics Advisor Teams will reinforce the 100 percent monthly inventory policy in conjunction with IJC partners to ANP units.

## Our Response

ISAF and NTM-A/CSTC-A comments were responsive. OIG recognizes the shortages in personnel resources/skill sets and has partially addressed this issue with Observation/Recommendation 5 of this report. We request that ISAF provide a status update in six months on efforts to establish a baseline accountability of equipment supplied to the ANP by the U.S, per Recommendations 22.1 and 22b. We also request that ISAF provide a copy of the FRAGO discussed in Recommendation 22.c. We also request a six-month update by NTM-A/CSTC-A on the status/effectiveness of the new Logistics Readiness Tool, as well as the status of MoI survey teams discussed in recommendation 22.d, and a copy of the reissued MoI guidance discussed in Recommendation 22.e.

## **Observation 23. Afghan Uniformed Police Present for Duty Strength in Regional Command-East**

The AUP present for duty strength in some high threat districts in RC-E reportedly fell significantly below levels of assigned strength. Moreover, AUP personnel that were on-hand were being used to provide security for GIRoA officials and infrastructure, further reducing police capability to perform their core mission in key districts/precincts.

This occurred because the AUP personnel assigned in these high threat districts were not present for duty because of training, leave, assignment to non-police duties, or were absent without leave.

The shortfall in present for duty strength vice assigned strength, aggravated by assignment of AUP to what appears to be non-core policing duties, could degrade effectiveness of these forces in focusing on the security and policing needs of the population and undermine Coalition/GIRoA efforts to establish stability and effective governance.

***Applicable Criteria*** (See Appendix C, Number 18, for additional details.)

- IJC Operation Order Omid 1390 001-2010, App. 2 to Annex G, ANP Growth and Development, 9 Oct 2010

### ***Discussion***

According to ANP commanders and mentors in RC-E, the AUP present for duty strength often fell significantly short of assigned strength. Some districts reported having an average of 50 percent of their assigned police strength present for duty. Additionally, AUP personnel were reportedly being assigned to conduct secondary missions, such as providing VIP security or protecting GIRoA infrastructure, instead of focusing on their primary mission to support the security and policing needs of the population.

Factors contributing to low present for duty strength include:

- Assigning newly recruited AUP personnel against district/precinct strength while they undergo initial/basic police training,
- Extended periods of leave, and
- Absent Without Leave (AWOL).

Furthermore, the ongoing elimination of many private security companies has caused AUP leaders and CF mentors/trainers concern that the AUP will have to comply with additional requests by Afghan leaders to protect GIRoA officials and facilities in RC-E. This would further reduce the police presence and capabilities in KTDs and AOIs that are already under-staffed.

Given the criticality of KTDs and AOIs in RC-E, the OIG team believes that AUP present for duty strength must be maintained at or near 90 percent of assigned strength levels in these high-threat districts. Additionally, should the AUP be assigned duties beyond their core functions, the need for additional police personnel to perform these duties should be factored in to the analysis of the overall ANP requirement and the development of the SY 1390 *Tashkil*. (See Observation 2.)

## Recommendations

23. Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/ Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, in coordination with the International Security Assistance Force Joint Command:

- a. Assist the Ministry of Interior to manage the present for duty strength in Key Terrain Districts and Area of Interest districts in Regional Command-East at a level appropriate to the threat.
- b. Mentor the Minister of Interior to direct Afghan Uniformed Police Chiefs to eliminate/ minimize use of personnel for missions outside of the MoI-approved mission set.
- c. Commander, International Security Assistance Force Joint Command, direct Coalition Force mentors to monitor and report assignment of Afghan Uniformed Police personnel to duties outside of the MoI-approved mission set to the Coalition Force chain of command.

## Management Comments

This observation was originally written as an assigned strength issue in RC-E. NTM-A/ CSTC-A non-concurred with the recommendations, providing data that indicated that assigned strength was sufficient. The issue was present for duty strength.

## Our Response

Based on the management comments received on the draft report, OIG has rewritten this observation for the final report to focus on “present-for-duty” shortfalls vice assigned strength shortfalls as the primary condition warranting an observation and recommendations. NTM-A/ CSTC-A has reviewed the rewritten observation/recommendations and has concurred with the rewritten observation and recommendations. If ISAF, NTM-A/CSTC-A, or IJC have any additional comments on these rewritten recommendations, we ask that they respond in the final report.

## **Observation 24. Pay for Afghan Border Police in Regional Command-East**

ABP personnel in RC-E are not being paid on a consistent basis, according to U.S. mentors/trainers. The ABP pay process has proven erratic and unreliable.

ABP kandaks often operate in remote geographic locations, which become even less accessible during bad weather. As a result of a lack of an established system of banks in RC-East to support an electronic pay system for the ANP, the ABP often have to be paid using roving paymasters, travelling for extended distances over difficult and dangerous terrain. Furthermore, cash payments provide opportunities for exploitation of police pay, which has been a long standing problem.

The inconsistent pay system has a negative effect on ABP morale, according to CF mentors, and could result in higher attrition and low-level corruption.

***Applicable Criteria*** (See Appendix C, Number 4 and 13, for additional details.)

- Army Field Manual 3-24, "Counterinsurgency," December 2006.
- DOD Instruction 3000.05, "Stability Operations," September 16, 2009.

### ***Discussion***

According to CF mentors/trainers, ABP personnel in RC-E, a high-threat border, are not receiving their pay on a consistent basis, reportedly due to lack of banking facilities, difficult geographic access, and other factors.

Among the challenges to providing ABP personnel their pay are their geographically remote base locations in RC-E and the security risk in travelling there. The ABP bases include the frontier with Pakistan which has poor road access and which are made inaccessible by weather conditions in the winter.

The inability of the ABP to regularly pay their patrolmen has been compounded because an electronic pay system is not yet available in some of more austere districts along the Afghanistan/Pakistan border in RC-E. Availability of air assets to transport payroll personnel causes further unpredictability. Additionally, cash payments to ABP personnel often necessitate extensive and time-consuming travel through dangerous areas to deliver funds to family members.

Furthermore, cash payments are apt to encourage corruption at various levels in the chain of command, further delaying/diverting/diluting ABP pay, causing associated morale and attrition problems. Not receiving pay for protracted periods can also promote corruption on the part of the individual policeman, who may feel the need to obtain money for his family through solicitation/acceptance of bribes.

These issues notwithstanding, the MoI, with assistance from the Coalition, has the responsibility to ensure ABP personnel receive their pay on a periodic and predictable basis.



## Recommendations

24. Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/ Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, in coordination with the Ministry of Interior:

- a. Expedite implementation of electronic pay procedures and/or ensure pay agent or other procedures result in consistent delivery of salaries.
- b. Determine whether this problem exists with Afghan Border Police units in other regions and apply appropriate corrective actions.

## Management Comments

NTM-A/CSTC-A concurred. NTM-A/CSTC-A continues to work with ISAF and the U.S. Embassy to implement electronic pay procedures. They need significant help from organizations outside NTM-A/CSTC-A and MoI to implement banking reforms that will allow greater use of Electronic Funds Transfer (EFT) to pay the ANP. NTM-A/CSTC-A is looking at a three-phased approach to address pay of ANP members that includes leveraging existing ANA processes, banking agreements, and working on banking infrastructure. NTM-A/CSTC-A has determined that this issue is common to all ABP.

## Our Response

NTM-A/CSTC-A comments were responsive. We request an update in six months on the percentage of ABP enrolled in the EFT system.

## Observation 25. Afghan National Police District and Precinct Facilities

District and precinct headquarters facilities were in deplorable condition in some locations, including in KTDs.

This occurred because of two primary factors:

- Many existing locations appear to have no standardized design, footprint, or amenities beyond the most basic walled compound and a few deteriorating offices, and they were constructed many years ago.
- Lower level district/precinct facilities of the MoI bureaucracy have been traditionally underfunded, with little to no discernable operations and maintenance funds for routine sustainment.

The often deplorable conditions with regard to security, sanitation, and electrical power limit the effectiveness of command, control, and operations and degrade morale. Moreover, this presents an unprofessional image of the local police to the population and undermines police credibility.

***Applicable Criteria*** (See Appendix C, Number 20, for additional details.)

- Joint Publication 3-07.1, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense,” 30 April 2004.

### ***Discussion***

Many district and precinct facilities at sites visited were badly in need of renovation, including police facilities located in districts/precincts considered to be high threat.

The deficiencies observed were many. For example, there was no useable space within district and precinct police headquarters facilities to secure evidence or temporarily incarcerate detainees. Externally, the security protection needed upgrading to be able to protect against attack by insurgents.

Although the need to improve quality of police facilities was heartily recognized by local officials, local Afghan AUP commanders seemed powerless to improve their basic facility due to insufficient funds. They reported having insufficient influence over the use of available funding with senior levels of police command.

The upgraded appearance and functionality of districts and precincts in KTDs, in particular, would improve police morale and convey an enduring commitment to secure the local community and an enhance GIRoA support. Small local renovation contracts to improve district and precinct stations could also provide local employment for construction, and enable the population to have a stake and greater pride in their security force.

Acknowledgement of these infrastructure conditions appears to be reflected in increased future ASFF funding.<sup>19</sup> Regional and provincial facilities, institutional capacity and special programs are being addressed, including district and precinct headquarters. What remains unclear is the specificity (by name locations) of the targeted districts and precincts for facility upgrade and the priority and timeframe in which renovations might occur.

Based on recommendations from IJC and its mentors with the ANP, an accelerated facilities renovation program focused on priority districts and precincts in the COIN fight would provide visible evidence of progress. Discussions with NTM-A resource management staff indicated that the cost to upgrade selected AUP facilities in key districts would be supportable. However, first IJC would need to identify its priorities.

## Recommendation

25. Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/ Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, in coordination with the International Security Assistance Force Joint Command, identify district/precinct headquarters that are not up to a reasonable physical standard and direct funding towards their improvement. Ensure that this initiative is incorporated in appropriate spending plans, in accordance with command priorities.

## Management Comments

NTM-A/CSTC-A concurred. NTM-A/CSTC-A and IJC already employ a variety of methods to identify facilities that require improvements: Focused District Development (FDD) site assessments conducted by the FDD mentors, facilities investigations/assessments conducted by a contractor, input from the Battle Space Owner, brigade engineers, and task force commanders. Coalition Forces and Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are also used to feed input back to NTM-A/CSTC-A. After consolidating the inputs, projects have been/will be programmed and executed.

## Our Response

NTM-A/CSTC-A comments were responsive. No further comments are required.

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<sup>19</sup> Office of Secretary of Defense Department of Defense Budget Fiscal Year 2011: Justification for FY 2011 Overseas Contingency Operations – Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), dated Feb 2010, Section IV Budget Activity: Interior Forces (Afghan National Police) pages 42 and 43 (Infrastructure and District Headquarters).

## **Observation 26. North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan Anti-Corruption Staff**

Given the ISAF Commander's priority emphasis on anti-corruption, NTM-A/CSTC-A anti-corruption staff was inadequate to play a meaningful role.

The establishment of a sufficient anti-corruption capability intrinsic to the NTM-A/CSTC-A staff was a relatively new initiative, based on the expanded ISAF role in the overall anti-corruption effort. Mission analysis of these expanded responsibilities by NTM-A/CSTC-A was underway but not complete.

The shortage of anti-corruption staff could inhibit the ability of NTM-A/CSTC-A to accomplish its roles and responsibilities delineated in the ISAF and NTM-A/CSTC-A anti-corruption plans.

***Applicable Criteria*** (See Appendix C, Number 9, 19, and 23, for additional details.)

- Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan, “Campaign Plan for the Development of Afghan National Security Forces,” September 20, 2008.
- ISAF Fragmentary Order 498-2009, “Anti-Corruption,” DTG 051040D, D + 30 Oct 09, (classified document).
- NTM-A/CSTC-A Fragmentary Order 10-263, “Anti-Corruption Action Plan,” Effective 231400D Jul 10, (restricted document).

### ***Discussion***

As the lead for ISAF anti-corruption efforts within the ANSF, the NTM-A/CSTC-A staff responsible appeared to be insufficient to perform its critical role in support of the ISAF anti-corruption campaign.

Providing adequate personnel to the NTM-A/CSTC-A anti-corruption staff is paramount to both ISAF's and NTM-A/CSTC-A's ability to have an impact on curbing the corruption still prevalent within the MoI/ANP. As stated in ISAF Operations Plan 38302, “the failure of GIRoA to marginalize malign actors and address governmental corruption poses a high risk to mission success”.

NTMA-A/CSTC-A campaign plan states that “Corruption within government institutions poses the most dangerous threat to the long term development of a professional ANSF, and, ultimately, to the effectiveness of governance.” The ISAF command and staff underscored the importance of reducing corruption and the key role of the government and security forces. They maintained that, while corruption cannot be totally eliminated, the goal is to reduce it to a level where the Afghan people see their government as legitimate.

The NTM-A/CSTC-A anti-corruption mission includes:

- Leading the ISAF anti-corruption efforts within the ANSF,
- Coordinating unity of command needed within ISAF and the ANSF to address corruption,

- Assisting the Afghan Major Crimes Task Force to coordinate, develop, and submit cases of corruption to the Afghan High Office of Oversight that has the responsibility to coordinate anti-corruption across the entire Afghan government and to develop anti-corruption plans and policies across the various Afghan ministries,
- Coordinating with the MoD and MoI in developing cases of corruption for submission to the Afghan Attorney General for prosecution, and
- Coordinating NTM-A/CSTC-A anti-corruption POIs and training MoI/ANP and MoD/ANA.

The additional personnel required to provide NTM-A/CSTC-A a sufficiently robust anti-corruption staff will also enable it to significantly enhance its support for the recently developed Law Enforcement and Corruption Commission, which is made up of members from the European Union Police, the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the office of the MoI Inspector General. The commission has had several recent successes prosecuting or removing corrupt police officials. An enhanced NTM-A/CSTC-A staff to mentor the MoI and ANP, and the MoD and ANA, would also provide the capability to leverage better interagency and international anti-corruption organizations and produce significant dividends.

## Recommendation

26. Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/ Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, build the anti-corruption staff to provide a capability that adequately supports the International Security Assistance Force anti-corruption mission.

## Management Comments

NTM-A/CSTC-A non-concurred. The current manning and expected future manning of the Anti-Corruption Office adequately supports the International Security Assistance Force anticorruption mission. Merely building an Anti-Corruption staff is not sufficient to address this problem. NTM-A/CSTC-A focuses the entire command on stewardship and accountability. NTM-A/CSTC-A has developed and will develop [anti-corruption] methods across the command that remove the opportunity for corrupt behavior instead of only building the capacity to respond to it.

## Our Response

NTM-A/CSTC-A comments were responsive. While we remain concerned about the relative personnel strength of the NTM-A/CSTC-A anti-corruption office to support ISAF's high priority for the program, we accept management's analysis and acceptance of the associated risk. We will look at this issue again in future assessments. No further action is required.

## **Observation 27. Ministry of Interior Inspector General Investigations**

NTM-A/CSTC-A IG/Staff Judge Advocate/Anti-Corruption Offices have not been tracking corruption cases substantiated by MoI IG investigation to gain visibility and the capacity to provide follow-up mentor support, when appropriate.

This occurred because NTM-A/CSTC-A has yet to develop, in coordination with the MoI IG, a process to track case progress and administrative or legal action, if any, taken against senior MoI or ANP officials who have had allegations of corruption substantiated by the MoI IG or other investigative authorities.

As a result, it has not been possible to determine whether the Minister of Interior and Afghan Attorney General have taken appropriate action against senior MoI/ANP officials who have been the subject of repeat allegations or to monitor what disciplinary actions have been taken against them.

As a consequence, CSTC-A and MoI investigative authorities have not had the data analysis to define and report the extent of the anti-corruption problem and additional measures that need to be taken to address it.

***Applicable Criteria*** (See Appendix C, Number 12, for additional details.)

- DOD Inspector General Report No. SPO-2009-007, “Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the Afghan National Security Forces,” September 30, 2009.

### ***Discussion***

Neither NTM-A/CSTC-A IG, the Staff Judge Advocate, nor the Anti-Corruption Office have been tracking corruption cases substantiated by MoI IG investigations to gain visibility and the ability to provide follow-up support, when appropriate. This is a repeat observation from DODIG Report No. SPO-2009-007, dated September 30, 2009. The CSTC-A Commander concurred with the recommendation, noting that the issue would require a concerted and synchronized effort over time by all levels of command and in all activities of the U.S. government effort in Afghanistan. He stated that the CSTC-A IG and SJA would actively engage their Afghan counterparts on the issue and that CSTC-A personnel would be directed to report suspected/alleged corruption or bribery to the CF chain of command.

An NTM-A/CSTC-A system for tracking corruption cases investigated by the MoI IG with respect to MoI/ANP personnel and those referred to the Attorney General for prosecution would serve to maintain understanding of the progress, or lack thereof, with respect to the MoI anti-corruption initiative. The results of the data regarding investigations and any resulting disciplinary action taken against MoI/ANP personnel would enable trend analysis and reporting to the ISAF chain of command. The knowledge gained would enable appropriate mentoring actions to support MoI anti-corruption initiatives or to refer to the interagency with respect to the Attorney General’s office.

To address fraud, waste, and abuse, MoI has taken appropriate action to codify in exacting detail policies regarding individual accountability and responsibility of MoI/ANP personnel. By tracking progress in reducing corrupt activities, the command will be able to present ISAF and the interagency with a clearer picture of related issues, and NTM-A/CSTC-A will be better prepared to recommend timely corrective actions and provide historical case data and analysis for its newly assigned staff.

Given the complexity and the reportedly pervasive nature of corruption in GIROA, the OIG team still believes that a database to track corruption cases is advisable, but that the responsibility to establish and maintain such a data base more appropriately resides at the ISAF level.

## **Recommendation**

27. Commander, International Security Assistance Force/U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, in coordination with the Ministry of Interior and the International Security Assistance Force Deputy J-5/Anti-Corruption office, develop a data base capable of tracking corruption cases investigated by the Ministry of Interior Inspector General and referred to the Attorney General for follow-up action.

## **Management Comments**

ISAF concurred with comments, noting they do not need to independently develop such a database. The Justice Sector Support Program is developing a case-management system. While it may not be precisely what is required, it is indicative of the development of such systems. ISAF will consider an inquiry into the existing systems or those currently under development rather than starting from whole cloth on the development of a new database.

## **Our Response**

ISAF comments were partially responsive. Using the Justice Sector Support Program case management system, once developed and implemented, will meet the intent of Recommendation 27.a. We request that ISAF provide a six-month update on the operational status/capability of the Justice Sector support Program case management system.

## Observation 28. Afghan National Police Lessons Learned Process

Lessons learned by either U.S. or other international forces mentoring/training the police have not been systematically captured and made accessible in electronic database format.

This occurred because NTM-A/CSTC-A and its predecessor command, and current mentor personnel, including combat units and civilian advisors, have not been required to systematically capture and report lessons learned either during their tours or before departure. Furthermore, neither did major U.S. army commands or NATO elements capture lessons learned from their returning forces.

As a result, very few ANP lessons learned have been made available to be applied in current ANP support operations, or to educate, train and prepare future military or civilian personnel prior to their deployments to Afghanistan.

**Applicable Criteria** (See Appendix C, Number 6, 8, and 18, for additional details.)

- Army Regulation 11-33, “Army Lessons Learned Program: System Development and Application,” October 10, 1989.
- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Notice 3150.25, “Joint Lessons Learned Program and Joint Lessons Learned Information System,” January 22, 2008.
- IJC Operation Order OMID 1390 001-2010, “ISAF Joint Command Operations in Afghanistan – Annex-LL Lessons Learned – NIU,” October 9, 2010.

### Discussion

**ANP Lessons Learned.** Lessons learned have provided an invaluable resource for U.S. military or civilian personnel involved in or supporting combat operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan, but there is no comparable program for those working with the ANP.

This type of information is critical to improving operational effectiveness, including force protection, and to avoid repeating costly mistakes. In the dynamic COIN environment, not sharing lessons learned with those who need to continuously improve their effectiveness represents perspective and effectiveness lost.

Traditionally, U.S. military services and Coalition partners have collected lessons learned from combat operations and training exercises. Lessons learned applied to ANP development would also have an impact at the tactical, operational, and even strategic levels.

The Center for Army Lessons Learned program “creates a system to serve in both peace and wartime as the focal point for the collection, analysis, dissemination, and implementation of combat relevant lessons learned which will enhance the Army’s ability to perform its missions.”<sup>20</sup> Additionally, “[Major Army Commands] and designated collection agencies will forward after action reports to the CALL within 120 days of the end of an exercise or event.”<sup>21</sup> Data is collected at Fort Leavenworth and presented on its website.

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<sup>20</sup> AR 11-33, “Army Lessons Learned Program: System Development and Application,” paragraph 1-1.

<sup>21</sup> AR 11-33, paragraph 1-5.a.(2).



In addition “The Joint Lessons Learned Program provides a knowledge management process established to enhance joint capabilities through discovery, knowledge development, implementation, and the sharing of lessons from joint operations, training events, exercises, and other activities. It contributes to joint capabilities integration and development, other DOD issue resolution processes, and DOD transformation.”<sup>22</sup>

The CALL has a detachment in Kabul with one U.S. Army O-6 (Colonel). They also have eight Theater Observation Detachments embedded with operational and training units collecting information, verifying it is factual, and sending it to the CALL after vetting with local U.S. commanders.

**Search for ANP Lessons Learned.** DOD has played a key role in ANP development since 2007, but our team was unable to locate any substantive ANP lessons learned from U.S. military or NATO sources. This included the Joint Lessons Learned Information System website, the CALL center at Fort Leavenworth, the CALL detachment under CSTC-A, or the IJC lessons learned office in Afghanistan.

## Recommendation

28. Commander, International Security Assistance Force, in coordination with the International Security Assistance Force Joint Command and North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/ Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, develop a plan to collect Afghan National Police lessons learned and disseminate them in-country and to the U.S. Center for Army Lessons Learned.

## Management Comments

ISAF concurred with comments. CALL collects, analyzes, disseminates, integrates, and archives Army and Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational (JIIM) observations, insights, lessons (OIL), and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) to support full spectrum military operations. The methodology involves: collection, processing of information, analysis to derive lessons, and dissemination in a variety of media world-wide. Afghan National Police lessons learned dissemination occurs via the CALL distribution process as well as, existing NTM-A/CSTC-A Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPR), SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET), and Centrix SharePoint lessons learned sites and ISAF lessons learned portal.

## Our Response

ISAF comments were responsive. We request that IJC provide OIG a copy of/access to the lessons learned for ANP training/development in the last six months that have been documented in the processes described in the management comments and identify how the lessons learned are

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<sup>22</sup> Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff Notice, Joint Lessons Learned Program and Joint Lessons Learned Information system,” paragraph 4.b.

distributed to NTM-A/CSTC-A mentors/trainers and IJC partnered units. We will also continue to monitor this issue on future assessments.

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# Appendix A. Scope, Methodology, and Acronyms

We conducted this assessment from April to November 2010 in accordance with the standards published in the *Quality Standards for Inspections*. We planned and performed the assessment to obtain sufficient and appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our observations and conclusions, based on our assessment objectives. Site visits in Afghanistan were conducted from August 1 to 9, 2010 and October 1 to 15, 2010.

We reviewed documents such as Federal Laws and regulations, including the National Defense Authorization Act, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instructions, DOD directives and instructions, and appropriate USCENTCOM, NATO/ISAF, IJC, USFOR-A, NTM-A/CSTC-A, and MoI guidance.

The purpose of our assessment in Afghanistan was to determine whether U.S. government, North Atlantic Treaty Organization/International Security Assistance Force (NATO/ISAF), Coalition, and Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan goals, objectives, plans, guidance, and resources to train, equip, and mentor the ANP are prepared, issued, operative, and relevant. We will also determine the status of actions taken in response to recommendations made in Department of Defense Inspector General Reports No. SPO-2009-006 and SPO-2009-007, as they pertain to the ANP.

We also visited or contacted organizations and individuals in the U.S. and Afghanistan that are directly responsible or advise the commanders responsible for planning and implementing the train, advise, and assist mission for the ANP. We reviewed the programs and processes used to develop of the ANP and spoke with U.S. and Afghan leaders and managers at all levels, ranging from general officers, to staff officers, to training and mentor team members in the field.

The ANP assessment chronology was as follows:

April - July 2010	Research and fieldwork in CONUS
August 1 - 10 and October 1 - 15, 2010	Fieldwork in Afghanistan
October 15, 2010	Out Brief to IJC and NTM-A/CSTC-A
October – November 2010	Analysis and report writing
November 2010	Draft report issued
December 2010	Management comments received and evaluated

## Limitations

We limited our review to DOD-funded programs, NATO-funded programs, and international donation programs supporting the Afghan National Police (ANP).

Security considerations and allotted time in Afghanistan precluded visits to province, district, and precinct police stations in RC-S and RC-SW.

## Use of Computer-Processed Data

We did not use computer-processed data to perform this assessment.

## Use of Technical Assistance

We did not use Technical Assistance to perform this assessment.

## Acronyms Used in this Report

The following is a list of the acronyms used in this report.

ABP	Afghan Border Police
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANCOP	Afghan National Civil Order Police
ANP	Afghan National Police
ANSF	Afghan National Security Forces
ASFF	Afghan Security Forces Fund
AUP	Afghan Uniform Police
BSB	Brigade Support Battalion
CALL	Center for Army Lessons Learned
C-IED	Counter-Improvised Explosive Device
COIN	Counter Insurgency
CPR	Command Plan Review
CSTC-A	Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan
CUAT	Commander’s Unit Assessment Tool
GIRoA	Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IJC	ISAF Joint Command
JMD	Joint Manning Document
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
LMTT	Logistics Military Training Team
LTV	Light Tactical Vehicle
KTD	Key Terrain District
MoD	Ministry of Defense
MoDA	Ministry of Defense Advisors
MoI	Ministry of Interior
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NTM-A	NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan
PKM	A Russian-made Pulemyot Kalashnikova Machine Gun
PMR	Program Management Review
POI	Program of Instruction
RFF	Request for Forces
RPG	Rocket Propelled Grenade
PSP	Provincial Supply Point
RC	Regional Command (North, South, Southwest, West, East)

RLC	Regional Logistics Center
ROL	Rule of Law
RTC	Regional Training Command
SY	Solar Year

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## Appendix B. Summary of Prior Coverage

During the last four years, the DOD, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), and the Department of Defense Inspector General (DODIG) have issued a number of reports and testimony discussing the accountability and control over munitions and other equipment provided to the ANSF and the development of ANSF logistical capability.

Unrestricted DOD reports can be accessed over the Internet at <http://www.defense.gov/pubs>. Unrestricted GAO reports can be accessed over the Internet at <http://www.gao.gov>. Unrestricted SIGAR reports can be accessed over the Internet at <http://www.sigar.mil>. Unrestricted DODIG reports can be accessed over the Internet at <http://www.dodig.mil/audit/reports>.

Some of the prior coverage we used in preparing this report has included:

### Department of Defense

Report to Congress in accordance with sections 1230 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181), as amended, “Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,” November 2010.

Report to Congress in accordance with section 1230 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181), “Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,” April 2010.

Report to Congress in accordance with section 1231 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181), “United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces,” April 2010.

Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1230, Public Law 110-181), “Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,” June 2009.

Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1230, Public Law 110-181), “Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,” January 2009.

Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1230, Public Law 110-181), “Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,” June 2008.

Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1231, Public Law 110-181), “United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces,” June 2008.



## **Government Accountability Office**

GAO 11-66, “Afghanistan Security: Afghan Army Growing, but Additional Trainers Needed; Long Term costs Not Determined,” January 27, 2011.

GAO-10-842T, “Preliminary Observations on DOD’s Progress and Challenges in Distributing Supplies and Equipment to Afghanistan,” June 25, 2010.

GAO-10-655R, “Strategic Framework for U.S. Efforts in Afghanistan,” June 15, 2010.

GAO-09-280, “Afghanistan Security: U.S. Programs to Further Reform Ministry of Interior and National Police Challenged by Lack of Military Personnel and Afghan Cooperation,” March 9, 2009.

GAO-09-263SP, “Securing, Stabilizing, and Developing Pakistan’s Border Area with Afghanistan,” February 23, 2009.

GAO-08-883T, “U.S. Efforts to Develop Capable Afghan Police Forces Face Challenges and Need a Coordinated, Detailed Plan to Help Ensure Accountability,” June 18, 2008.

GAO-08-661, “Further Congressional Action May Be Needed to Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain Capable Afghan National Security Forces,” June 18, 2008.

## **Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR)**

SIGAR Audit-10-11, “Actions Needed to Improve the Reliability of Afghan Security Force Assessments,” June 29, 2010.

## **Department of Defense Inspector General**

DODIG Report No. D-2010-042, “DOD Obligations and Expenditures of Funds Provided to the Department of State for the Training and Mentoring of the Afghan National Police,” February 9, 2010.

DODIG Report No. SPO-2009-007, “Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the Afghan National Security Forces,” September 30, 2009.

DODIG Report No. D-2009-100, “Afghanistan Security Forces Fund Phase III – Accountability for Equipment Purchased for the Afghanistan National Police,” September 22, 2009.

DODIG Report No. SPO-2009-006, “Assessment of the Accountability and Control of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives (AA&E) Provided to the Security Forces of Afghanistan,” September 11, 2009.

DODIG Report No. SPO-2009-001, “Assessment of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives Control and Accountability; Security Assistance; and Sustainment for the Afghan National Security Forces,” October 24, 2008.

DODIG Report No. IE-2007-005/DoS Report No. ISP-I-07-34, “Interagency Assessment Of the Counternarcotics Program in Afghanistan,” July 2007.

DODIG Report No. IE-2007-001/DoS Report No. ISP-IQO-07-07, “Interagency Assessment of Afghanistan Police Training and Readiness,” November 2006.

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## Appendix C. Criteria—Afghan/U.S. Policy and DOD Policy

1. **Afghanistan National Development Strategy Secretariat, “Islamic Republic of Afghanistan – Afghanistan National Development Strategy 1387-1391 (2008-2013) – A Strategy for Security, Governance, Economic Growth & Poverty Reduction.”** This document reflects the commitment of the GIRoA to poverty reduction and private sector-led economic growth for a prosperous and stable Afghanistan by establishing the following goals: (1) Improved security and law enforcement, (2) Strengthened governance/government accountability, rule of law, and human rights, and (3) Improved economic and social development.
2. **Afghanistan Police Training Mission, “NCO Police Course Overview,” February 2010 and “Revised Basic Police Course Overview,” January 2009.** These programs of instruction establish the current training time allotted to mine and IED awareness.
3. **Army Field Manual 3-07.1, “Security Force Assistance,” May 1, 2009.** This field manual provides the doctrinal guidance and direction for how U.S. forces contribute to security force assistance. It requires that foreign personnel cross-train on all types of weapons, communications, and other equipment, and skills particular to their unit. Personnel losses must never cause weapons, communications equipment, or essential skills to be lost due to a lack of fully trained replacement personnel.
4. **Army Field Manual 3-24, “Counterinsurgency,” December 2006.** This field manual establishes doctrine/fundamental principles for military operations in a COIN environment. Additionally, it establishes that the most effective force requirement gauge is troop density, the ratio of security forces (including the host nation’s military and police forces, as well as foreign counterinsurgents) to inhabitants. Also, the COIN environment requires counterinsurgents to not only determine the kinds of weapons to use and how to employ them but also establish whether lethal means are desired. This field manual also establishes that a clear-hold-build operation should be executed in a specific, high-priority area experiencing overt insurgent operations and has the following objectives: (1) create a secure environment, (2) establish a firm government control of the populace and area, and (3) gain the populace’s support.
5. **Army Field Manual 3-24.2, “Tactics in Counterinsurgency,” April 21, 2009.** This field manual establishes doctrine for tactical COIN operations at the company, battalion, and brigade levels. It requires the maximization of the number, effectiveness, and use of host nation security forces to secure and control the population and to prevent the insurgent’s freedom of movement. Additionally, close coordination and affective cooperation between the host nation (civil, police, and military), the U.S. counterinsurgency force, and all other Coalition partners allows the full strength of each to engage all levels of the insurgency.

6. **Army Regulation 11-33, “Army Lessons Learned Program: System Development and Application,” October 10, 1989.** This regulation establishes the Army Lessons Learned System which collects, analyzes, disseminates, and provides for the implementation of combat-relevant lessons that impact doctrine, training, organization, materiel, and leadership concepts and requirements. It also establishes a system to identify and integrate input from combat training center rotations, major exercises, military operations, disaster relief operations, special events unit initiatives, intelligence reports, historical sources, and other programs into the Army Lessons Learned Program.
7. **Center for Army Lessons Learned Handbook 10-08, “Partnership: Development of Logistics Capabilities,” November 2009.** This handbook presents partnering considerations in developing a fundamental base for a self-sustaining host nation security force. Although based largely on the experiences of units deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom from 2007-2009, the sustainment development ideas and concepts presented in this book are worth of consideration by any leader assigned the challenging task of developing host nation logistics. The information contained in this product reflects the actions of units in the field and may not necessarily be approved U.S. Army policy or doctrine.
8. **Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Notice 3150.25, “Joint Lessons Learned Program and Joint Lessons Learned Information System,” January 22, 2008.** This notice highlights policy, guidance, and responsibilities for the Joint Lessons Learned Program and establishes the Joint Lessons Learned Information System as the DOD system of record. The Joint Lessons Learned Program is a knowledge management process established to enhance joint capabilities through discovery, knowledge development, implementation, and sharing of lessons from joint operations, training events, exercises, and other activities. It contributes to joint capabilities integration and development, other DOD issue resolution processes, and DOD transformation.
9. **Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan, “Campaign Plan for the Development of Afghan National Security Forces,” September 20, 2008.** This document provides an overarching strategy for the development of the Afghan Security Forces, to include the MoD and the MoI. The plan aims to synchronize security sector development efforts across the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior, CSTC-A, and the wider International Community. The plan lays out the guidance and the processes for security ministry and Afghan security forces generation and development. It also takes into account the Afghanistan National Development Strategy dated April 2008 and the altered circumstances since these agreements and strategies were conceived, including changes to the security environment. It is complementary to Commander, International Security Assistance Force Operations Plan 38302 and supports the ISAF security effects.

10. **CSTC-A Fragmentary Order 09-043, “Subject: Verification of Monthly Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) Compliance with 100 Percent Weapons Serial Number Inventory,” March 8, 2009.** This fragmentary order directs all subordinate elements of CSTC-A to implement measures to ensure improved ANSF supply discipline by confirming that the ANSF conduct a monthly 100 percent serial number inventory of all weapons and assisting the ANSF in its efforts to account for, control, and physically secure weapons.
11. **DOD Directive 1404.10, “DOD Civilian Expeditionary Workforce,” January 23, 2009.** This document establishes the policy through which an appropriately sized subset of the DOD civilian workforce is pre-identified to be organized, trained, and equipped in a manner that facilitates the use of their capabilities for operational requirements. These requirements are typically away from the normal work locations of DOD civilians, or in situations where other civilians may be evacuated to assist military forces where the use of DOD civilians is appropriate.
12. **DOD Inspector General Report No. SPO-2009-007, “Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the Afghan National Security Forces,” September 30, 2009.** This report evaluated whether DOD, Coalition, ISAF, MoI, and MoD goals, objectives, plans, guidance, operations, and resources to train, equip, field, and mentor the ANSF were prepared, issued, operative, and complete.
13. **DOD Instruction 3000.05, “Stability Operations”, September 16, 2009.** This Instruction provides guidance on stability operations and will evolve over time as joint operating concepts, missions, and lessons learned aid in the development of DOD policy and assignment of responsibility for the identification and development of DOD capabilities to support stability operations.
14. **DOD Instruction 4140.66, “Registration and Monitoring of Defense Articles,” October 15, 2009.** This document establishes policy, assigns responsibility, and sets forth procedures in accordance with section 1228 of Public Law 110-181 to certify the establishment of a registration and monitoring system for controlling the export and/or transfer of defense articles to specified countries and/or to other groups, organizations, citizens, or residents of those countries.
15. **DOD Instruction 5000.64, “Accountability and Management of DoD-Owned Equipment and Other Accountable Property,” November 2, 2006.** This Instruction provides policy and procedures for DoD-owned equipment and other accountable property and establishes policy and procedures to comply with 40 U.S.C., section 524. It also requires that accountable property records shall be established for all property purchased, or otherwise obtained, that are sensitive as defined in DoD 4100.39-M, “Federal Logistics Information System,” Volume 10, Table 61, November 2007.

16. **DOD Instruction 5000.68, “Security Force Assistance (SFA),” October 27, 2010.** This Instruction establishes policy and assigns responsibilities regarding the preparation of DOD personnel and operational planning for, as well as the conduct of, security force assistance across the DOD. It also establishes that security force assistance shall encompass DOD efforts to support the professionalization and the sustainable development of the capacity and capability of the foreign security forces and supporting institutions of host countries, as well as international and regional security organizations.
17. **DOD 4140.1-R, “DOD Supply Chain Material Management Regulation,” May 23, 2003.** This regulation implements DOD Directive 4140.1 and establishes requirements and procedures for DOD material managers and others who need to work within or with the DOD supply system.
18. **IJC Operation Order OMID 1390 001-2010, “ISAF Joint Command Operations in Afghanistan” – Annex G, Appendix 2 (Classified) and Annex-LL (Lessons Learned – NIU) (Unclassified), October 9, 2010.** Annex G, Appendix 2 is classified. Annex LL is the authoritative document regarding the management of the IJC’s Lessons Learned process, which captures, collects, and wherever possible, analyzes and disseminates among CF the Battlefield Observations, Lessons Learned, and Good/Best Practices.
19. **ISAF Fragmentary Order 498-2009, “Anti-Corruption,” DTG 051040D, D+30 Oct 09.** This is a classified document.
20. **Joint Publication 3-07.1, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense,” 30 April 2004.** This document sets forth doctrine and selected Joint tactics, techniques, and procedures to govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis of interagency coordination and U.S. military involvement in multinational operations. Page V-27, para 10.d(4) states “Tailor the proper types of equipment maintenance and training sustainability packages to the needs of the Host Nation.”
21. **MoI Affairs, Department of Strategy, “Police Plan for SY 1389,” March 2010.** This Police Plan provides operational planning guidance for the continued development of MoI operational capability to meet the current and future challenges of stabilization, civil order, law enforcement, and security of Afghanistan.
22. **MoI Afghan National Police Strategy, March 2010.** This document provides strategic guidance for the continued development and operational capability of the MoI to meet the current and future challenges of stabilization and security of Afghanistan. It is the second in the series of strategic planning documents and is followed by the “Police Plan for SY 1389.” The strategy specifies the objectives for the continued development of the police, law enforcement activities, and associated systems.

23. **Mol Logistics Management Directorate, “Process for the Management of Logistics,” January 6, 2009.** This MoI policy introduces NATO/U.S. military doctrine and structure to the logistical support and sustainment of the ANP. It establishes common procedures, formats, forms, and time standards for the logistics management processes of the MoI and movement of logistic information between supporting and supported organizations and activities. It also details the establishment of an Authorized Stockage List for Regional Logistics Centers or Provincial Supply Points. An initial Authorized Stockage List for any supply class or group except spares may be created by using *Tashkil* documents and supported soldier density.
24. **Mol Surgeon General, “ANP Medical Support Doctrine.”** This document describes the ANP medical support process to care for wounded ANP soldiers, including medical logistics, ground and air medical evacuation, medical treatment, and provision of medical personnel.
25. **NTM-A/CSTC-A Fragmentary order 10-263, “Anti-Corruption Action Plan,” Effective 231400D Jul 10.** This is a restricted document.
26. **NTM-A/CSTC-A training requirements: Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR) V.10 (RFF Plan B) Confidential NOFORN, Titled: Analysis of Unfilled Requirements, 12 Oct 10.** This is a classified document.
27. **“Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan – Report to Congress in accordance with sections 1230 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-81), as amended” November 2010.** This report is an update on progress toward security and stability in Afghanistan from April through September 2010. It states that the MoI remains assessed as not being able to accomplish its mission without significant Coalition assistance. Of the 25 Ministerial Development Areas assessed, seven departments are able to accomplish their mission, with only some Coalition assistance. Of the 18 remaining ministerial development areas, two departments are assessed as existing but not able to accomplish their mission and 16 are assessed as not being able to accomplish their mission without significant Coalition assistance. Since March 2010, the ANP has sustained growth ahead of monthly objectives. Current ANP end-strength through August 2010 is 119,639 – exceeding the 2010 goal of 109,000. However, without further significant improvement in recruiting and retention, the ANP goal of 134,000 for November 2011 will not be met. ANP logistics capabilities are not as well-developed as ANA logistics, due in part to the focus on COIN operations. With some of the focus shifting to governance and development functions, the ANP/MoI has received more attention. To leverage capabilities of the ANA, NTM-A/CSTC-A is working jointly with the MoI and MoD in the development of a standing Cross Ministry Service Agreement where the overarching aim is to create an integrated National Logistics System.



28. **Title 22 U.S.C. § 2403: U.S. Code--Section 2403: Definitions.** Defines "defense article" in subsection (d) (3) to include, among other things:

any machinery, facility, tool, materiel supply, or other item necessary for the manufacture, production, processing repair, servicing, storage, construction, transportation, operation, or use of any article listed in this subsection.

29. **Title 40 United States Code, section 524.** Title 40 U.S.C., section 524, requires accountability and control over U.S. Government property. It states:

(a) Required. Each executive agency shall –

(1) maintain adequate inventory controls and accountability systems for property under its control.

# Appendix D. Organizations Contacted and Visited

We visited, contacted, or conducted interviews with officials (or former officials) from the following NATO, U.S., and Afghan organizations:

## United States

### *Department of Defense*

#### **Office of the Secretary of Defense**

- Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Central Asia Policy (DASD APC)

#### **Joint Staff**

- Deputy Director, Regional Operations, J-3
- Director, Pakistan/Afghanistan Coordination Cell

### *Other Organizations/Individuals*

- Selected Staff Members, Senate Armed Services Committee
- Senior Fellow, Institute for the Study of War
- Lead spokesman on British Operations in Afghanistan
- Joint Operations Analysis Officer, Institute for Defense Analyses
- Kim T. Adamson Chair of Insurgency and Terrorism, Marine Corps University
- Former Commander of the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan

## Afghanistan

- European Union Police key staff members

### **U.S. Embassy**

- Coordinating Director, Rule of Law and Law Enforcement
- Officials assigned to the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Bureau

### **U.S. Central Command**

- Commander, International Security Assistance Force/U.S. Forces–Afghanistan/key staff
  - J2
  - J3
  - J5
  - Director of Task Force 2010
- Commander, International Security Assistance Force Joint Command and key staff
  - Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Programs
  - Stability Operations
  - Future Operations

- ANSF Development Assistance Bureau
- Development Cell-Commander's Unit Assessment Tool (CUAT)
- Commander, RC-C/Gazi Military Training Center
- Commander, RC-N
  - Police Operational Mentor and Liaison Team—Meymaneh
  - Brigade Support Battalion, 1/10 Mountain Division
- Commander, RC-E/Combined Joint Task Force 101 (Bagram) and key staff
  - Task Force Sheriff
  - Brigade Support Battalion, 3/101 Airborne Division (Air Assault)
  - Commander, 615<sup>th</sup> MP Company, 95<sup>th</sup> MP Battalion
- RC-S Future Plans/Force Development
- RC-SW ANSF Development Assistance Bureau
- RC-SW CJ7/Engineers
- Commander, Helmand Province Partner Team
- Commander, Combined Security Transition Command—Afghanistan and key staff
  - Deputy Commander-Police Development
  - Commander, Combined Training Advisory Group—Police
  - Staff CJ1 through CJ8, Security Assistance Office, Surgeon, and Programs
  - MPRI mentors
  - Commander, Regional Support Command-East
  - Commander, Regional Support Command-South
  - Commander, Regional Support Command-Southwest
  - Coalition/DynCorp/MPRI trainers at Central Training Center (Kabul) and ANP RTCs in RC-E, RC-S, and RC-SW
- Commander, Joint Task Force 435

## **Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan**

### ***Ministry of Interior***

- Minister of Interior
  - Chief of Staff, Administration and Support
  - Deputy Minister for Strategy and Policy
  - Director of Logistics
  - Inspector General
- National Police Command Center
- Commander, Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP)/key staff members
- Commander, Afghan Border Police/key staff members
- Commander, Afghan National Police Academy/key staff members
- Deputy Chief of the Kabul City Police
  - Kabul Police HQ
  - Kabul AUP Zone 4
  - Kabul Police Districts 8, 16, and Bagrami
- Commander ,303<sup>rd</sup> AUP Pamir Corps (RC-N)

- ABP Border Crossing, Hairatan
- Commander, 505<sup>th</sup> AUP Zone (RC-E)
  - AUP Provincial HQ for Paktya
  - Precinct 2, Gardez District
- Operations Coordination Center – RC-SW
- ANP Central Training Center at Kabul
- ANP Regional Training Centers in RC-E, RC-S, and RC-SW
- MoI Material Management Center
- MoI Interim Logistics Facility
- 22 Bunkers ANP Ammunition Depot
- ANP Regional Logistics Centers at Gardez and Kandahar

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# Appendix E. Memorandum for Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff



INSPECTOR GENERAL  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE  
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704

November 8, 2010

MEMORANDUM FOR Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Insufficient NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/ Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (NTM-A/CSTC-A) Personnel to Conduct Oversight.

Ref: Assessment of Efforts to Train, Equip, and Mentor the Expanded Afghan National Police (Project No. D2010-D00SPO-0198.000)

In the process of conducting a field assessment of efforts to train, equip and mentor the Afghan National Police (ANP), the DoD Office of the Inspector General (DoD OIG) team identified an observation which presents a time-sensitive challenge. The issue is insufficient NTM-A/CSTC-A personnel to conduct adequate oversight of current and future Afghanistan Security Forces Funding (ASFF) contract expenditures.

We are therefore providing this memorandum to management for information and potential action, as appropriate. We plan to issue the complete draft report in November 2010. Management comments to this management letter are optional. Should management opt to provide comments, please provide them no later than November 15, 2010.

## **Background**

On April 19, 2010, the DoD OIG announced an assessment to determine whether:

- U.S. government, North Atlantic Treaty Organization/International Security Assistance Force (NATO/ISAF), coalition, and Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) goals, objectives, plans, guidance, and resources to train, equip, and mentor the Afghan National Police (ANP) are prepared, issued, operative, and relevant.
- Recommendations made in prior assessments of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), especially with respect to the ANP, have been implemented (Reports No. SPO-2009-001 and SPO-2009-007).

A DoD OIG team from the Office of Special Plans and Operations conducted site visits to Afghanistan from July 29 to August 10, 2010; and October 1 to October 15, 2010.

While in country, the OIG team held over ninety individual and/or group meetings with senior leaders and staff of ISAF, NTM-A/CSTC-A, and the International Joint Command in Kabul and at five of the six ISAF regional commands across the country. We met with multiple senior Ministry of Interior and Afghan National Police officials, including the MoI Minister, and commanders of the Afghan Civil Order Police, Afghan Border Police, and Afghan Uniformed Police. We also visited national training, logistics, maintenance, and transportation facilities supporting ANP development in and around Kabul, and at regions, zones, provinces, districts, and precincts.

### **Discussion**

**Background:** The NTM-A/CSTC-A effort to rapidly build the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) is now a key ISAF priority. Missions include, at a minimum: providing training, equipping, mentoring, and construction, and related oversight support in multiple areas of force development at geographic sites around the country.

The command's ANP infrastructure development program, for example, has progressed with the construction of multiple logistical, training, coordination, and support centers throughout the six regional commands. These include 36 training centers, six regional supply centers, and plans to build 34 provincial supply points throughout the country, the first of which is operational in Helmand Province.

**Resource Management:** NTM-A/CSTC-A has resource management responsibilities for the \$24.8B of Afghanistan Security Forces Funds (ASFF) provided through FY2010, and another \$18.3B estimated to be appropriated in FY 2011 and FY 2012. Of the expended funds, \$5.4B was used for ANSF infrastructure construction; another \$5B is expected to be used for new ANSF construction over the next two years.

In response to the magnitude of the fiscal resources that already or will fall under NTM-A/CSTC-A's management domain, the command has begun building what it calls the Infrastructure Train and Advise Group (ITAG). This is a fledgling organization under NTM-A/CSTC-A, created largely using currently assigned personnel. The role of ITAG is to provide enhanced program management of ASFF fiscal resources used to support ANSF expansion. This is a significant challenge, for which NTM-A/CSTC-A is inadequately staffed to perform its current contract oversight responsibilities.

**Personnel Needs:** Our field assessment concluded that NTM-A/CSTC-A lacks the personnel resources required to build ITAG capability in line with its current and projected expenditures and contract oversight responsibilities. NTM-A/CSTC-A reported they were able to provide oversight of approximately 40 percent of their current contract

responsibilities, while additional ASFF funding is rapidly creating additional contracting oversight challenges. The NTM-A/CSTC-A command needs sufficient personnel with appropriate capability to be able to perform its vitally important oversight roles and responsibilities and these resources should be provided on an expedited basis.

ITAG oversight teams fielded to the six regional commands, plus reinforcement of the ITAG staff at CSTC-A headquarters, are included in the NTM-A/CSTC-A plan. Collectively, they are expected to ensure that infrastructure and service contracts in support of ANSF force development are executed according to contract requirements, including engineering specifications. In addition, ITAG teams will ensure that contracting officer representatives are performing their duties country-wide.

To meet its resource management/oversight needs, ISAF and NTM-A/CSTC-A planning proposals have established a requirement for approximately 300 additional ITAG personnel, which they have identified by specific skill sets, plus required force protection. They also require additional enabling personnel support in such capability areas as pay support teams, logisticians, engineers, and acquisition professionals. NTM-A/CSTC-A intends to submit a Request for Forces that will address these NTM-A/CSTC-A personnel needs, among others.

**Summary:** NTM-A/CSTC-A has the responsibility to provide stewardship over the multi-billion dollar U.S. ASFF resources that have been or will be contractually committed to support the rapid expansion of the ANSF. Currently, the command does not have the capability to provide the necessary oversight of already contracted infrastructure projects, much less those planned for the near future. Deployment of personnel with the right skill sets to support NTM-A/CSTC-A's critical oversight mission will prevent potential ASFF contracting-related fraud, waste, and abuse, or contractor failure to properly execute according to requirements.

#### **Observation and Recommendation**

**Observation:** The North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan mission cannot provide adequate oversight over ongoing and anticipated contracts with the current staff capability.


The expansion of the ANSF growth has driven a requirement for more contracted support which has consequently exceeded the command's capability to provide adequate oversight. Without additional staff, the oversight capability gap will continue to expand as additional ASFF funding is transferred to the command and converted into support contracts.



Without the expedited provision of additional skilled personnel, the command cannot be expected to carry out effectively its management and fiscal oversight responsibilities. The inability to provide comprehensive oversight of ASFF resources could lead to fraud, waste, and abuse, and improper contract execution that would negatively impact counterinsurgency efforts.

**Recommendation:** Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, take appropriate action to provide NTM-A/CSTC-A the personnel required to execute its oversight mission.

We would be pleased to discuss this preliminary observation and recommendation at your convenience. I can be reached at 703-604-9262. An alternative point of contact is Mr. Stanley Meyer at: 703-604-9130, DSN: 664-9130, ([Stanley.Meyer@dodig.mil](mailto:Stanley.Meyer@dodig.mil)).

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "K. Moorefield", with a stylized flourish at the end.

Kenneth P. Moorefield  
Deputy Inspector General  
Special Plans and Operations

# Appendix F. Management Comments



NATO TRAINING MISSION - AFGHANISTAN  
COMBINED SECURITY TRANSITION COMMAND – AFGHANISTAN  
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN  
APO AE 09356

NTM-A/CSTC-A CG


16 January 2011

## MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR GENERAL

SUBJECT: ISAF Responses and Comments to DoD IG Draft Report (14 DEC 2010) on the Assessment of U.S. Government Efforts to Train, Equip, and Mentor the Expanded Afghan National Police (ANP) (Project No. D2010-D000SPO-0198.000)

1. Thank you for the opportunity to comment on your report that assessed efforts to train, equip, and mentor the expanded ANP. Enclosed you will find our specific responses and comments to the draft report.
2. As we approach the challenges of 2011, we know that ISAF must aggressively train Afghan trainers, continue to work with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to secure the population from the insurgents, and ensure we provide adequate oversight of the money appropriated for this mission by the US Congress. Your assessment helps us see ourselves, providing a valuable perspective as we continue to execute these critical tasks in the coming year.
3. Your report highlights three important aspects regarding the growth and development of the Afghan National Police (ANP) and the Ministry of Interior (MoI).
  - a. The US Government made a deliberate decision not to build Police logistical systems until this year. This allowed us to focus and prioritize our efforts on growing the police force required to conduct operations in a combat zone.
  - b. We are critically short specialty trainers, partners, and other personnel that affect our ability to provide adequate trainers and provide the proper stewardship of the funds and resources being expended here.
  - c. Almost all endeavors to grow and develop the ANP and MoI require a joint effort by two commands—NTM-A and IJC. These responsibilities require a coordinated effort inside ISAF and cannot be adequately accomplished by the work of just one command or the other.
4. Again, thank you for the opportunity to comment on your draft report. We look forward to working with you in the future.
5. POC for this memorandum is COL Mark Fassl, CIG, DSN 312-237-1076.

Encl  
as  
  
CF:  
Commander, IJC

  
WILLIAM B. CALDWELL, IV  
Lieutenant General, US Army  
Commanding

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**OBSERVATION 1. (Page 9, DoDIG Draft): Process for Coordinating Operational Issues During Tashkil Development**

**RECOMMENDATION 1. (1, page 10, DoDIG Draft):** Commander, International Security Assistance Force/U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, in coordination with the International Security Assistance Force Joint Command and North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan:

a. Develop a formal process to ensure that International Security Assistance Force Joint Command operational considerations are incorporated, as appropriate, into the annual requirements generation/force development/contracting process.

**ISAF RESPONSE 1.a.:** ISAF already has an effective and well coordinated formal process in place. In the SY1390 Command Plan Review (CPR) International Security Assistance Force Joint Command (IJC) operational considerations were, and continue to be, heavily considered in the requirements generation/force development process. More importantly, the operational, institutional and national needs of the Afghan National Police (ANP) force were the drivers of the Afghan Ministry of the Interior (MoI) planned, coordinated and executed CPR process. The CPR policies and procedures continue to be developed, refined and documented as part of the MoI institutional and ministerial development efforts. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Projects, IJC was part of the entire process and validated the final solution.

b. Establish a systematic process for identifying, prioritizing, and approving significant resource requests from the International Security Assistance Force Joint Command at regular intervals during the annual Tashkil resource planning process.

**ISAF RESPONSE 1.b.:** The process exists and is used by IJC. For example, we recently processed unprogrammed request for 10k ALP and AUP uplift in Helmand and Kandahar. NTM-A has developed systemic procedures to identify, prioritize, and approve requirements on an annual, and emerging, basis. The annual process is the Command Plan Review (CPR) process, and the emergent process is the Program Management Review (PMR – Encl. 1). The PMR is a mature NTM-A process with an established policy and procedures. The PMR process addresses all MoD and MoI, as well as coalition requirements for validation, approval and programmatic or budgetary support. The PMR uses coalition mission partners to advocate for MoD and MoI needs. The CPR is a MoI led activity with NTM-A, IJC and EUPOL participation to define, prioritize and approve force structure changes for the upcoming solar year. These CPR approved force structure changes define Tashkil development, approval and force generation planning for the future solar year. The CPR policies and procedures continue to be developed, refined and documented as part of the MoI institutional and ministerial development efforts.

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**OBSERVATION 2. (Page 11, DoDIG Draft): Requirement for Additional Afghan National Police**

**RECOMMENDATION 2. (Page 12, DoDIG Draft):** Commander, International Security Assistance Force/U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, in coordination with the International Security Assistance Force Joint Command, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, and the Ministry of Interior, develop Solar Year 1390 *Tashkil* requirements for appropriate increases in Afghan National Police strength to counter and roll back insurgent advances, especially in Key Terrain Districts and Area of Interest districts.

**ISAF RESPONSE 2.:** This recommendation has already been implemented. In the recently concluded SY1390 Command Plan Review, the Minister of the Interior approved the addition of nearly 10,000 Afghan Uniformed Policemen in response to Afghan Zone Commanders and IJC requests. These additional police forces are already being recruited, trained and assigned to the fielded force to assist in counter-insurgency operations.

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**OBSERVATION 3. (Page 13, DoDIG Draft): Programs of Instruction at Afghan National Police Regional Training Centers**

**RECOMMENDATION 3. (Page 14, DoDIG Draft):** Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, in coordination with the Ministry of Interior:

a. Standardize and improve, where necessary, the Program of Instruction across all Afghan National Police training facilities.

**NTM-A/CSTC-A RESPONSE 3.a.:** A new, Afghan Centric and student focused Program of Instruction (Pol) for Basic Training (Encl. 2) has been produced and will commence national roll out in January 2011. This will address pre-existing issues with inconsistent curriculum content, methods of delivery and provides a truly national common standard for police training capable of delivery by Afghan Instructors and Coalition Partners.

The Basic Patrolmen's Program of Instruction has undergone extensive revision. It is a significantly more Afghan Centric course and has been extensively revised following input from the NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan, the Ministry of Interior, the European Policing Mission and the German Police Project Team (GPPT). It has been piloted independently by NTM-A and the GPPT and refined further. The changes in methodology which have been effected to focus more on delivery by Afghan Trainers for long term sustainability and to facilitate transition; it is now competency based, and is underpinned by the Afghan National

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Police Strategy. It is designed to be student interactive and participative replacing the previous didactic approach and there is significant incorporation of pictorial imagery and visual aids.

In addition to assuring and standardizing the curriculum content, a national common minimum standard will be achieved and applied by the adoption and dissemination of a comprehensive ‘Teacher’s Guide’ which provides explicit guidance to accompany the course curriculum. This guide effectively removes any ambiguity and adherence to this will ensure that delivery is and remains standardized and consistent regardless of geo-delivery and deliverer.

All National Police Training facilities will be fully briefed on these changes and the adoption of this course and teacher’s guide will occur incrementally and systematically as new intakes of recruits join throughout 2011.

b. Conduct regular oversight visits to ensure compliance.

**NTM-A/CSTC-A RESPONSE 3.b.:** NTM-A/CSTC-A remains significantly short of required personnel. Without assignment of these required personnel, we cannot provide adequate oversight.

A program of oversight visits to training sites was previously undertaken by NTM-A and areas of improvement have been identified and acted upon. Subject to assignment of required personnel, we plan for multi-disciplinary Assessment Teams to audit compliance with Programs of Instruction. This will also contribute to the ongoing evaluation process and continuous improvement cycle to ensure training remains nationally consistent and fit for purpose.

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**OBSERVATION 4. (Page 15, DoDIG Draft): Untrained Afghan Uniformed Police**

**RECOMMENDATION 4. (Page 17, DoDIG Draft):** Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, in coordination with the Ministry of Interior, develop a strategy and supporting plans to expedite basic training of the untrained Afghan Uniformed Police at a rate consistent with Afghan National Police Commanders’ and Regional Commanders’ needs, the insurgent threat, and International Security Assistance Force transition plans/projections.

**NTM-A/CSTC-A RESPONSE 4.:** Training untrained and already assigned policemen, known as “reform training,” is extremely difficult and has historically generated limited effect. We will continue to conduct reform training, but over time, untrained police will attrit out of the force and be replaced by trained police. No new police will be assigned without training.

Reform training will be accomplished by two methods:

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1. Provincial Training Companies organized under the Afghan National Police Training General Command (ANPTGC). Provincial Training Companies will provide training at the Provincial and District level. These training companies are being organized under next year's table of organization (Tashkil SY1390).

2. Use of excess capacity at Afghan National Police training institutions. Training seats at the ANP schools will be provided for reform training in regions where the growth goals have been met. Growth of the ANP has priority over reform training.

NTM-A supports the IJC-led Focused District Development (FDD) program to train already assigned Afghan Uniformed Policemen.

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**OBSERVATION 5. (Page 19, DoDIG Draft): Shortage of Institutional Trainers**

**RECOMMENDATION 5. (Page 21, DoDIG Draft):** Commander, International Security Assistance Force/U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, in coordination with North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/ Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, develop an alternative personnel plan to the Combined Joint Statement of Requirements process to fill any trainer/mentor gap so as to be able to sustain force generation plans.

**ISAF RESPONSE 5.:** ISAF nonconcurs with this recommendation. It is the bureaucratic equivalent to telling a patient that they are sick and to heal themselves. While the observation is accurate and all elements of ISAF attempt to source these personnel requirements through every available means, the recommendation clearly needs to be focused outside the theater at higher echelons of command.

ISAF and NTM-A are well aware of the NTM-A shortage of required personnel to accomplish the NTM-A mission, but alternative personnel plans developed within the theater largely force ISAF to choose between resourcing two commands/missions – IJC and NTM-A – who both have personnel shortfalls.

NTM-A/CSTC-A conducted a manpower assessment that included ANP and MoI related manpower requirements (mentors/advisors at the HQ, partners within the police pillars, for trainers at the ANP training facilities, etc.). This assessment led to an increase in personnel requirements to support the planned ANP growth.

ISAF is exploring all methods to source both these requirements and those of IJC to partner with fielded ANP forces. Unfortunately, ISAF's ability to source these requirements with theater assets is extremely limited.

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**OBSERVATION 6. (Page 23, DoDIG Draft): Ministry of Interior Inspector General Personnel Resources**

**RECOMMENDATION 6. (Page 24, DoDIG Draft):** Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, coordinate with and assist the Ministry of Interior to:

- a. Conduct a manpower study of the Ministry of Interior Inspector General Directorate to determine the personnel necessary for the office to accomplish its mission.

**NTM-A/CSTC-A RESPONSE 6.a.:** NTM-A/CSTC-A does not have the capability to perform a manpower study at this time. CJ7 and CJ1 are expecting inbound personnel in the next few months who will provide this capability. In light of this, we recommend DoD IG SPO provide expertise from Iraq and elsewhere to provide expert advice on the proper size of an IG organization in Afghanistan.

- b. Include the results of the manpower study, as appropriate, in developing the Solar Year 1390 Tashkil for the Ministry of Interior Inspector General office.

**NTM-A/CSTC-A RESPONSE 6.b.:** Once the information can be provided by DoD IG SPO, the NTM-A/CSTC-A mentors, in conjunction with MoI Inspector General, will submit the new personnel requirements into the Program Management Review (PMR) process, which would validate the IG requirement for more people. The expected milestone for this is April 2011. However, at this point, increases in personnel can only be granted by the Solar Year 1391 Command Plan Review process, which will begin in April 2011. MoI IG, in conjunction with NTM-A/CSTC-A, will present the validated IG requirement to the CPR process in April 2011. Pending approval from the MoI Tashkil office and Interior Minister, increases in personnel can be started in Solar Year 1391, starting March 2012.

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**OBSERVATION 8. (Page 27, DoDIG Draft): Afghan Uniformed Police and Afghan Border Police Armament**

**RECOMMENDATION 8. (Page 28, DoDIG Draft):** Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, in coordination with International Security Assistance Force Joint Command and the Ministry of Interior/Afghan National Police, determine if additional heavy weapons should be added to the *Tashkil* of the Afghan Uniformed Police, especially in Key Terrain Districts and Area of Interest districts, and to the Afghan Border Police along the borders.

**NTM-A/CSTC-A RESPONSE 8.:** NTM-A/CSTC-A and IJC have already begun the process of developing this capability in the ANP, but this materiel and organizational solution is not

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sufficient to address the issue. The ANA will need to better coordinate a joint response to border incursions beyond the capability of ABP units to repel.

Based on repeated attacks on some remote Afghan Border units, IJC requested and NTM-A provided an interim heavy weapons capability to the Border Police in May - June 2010. In conjunction with MoI and Border Police leadership, NTM-A designed an organic Border Police heavy weapons unit for an enduring organic capability. The design was developed in the late summer and early fall of 2010, socialized with IJC and MoI, and formally approved in the Command Plan Review (CPR) process. The first Border Police Heavy Weapons Company is forecasted for full operational capability in March 2011. Two Border Police Heavy Weapons Companies were approved in the Command Plan Review for generation in SY1390. Additional Border Police Heavy Weapons Companies are forecasted, with one per Border Police zone over the next three years.

Policy guidance already exists that directs joint ANA and ANP operations to address this type of problem. Instead of imposing materiel and organizational changes that will field capabilities to the ANP that already exist in the ANA, NTM-A and IJC are focused on ensuring joint doctrine exists to allow a joint response to this type of situation. Unfortunately, some ANA units and leaders continue to resist efforts to respond to situations in which ANP units require reinforcement. IJC continues to address this with the fielded forces and NTM-A with the ministerial and general staff leadership.

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**OBSERVATION 9. (Page 29, DoDIG Draft): Machine Gun and Rocket Propelled Grenade Training for Afghan Uniformed Police**

**RECOMMENDATION 9. (Page 30, DoDIG Draft):** Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, in coordination with the Ministry of Interior/Afghan National Police, develop a plan to provide familiarization training/firing on these weapons in basic training, especially for Afghan Uniformed Police in Key Terrain Districts and Area of Interest districts.

**NTM-A/CSTC-A RESPONSE 9.:** Attacks on AUP and ABP units in Key Terrain and Area of Interest Districts make this an attractive option until you explore the opportunity costs associated with this kind of training. Incorporation of formal PKM training in the Basic course would require an extension to the overall training schedule, which is not possible at this time if we are to meet our uplift requirements for AUP in critical portions of the country.

RPG familiarization to provide a defensive capability represents a more significant challenge as we will have to identify and acquire suitable sites and appropriately qualified instructors.



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There may be other familiarization tasks – loading and unloading the weapon, safety manipulation, etc. – that are more easily implemented and can be incorporated into training PoIs at a future date.

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**OBSERVATION 10. (Page 31, DoDIG Draft): Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Training and Equipment**

**RECOMMENDATION 10.a. (Page 32, DoDIG Draft):** Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, in coordination with the Ministry of Interior, review Regional Training Command Programs of Instruction to ensure appropriate and sufficient counter-improvised explosive device training is provided to Afghan Uniformed Police during basic training.

**NTM-A/CSTC-A RESPONSE 10.a.:** NTM-A/CSTC-A is in the process of organizing a cell inside our CJ7 that will have staff proficiency for Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) force development and training. As previously highlighted, the Basic Program of Instruction (Encl. 2) has been reviewed and the new PoI will be implemented in 2011. The C-IED training/awareness elements of the course have been enhanced and will amount to 22 hours of instruction. In addition, pictorial imagery has now been incorporated and there is now a significant practical element to this training.

**RECOMMENDATION 10.b. (Page 32, DoDIG Draft):** Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, in coordination with International Security Assistance Force Joint Command and the Ministry of Interior, determine what Afghan National Police units would benefit from additional Counter-Improvised Explosive Device/Explosive Ordnance Disposal equipment, prioritize the requirement, and develop a procurement plan to provide the equipment.

**NTM-A/CSTC-A and IJC RESPONSE 10.b.:** NTM-A/CSTC-A and IJC are already implementing this recommendation. NTM-A will partner with IJC to review the equipment already fielded to the force, assess if any additional equipment must be fielded, and synchronize that with improvements in training and fielding of organizations focused on the C-IED mission.

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**OBSERVATION 11. (Page 33, DoDIG Draft): Shortage of ANP Medical Personnel at the Regional Training Centers**

**RECOMMENDATION 11. (Page 34, DoDIG Draft):** Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan:

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a. Mentor the Minister of Interior to develop and aggressively execute a plan to recruit and ensure assignment of authorized medical personnel to the Regional Training Centers and to determine if an increase in the Tashkil authorization for medical personnel at the Regional Training Centers is appropriate.

**NTM-A/CSTC-A RESPONSE 11.a.:** NTM-A/CSTC-A stood up a recruiting cell to develop policy and address/improve the ANP medical recruiting process.

b. Mentor the Minister of Interior and the Minister of Defense to develop and sign a Memorandum of Understanding/Agreement that will allow Afghan National Police personnel to be treated at Afghan National Army medical facilities.

**NTM-A/CSTC-A RESPONSE 11.b.:** A Memorandum of Understanding/Agreement to allow Afghan National Police personnel to be treated at Afghan National Army medical facilities was recently signed by Minister of Defense and Ministry of Interior.

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**OBSERVATION 12. (Page 37, DoDIG Draft): Afghan National Army Support of the Afghan National Police**

**RECOMMENDATION 12.a. (Page 38, DoDIG Draft):** Commander, International Security Assistance Force/U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, in coordination with International Security Assistance Force Joint Command and North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, mentor the Minister of Defense and Minister of Interior to develop and execute a joint strategy for unified and mutually supporting Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police counterinsurgency operations.

**ISAF RESPONSE 12.a.:** ISAF is doing this. The Ministry of Defense Counter Insurgency (COIN) Policy is an approved joint strategy for unified and mutual supporting ANA and ANP counterinsurgency operations. Greater effort is required within the ANSF to communicate, understand, implement and coordinate this strategic policy. MoI published the document (Encl. 3) which directs the MoI to coordinate with the ANA in all operational planning during the hold phase in order to have a cohesive mission-based approach to protect areas cleared by ANSF. It also directs the General Staff (GS) to develop and disseminate COIN doctrine to all levels of the ANA for implementation of essential tasks during all phases of the COIN fight.

Both NTM-A and IJC are working to assist the ANSF to develop tactical level COIN doctrine and practices which are widely understood and followed by both the ANA and ANP.

**RECOMMENDATION 12.b. (Page 38, DoDIG Draft):** Commander, International Security Assistance Force/U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, in coordination with International Security Assistance Force Joint Command and North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-

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Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, mentor the Minister of Defense and Minister of Interior in the development of doctrine, policy, and planning to support joint Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police operations.

**ISAF RESPONSE 12.b.:** Many of the fundamental systems and guidance to implement this recommendation are already in place.

The Strategic Defense Planning System (SDPS) consists of four cornerstone strategic documents that are reviewed annually and supply strategic direction and guidance regarding joint ANA and ANP operations. These documents, the National Military Strategy (NMS – Encl. 4); Guidance for Operational Planning (GOP – Encl. 5); General Staff Planning Guidance (GSPG – Encl. 6) and Defense Capabilities Planning Guidance (DCPG – Encl. 7) provide strategic oversight and intent. Greater effort is required in promulgating these documents throughout the ANSF and in developing further Concepts of Operations (CONOPS) and tactical plans that support operations that are derived from the national strategy.

The NMS (Encl. 4) lists as a strategic role and mission of the ANA to support the ANP and ABP during emergencies and directs the ANA to assume command and control for the ANSF.

Paragraph 5 of the GOP (Encl. 5) directs “that the MoI has primary responsibility for conducting operations designed to hold areas that have been cleared by ANA forces; however, the ANA has a vital role in supporting their efforts particularly while the ANP is continuing to build and develop until it can subsequently assume primacy. Deterrence and reassurance presence patrolling must be implemented to preempt insurgency activities, block and prevent the enemy’s infiltration, and provide security. The ANA must hold while the ANP capability and capacity is built.” The paragraph goes on to state the following during the Building phase: “The ANA and ANP’s primary role during this stage is continuing to guarantee permanent security.”

The Logistics Cooperation Agreement (Encl. 8) between MoD and the MoI prescribes the necessary detail in order to assess, allocate, distribute and account for the necessary material during joint ANA and ANP operations.

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**OBSERVATION 13. (Page 39, DoDIG Draft): Governance/Rule of Law in Key Terrain Districts**

**RECOMMENDATION 13. (Page 41, DoDIG Draft):** Commander, International Security Assistance Force/U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, in coordination with the U.S. Chief of Mission:

- a. Support the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in identifying districts in which governance/Rule of Law representatives are not effectively present, especially in key terrain districts and area of interest districts.

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**ISAF RESPONSE 13.a.:** NTM-A/CSTC-A supports the Minister of Interior in identifying courses of action to deal with weak, ineffective, or corrupt officials.

b. Support the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in the implementation of a strategy to address the lack of governance/Rule of Law in these districts.

**ISAF RESPONSE 13.b.:** ISAF concurs with this recommendation.

c. Support the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in reforming pay for prosecutors employed by the Ministry of Justice/Attorney General.

**ISAF RESPONSE 13.c.:** The US Embassy is the lead agency for pay reform for prosecutors and is currently heavily engaged with the Attorney General's Office getting them to enact pay reform. NTM-A will continue to support them in this effort through the Rule of Law Deputies Committee.

d. Assist the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in engaging the informal tribal system of justice in support of local police development and counterinsurgency operational objectives.

**ISAF RESPONSE 13.d.:** NTM-A supports the U.S. Government Rule of Law Strategy for Afghanistan which has as one pillar of support, support for traditional (vice tribal) judicial reform. The USG Rule of Law strategy calls for support of Afghan efforts to provide security and space for traditional justice system to ensure dispute resolution needs in the local community are being met.

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**OBSERVATION 15. (Page 45, DoDIG Draft): Oversight Related to Afghan Security Forces Fund Contracting**

**RECOMMENDATION 15.a. (Page 45, DoDIG Draft):** Commander, International Security Assistance Force/U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, in coordination with North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/ Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, request an increase in authorized/assigned subject matter experts consistent with the expanding Afghan Security Force Fund-related oversight needs and responsibilities.

**ISAF RESPONSE 15.a.:** Without the assignment of additional personnel to oversee contracts and affect other stewardship actions, ISAF cannot provide appropriate oversight of Afghan Security Force Fund (ASFF) investments. NTM-A/CSTC-A recently conducted a manpower assessment that included oversight and stewardship related manpower requirements. This assessment led to an increase in personnel requirements that is recorded in the command's Joint

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Manning Document (JMD) modification request and in Request for Forces (RFF) 1216, which is presently being sourced by the Joint Staff and Joint Forces Command.

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**OBSERVATION 16. (Page 47, DoDIG Draft): Afghan National Police Logistics System**

**RECOMMENDATION 16.a. (Page 48, DoDIG Draft):** Commander, International Security Assistance Force Joint Command, utilize Theater Sustainment Brigades and Brigade Support Battalions to support logistical development of the Afghan National Police.

**ISAF RESPONSE 16.a.:** IJC will explore additional partnering by Sustainment Brigades (SBDEs) deployed in theater as a means to develop the logistical systems in the ANP. Additionally, we continue to explore areas to create logistic synergy between Army and Police.

**RECOMMENDATION 16.b. (Page 48, DoDIG Draft):** Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/ Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, in coordination with the International Security Assistance Force Joint Command and the Ministry of Interior, develop a process for a monthly joint Coalition Force/Afghan National Police reconciliation of Ministry of Interior Form 14 supply requests from operational Afghan National Police commands and districts, providing a status of each request and projected date of fill.

**NTM-A/CSTC-A and IJC RESPONSE 16.b.:** NTM-A/CSTC-A and IJC concur with this recommendation.

This reconciliation will be conducted at the nearest Regional Logistics Center (RLC) for all associated units in their Area of Responsibility. In turn, the Material Management Center (MMC) will reconcile all receipted MoI 14s and publish a list of completed and pending fill actions via cipher message back to the respective RLC or published via webpage.

On 28 Dec 10, the MMC initiated the MMC Customer Service Help Line. This Help Line was activated to assist customers and will be used to answer questions regarding MoI 14 status and to ask general questions regarding properly filling out MoI 14s. This Afghan led initiative is intended to provide customers with more visibility and information direct from the Afghan MMC Logistics Experts.

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**OBSERVATION 17. (Page 49, DoDIG Draft): Civilian Personnel Shortages at Afghan National Police Regional Logistics Centers**

**RECOMMENDATION 17. (Page 50, DoDIG Draft):** Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-

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Afghanistan, in coordination with the Ministry of Interior, determine if salary adjustment incentives or other personnel hiring measures, such as contracting, must be implemented to provide the necessary Afghan workforce at Regional Logistics Centers/ Provincial Supply Points.

**NTM-A/CSTC-A RESPONSE 17.:** There are two COAs underway to address the manning shortfalls at the RLCs and PSPs. First, Advisors have worked with their Afghan counterparts on the MoI Logistics senior staff and to include this in the Command Plan Review process for SY1390 to convert the civilian positions back to AUP as they had been previously. We strongly believe that civilian manning of the warehouses is a good idea. Civilian manning of the appropriate positions in the RLCs and PSPs will keep us from diverting uniformed police from security missions. However, without civil service reform it's unlikely MoI will be able to hire and train an adequate number of civilians. When civil service reform is completed, the Afghans will take action through the CPR to convert the appropriate positions to civilians. Civilian Pay is a GIRoA challenge that must be addressed through civil service reform.

The second COA underway as an interim solution is contracting out the positions. NTM-A/CSTC-A has developed a statement of work and is working with contracting to move this initiative forward.

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**OBSERVATION 18. (Page 51, DoDIG Draft): Regional Logistics Centers/Provincial Supply Points**

**RECOMMENDATION 18.a. (Page 52, DoDIG Draft):** Commander, International Security Assistance Force Joint Command, in coordination with North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/ Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, ensure U.S. and other Coalition Force mentors understand the presence, capability, and role of Regional Logistics Centers/Provincial Supply Points, and clarify with the mentors/trainers the Ministry of Interior procedures for police units to submit Ministry of Interior Form 14 supply requests to Regional Logistics Centers/Provincial Supply Points, and the approval and issuance process.

**ISAF RESPONSE 18.a.:** NTM-A now hosts a twice monthly training meeting with all RLC and PSP Advisors to synchronize ANP training efforts, to include use of a coalition mobile training team and contractors. Additionally, the first-ever RLC/PSP Commander and Advisor Conference was held in early December 2010 to further educate and synchronize collective understanding of the logistics policies. Furthermore, MoI Logistics recently stood up their new Office of Professional Development in December 2010 to manage the training of Afghan logisticians. This new office is currently minimally manned but additional manning was included in SY1390 CPR and upon approval and implementation, will grow by eight positions headed by a Lt Col, enabling mobile training teams to travel to units nationwide in need of training and process assistance.

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We must ensure Partnered unit and POMLT training on ANSF logistical systems takes place either prior to deployment or immediately upon arrival in theater.

**RECOMMENDATION 18.b. (Page 52, DoDIG Draft):** Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/ Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, in coordination with the Ministry of Interior, assist in development of Ministry of Interior guidance/orders/procedures for Afghan National Police forces (Afghan Uniformed Police, Afghan Border Police, Afghan National Civil Order Police) that clarify/define the role and responsibilities of the Regional Logistics Centers/Provincial Supply Points vis-à-vis the Afghan National Police, and the Ministry of Interior procedures for requesting supplies from Regional Logistics Centers/Provincial Supply Points.

**NTM-A/CSTC-A RESPONSE 18.b.:** Guidance does exist for logistics management and maintenance management. We are working with MoI to produce additional guidance that updates existing policy. Logistics management policy is currently under revision and transportation and munitions initial policy concept papers have been prepared and are awaiting approval, after which working groups will be formed, policy drafted and vetted for final approval and publishing. As mentioned previously, we must continue to train Afghan logisticians on the new/updated policies.

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**OBSERVATION 19. (Page 53, DoDIG Draft): Stockage Levels at Regional Logistics Centers**

**RECOMMENDATION 19. (Page 54, DoDIG Draft):** Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/ Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, assist the Ministry of Interior to:

- a. Develop and issue command and control guidance for each Regional Logistics Center/Provincial Supply Point commander and Afghan National Police operational commanders in which these depots reside.

**NTM-A/CSTC-A RESPONSE 19.a.:** MoI Advisors worked with their Afghan counterparts on the MoI Logistics senior staff to correct the current SY1389 Tashkil and the SY1390 Tashkil currently under development. The Minister of Interior recently signed a Decree directing that RLCs and PSPs be removed from under the Regional Headquarters Commanders and will now fall under the Deputy Minister for Administration and Support, MoI Logistics under the direct command and control of the MoI Support Command Commander. This unifies command and control of the National Logistics System components under the Chief of Logistics and will help ensure support to all Police pillars down to the District level.

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A Class VIII medical logistics policy is currently in draft (Encl. 9). The approved policy will standardize Class VIII processes for Regional Logistic Centers/Provincial Supply Points.

b. Prepare and issue authorized stockage levels for each of the Regional Logistics Centers/Provincial Supply Points.

**NTM-A/CSTC-A RESPONSE 19.b.:** NTM-A/CSTC-A has already developed an Authorized Stockage Lists (ASL – Encl. 10) for each RLC and PSP currently in operation.

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**OBSERVATION 20. (Page 55, DoDIG Draft): Equipment/Supplies Shipped to Regional Logistics Centers/Provincial Supply Points**

**RECOMMENDATION 20. (Page 56, DoDIG Draft):** Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, assist the Ministry of Interior to:

a. Develop a system to ensure that Afghan National Police/Coalition personnel at the Regional Logistics Centers/Provincial Supply Points know what type and quantity of equipment and supplies are in-bound, and when.

**NTM-A/CSTC-A RESPONSE 20.a.:** NTM-A/CSTC-A has already implemented such a system. This system will ensure that Afghan National Police/Coalition personnel at the RLCs and PSPs know the type and quantity of equipment and supplies that are in-bound and when. The ANP Distribution Tracker lists all shipments from the MMC. Each entry lists order number, type of equipment, container numbers, ship date, etc. This tracker is e-mailed to all RLC advisors/personnel on a weekly basis and is available via the Internet. Several initiatives have been instituted to ensure Form 9s are receipted at the destination to include driver copies, container copies and package documents affixed to the inside upper right hand side of the container. Processes are under development to scan and send all MoI Form 9s from the Intermediate Logistics Facility (ILF) and Material Support Command (MSC) to the receiving RLC. Until a more robust communications system is in place at the ILF and MSC, this program will be limited in scope and availability.

b. Ensure compliance with current policy/procedure to maintain proper documentation with each shipment.

**NTM-A/CSTC-A RESPONSE 20.b.:** See response 20.a. above.

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**OBSERVATION 21. (Page 59, DoDIG Draft): Plan to Develop Afghan National Police Logistics Capability**



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**RECOMMENDATION 21. (Page 60, DoDIG Draft):** Commander, International Security Assistance Force/U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, in coordination with the International Security Assistance Force Joint Command, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, and the Ministry of Interior:

a. Develop and publish an integrated plan to develop the logistics capability of the Afghan Uniformed Police forces at the region/province/district, the Afghan Border Police at zone/brigade/kandak, and the Afghan National Civil Order Police at brigade/kandak.

**ISAF RESPONSE 21.a.:** ISAF recently requested and the Joint Staff approved deployment of a team to assess the ANP strategy and assist in the development of a comprehensive three year plan in concern with the MoI.

b. Issue guidance to Coalition logistics mentors/trainers as to how the plan should be implemented.

**NTM-A/CSTC-A RESPONSE 21.b.:** The planning effort referenced in 21.a. above will include implementation direction.

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**OBSERVATION 22. (Page 61, DoDIG Draft): Oversight of U.S. Supplied Equipment**

**RECOMMENDATION 22. (Page 63, DoDIG Draft):** Commander, International Security Assistance Force/U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, in coordination with the International Security Assistance Force Joint Command, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, and the Ministry of Interior:

a. Develop a plan for a 100 percent joint U.S./Afghan inventory of U.S.-procured equipment issued to the Afghan National Police in order to establish baseline accountability documented in U.S. and Afghan property books.

**ISAF RESPONSE 22.a.:** NTM-A in conjunction with IJC and the Ministry of Interior have several inventory efforts underway which are focused on achieving baseline accountability documented in U.S. and Afghan property books. This resource intensive effort will require several months to ensure 100 percent accountability of all the equipment issued over the past seven years.

b. Develop and implement a plan to ensure that Coalition Force and the Ministry of Interior/Afghan National Police have visibility over the transfer of equipment and weapons down the supply chain; establish a clear chain of custody and accountability--by serial number, especially in the case of sensitive items such as weapons.

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**ISAF RESPONSE 22.b.:** NTM-A’s ability to fully implement materiel management requirements like this are dependent on all logistic positions being filled with correct skill-sets as stated on our personnel requirements and authorization documents. In addition, since NATO positions (44 on the CJSOR) have gone un-resourced, meeting all the comprehensive milestones to accomplish the above recommendation are at risk.

**RECOMMENDATION 22. (Page 63, DoDIG Draft):** Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan:

d. Mentor/support the Ministry of Interior to organize and deploy survey teams to districts where Coalition Force partners are not established to conduct a baseline inventory of U.S.-provided equipment, especially weapons, and ensure property book accountability is maintained on an ongoing basis.

**NTM-A/CSTC-A RESPONSE 22.d.:** NTM-A lacks adequate resources to implement this recommendation. NTM-A/CSTC-A and the MoI Chief of Logistics currently use all resources available to conduct inventories and assessments in addition to forming a new training program to reinforce this. The biggest challenge is lack of connectivity and automation tools to quickly reconcile property books. This is currently being addressed to include MoI network connectivity to the RLCs and PSPs. Additionally, MoI Logistics Advisor Team has developed a new Logistics Readiness Tool (LRT) that is to be fielded in the next 45 days to automate all move, shoot and communicate asset inventory and status reporting.

e. Mentor the Minister of the Interior to reissue and enforce previous instructions to the Afghan National Police requiring 100 percent monthly inventories of weapons by serial number and quarterly inventories of sensitive and pilferable items, such as vehicles, radios, generators, rations, and clothing.

**NTM-A/CSTC-A RESPONSE 22.e.:** NTM-A/CSTC-A concurs with this recommendation. The MoI Logistics Advisor Team will reinforce this policy in conjunction with IJC partners to ANP units.

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**OBSERVATION 23. (Page 65, DoDIG Draft):** Afghan Uniformed Police Assigned Strength in Regional Command-East

**RECOMMENDATION 23. (Page 66, DoDIG Draft):** Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/ Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, in coordination with the International Security Assistance Force Joint Command:

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a. Assist the Ministry of Interior to provide trained personnel to fill Afghan Uniformed Police Tashkil authorizations in key Regional Command-East districts as soon as feasible.

**ISAF RESPONSE 23.a.:** ISAF non-concurs with this recommendation. The highest priority districts are receiving personnel fills ahead of the lower priority districts. AUP in RCs South and Southwest are higher priority requirements than those in RC-East.

In the SY1390 CPR, IJC operational considerations were, and continue to be, heavily weighted in the requirements generation/force development process for all Regional Commands. More importantly, the operational, institutional and national needs of the ANP force were the drivers of the Afghan MoI planned, coordinated and executed CPR process. The CPR policies and procedures continue to be developed, refined and documented as part of the MoI institutional and ministerial development efforts.

b. Assist the Ministry of Interior to define an appropriate mission set for the Afghan Uniformed Police.

**NTM-A/CSTC-A RESPONSE 23.b.:** The current security environment dictates that we focus ANP training on security functions in addition to traditional policing functions. The Afghan National Police Strategy identifies 14 Roles and Responsibilities for the AUP (Encl. 11, pp. 23-24) to which they will transition as the security situation improves.

c. Mentor the Minister of Interior to direct Afghan Uniformed Police Chiefs to eliminate/minimize use of personnel for missions outside of the MoI-approved mission set.

**NTM-A/CSTC-A RESPONSE 23.c.:** NTM-A and IJC aggressively challenge the misuse or mal-utilization of all MoI police assets. The Minister has continuously engaged his subordinate leaders since taking office on the proper care, leadership, training, and professionalism of the AUP and has devoted much time conducting inspections around the provincial and district police headquarters to assess the proper utilization of the police. The Minister of Interior has made the issue of corruption/abuse of power in the ANP as one of his top priorities.

d. Commander, International Security Assistance Force Joint Command, direct Coalition Force mentors to monitor and report assignment of Afghan Uniformed Police personnel to duties outside of the MoI-approved mission set to the Coalition Force chain of command.

**IJC RESPONSE 23.d.:** IJC concurs with this recommendation.

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**OBSERVATION 24. (Page 67, DoDIG Draft): Pay for Afghan Border Police in Regional Command-East**

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**RECOMMENDATION 24. (Page 68, DoDIG Draft):** Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/ Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, in coordination with the Ministry of Interior:

- a. Expedite implementation of electronic pay procedures and/or ensure pay agent or other procedures result in consistent delivery of salaries.

**NTM-A/CSTC-A RESPONSE 24.a.:** NTM-A/CSTC-A continues to work with ISAF and the US Embassy to implement electronic pay procedures as quickly as is possible and prudent. Ninety-five percent of the ANA are paid by Electronic Funds Transfer (EFT), but the banking environment in Afghanistan limits our ability to reach the same levels in the ANP. We need significant help from organizations outside NTM-A and MoI to implement banking reforms that will allow greater use of EFT to pay the ANP. Implementation may include the following phases: Phase 1 – MoI ANP use the existing standing agreement with ANA Air Corps to deliver banking agent with cash to Da Afghanistan Banks (DaBs) in these areas until infrastructure/ security is increased, and expand the existing M-Paisa pay-by-cellphone service where coverage is available. Phase 2 – Leverage the existing MoF Banking Agreement with national banks to require banks to provide mobile bank services to hard to reach and unbanked areas. Phase 3 – Once infrastructure for roads and communications are built, increase the number of banking centers/DaB branches to be closer proximity to ABP and other ANP units allowing EFT to be the primary means of receiving pay.

- b. Determine whether this problem exists with Afghan Border Police units in other regions and apply appropriate corrective actions.

**NTM-A/CSTC-A RESPONSE 24.b.:** The RC-East ABP pay issues are common to most ABP throughout the country. The same solutions for RC-East will apply to all border regions and other remote areas with regard to cash movement by air, use of M-Paisa pay-by-cellphone service, and banks providing additional mobile banking services to hard to reach areas.

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**OBSERVATION 25. (Page 69, DoDIG Draft): Afghan National Police District and Precinct Facilities**

**RECOMMENDATION 25. (Page 70, DoDIG Draft):** Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/ Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, in coordination with the International Security Assistance Force Joint Command, identify district/precinct headquarters that are not up to a reasonable physical standard and direct funding towards their improvement. Ensure that this initiative is incorporated in appropriate spending plans.

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**ISAF RESPONSE 25.:** NTM-A and IJC already employ a variety of methods to identify facilities that require improvements: Focus District Development (FDD) site assessments conducted by the FDD mentors, facilities investigations/assessments conducted by a contractor, input from the Battle Space Owner, brigade engineers, and task force commanders. Coalition Forces and Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are also used to feed input back to NTM-A. After consolidating the inputs, projects are programmed and executed.

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**OBSERVATION 26. (Page 71, DoDIG Draft): North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan Anti-Corruption Staff**

**RECOMMENDATION 26. (Page 72, DoDIG Draft):** Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/ Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, build the anti-corruption staff to provide a capability that adequately supports the International Security Assistance Force anti-corruption mission.

**NTM-A/CSTC-A RESPONSE 26.:** The current manning and expected future manning of the Anti-Corruption Office adequately supports the International Security Assistance Force anti-corruption mission. Merely building an Anti-Corruption staff is not sufficient to address this problem. NTM-A focuses the entire command on stewardship and accountability. We look for the methods across the command that remove the opportunity for corrupt behavior instead of only building the capacity to respond to it.

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**OBSERVATION 27. (Page 73, DoDIG Draft): Ministry of Interior Inspector General Investigations**

**RECOMMENDATION 27. (Page 74, DoDIG Draft):** Commander, International Security Assistance Force/U.S. Forces-Afghanistan:

a. In coordination with the Ministry of Interior and the International Security Assistance Force Deputy J-5/Anti-Corruption office, develop a data base capable of tracking corruption cases investigated by the Ministry of Interior Inspector General and referred to the Attorney General for follow-up action.

**ISAF RESPONSE 27.a:** We do not need to independently develop such a database. The Justice Sector Support Program is developing a case-management system. While it may not be precisely what is required, it is indicative of the development of such systems. ISAF should consider an inquiry into the existing systems or those currently under development rather than starting from whole cloth on the development of a new database.

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**OBSERVATION 28. (Page 75, DoDIG Draft): Afghan National Police Lessons Learned Process**

**RECOMMENDATION 28. (Page 76, DoDIG Draft):** Commander, International Security Assistance Force Joint Command, in coordination with North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/ Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, develop a plan to collect Afghan National Police lessons learned and disseminate them in-country and to the U.S. Center for Army Lessons Learned.

**ISAF RESPONSE 28.:** Since 14 SEP 10, the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) has provided a Theater Observation Detachment (TOD) at Camp Eggers. The TOD has a collection plan focused on the ANP. NTM-A/CSTC-A has submitted observations and insights to CALL, Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA), Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA) and the Counterinsurgency Advisory and Assistance Teams (CAAT).

CALL collects, analyzes, disseminates, integrates, and archives Army and Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational (JIIM) observations, insights, lessons (OIL), and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) to support full spectrum military operations. Methodology involves: collection, processing of information, analysis to derive lessons, and dissemination in a variety of media world-wide.

Afghan National Police lessons learned dissemination occurs via the CALL distribution process (Encl. 12) as well as, existing NTM-A/CSTC-A NIPR, SIPR, and Centrix SharePoint lessons learned sites and ISAF lessons learned portal.

We will continue to work to formalize horizontal and vertical reporting for mentors/partners, using the lessons learned from successes in Iraq.

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**GENERAL COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT REPORT**

The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), The North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/ Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (NTM-A/CSTC-A), and The International Security Assistance Force Joint Command (IJC) general comments on the subject draft report.

**1. (Page i, Paragraph 1, Synopsis)** The first paragraph, last sentence, states, “...which includes an expedited build-up of the ANSF.”

Should state,  
“...which includes an accelerated build-up of the ANSF.”

**2. (Page i, Paragraph 3, Synopsis)** The last paragraph, first sentence states, “...ANP forces, reaching 109,000 personnel *several* months ahead of schedule.”

Should state,  
“...ANP forces, reaching 109,000 personnel in Solar Month Asad, which is three months ahead of schedule.”

**3. (Page ii, Paragraph 3, Synopsis)** Sentence 2 states, “*With the deployment to Afghanistan of additional U.S. Brigade Combat Teams to Afghanistan in 2009 and 2010, it became feasible to partner U.S. tactical units more widely with the Afghan police.*”

Should state,  
“*With the deployment of additional U.S. Brigade Combat Teams to Afghanistan in 2009 and 2010, it became feasible to partner U.S. tactical units more widely with the Afghan police.*”

**4. (Page ii, Paragraph 5, Synopsis)** This paragraph is misleading, particularly where it says that ANP logistical development “...has lagged the growth of the ANP, making them still heavily reliant on coalition support.” The development of ANP logistical capability is going according to plan. We deliberately waited to generate enablers – including logistical units and capability – until this year so that we had a force in place that could prosecute a COIN fight in the near term. We recognized that this force would not be balanced and planned to provide coalition support until the enablers were fielded. Saying that logistical development has lagged clearly implies we are not proceeding according to plan, an implication that is not accurate.

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5. (Page iii, Paragraph 3, Synopsis) The first paragraph states, *“Oversight is fundamental to being able to sustain ANP operational...and to reduce corruption.”*

Should state,

*“Oversight is fundamental to reduce corruption.”*

6. (Page iii, Paragraph 1, Synopsis) Recommend you add at the end of the last sentence, “... , but presently lacks adequate personnel capacity to do so.”

7. (Page 4, New Training/Mentoring Strategies, 2<sup>nd</sup> bullet) There is reference to “ANA” in relation to training in Turkey. This should read “ANP.”

- *“Regional Command-Central (RC-C) organized ANP training in Turkey; the program will send up to 500 ANP personnel to Turkey to train for one month. A second group of 500 ANP will follow shortly thereafter. NTM-A will pay for the first group of ANA officers, while Japan has agreed to finance the second year. The objective is to expose the ANP to a working police force in a democratic Muslim country. RC-C is also working to establish a program to train ANP officers in Turkey for a year at a time.”*

Corrected version:

- *“NTM-A/CSTC-A is organizing ANP Officer Candidate School training in Turkey; the program will send up to 500 ANP personnel to Turkey to train for six months. A second group of 500 ANP will follow based on success with the first group. CSTC-A, Japan, and Turkey will pay for the first group of ANP officers. It has not yet been determined who will pay for the second rotation. The objective is to expose the ANP to a working police force in a democratic Muslim country. Regional Command-Central (RC-C) is also working to establish a program to train ANP officers in Turkey for a year at a time.”*

8. (Page 11, Observation 2) Observation paragraph 3, reads *“This has allowed insurgent groups in these regions to grow in force and in influence, undermined security, and damaged confidence in the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA).”*

This should be rephrased more clearly as follows:

*“The reduced ratio allows insurgent groups in these regions to grow in force and in influence, undermine security, and damage confidence in the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA).”*



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9. (Page 16, Observation 4, Discussion) Discussion states, “Two existing programs currently attempt to address the issue of untrained AUP in the force. The Focused Police Development Program is a six week training program for high threat areas that requires ANCOP personnel backfill to perform the police functions of the untrained AUP while they are being trained. It usually brings the untrained AUP to an established training center. The Directed Police District Development Program is another six week training course conducted in two cycles within the district, but does not require AUP or ANCOP backfill, as half of the AUP are trained at a time. This training option brings the trainers to the untrained AUP in their local area, usually a district.”

Comment: ANCOP is no longer the method used to provide a backfill unit to replace the AUP being trained for FPDD. Provincial police units, by the direction of the Provincial Chief of Police (PCoP) are able to provide backfill personnel from the local police forces so that ANCOP unit availability is not a requirement for FPDD.

10. (Page 23, Observation 6, Personnel Strength) Personnel Strength states, “The MoI IG Directorate has grown from approximately 131 positions in September 2009 to approximately 638 positions on the current Tashkil in October 2010, with 225 on staff at MoI.”

Should state,

“The MoI IG Directorate has grown from approximately 131 positions in September 2009 to approximately 225 positions on the current Tashkil in October 2010, with 131 on staff at MoI.”

11. (Page 33, Observation 11, Paragraph 3) Observation 11 states, “Aside from the issue of combat casualties, many policemen and their families do not receive routine medical care. Policemen and police candidates who become sick or ill at the RTCs are often not treated for minor illnesses in a timely manner which results in:

- Missing unnecessary days of work or training,
- Spreading communicable diseases or illnesses,
- Illness or injury becoming worse, which may require evacuation for long term care,
- Lower morale, and
- Possible death.”

Comment: We do not have any facts to support these findings. We ask you to provide us with the information you used to make this observation so we can investigate this assertion.

12. (Page 43, Observation 14, Paragraph 3) Paragraph 3 states, “Corrupt AUP practices that exploits the people...”

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Should state,

*“Corrupt AUP practices that exploit the people...”*

13. **(Page 44, Observation 14, Paragraph 1)** Insert at the end of the first paragraph, *“The newly established CJLATF Shafafiyat seeks to plan and implement ISAF anti-corruption efforts, including a focus on ANSF as a function and the face of governance.”*

14. **(Page 65, Observation 23)** Observation 23 states, *“This occurred because the AUP personnel approved in the current RC-E Tashkil have not been assigned, given the higher priority to meet police force needs in RC-S and RC-SW.”*

Recommend the statement be changed to:

*“This occurred because, for these districts, the AUP personnel approved in the current RC-E Tashkil have not been assigned, given the higher priority to meet police force needs in RC-S and RC-SW.”*

15. **(Page 65, Observation 23)** Observation 23 states, *“According to ANP commanders and mentors in RC-E, the AUP were significantly under strength against Tashkil authorizations. Some provinces reported having an average of 50 percent of their assigned strength.”*

Recommend the statement be changed to:

*“According to ANP commanders and mentors in RC-E, AUP districts were significantly under strength against Tashkil authorizations. Some of them reported having an average of 50 percent of their assigned police strength.”*



SPECIAL OPERATIONS/  
LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT  
& INTERDEPENDENT CAPABILITIES

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2500 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2500

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR GENERAL

SUBJECT: Coordination Response for Assessment of U.S. Government Efforts to Train, Equip, and Mentor the Expanded Afghan National Police

- Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations concurs with the Assessment of U.S. Government Efforts to Train, Equip, and Mentor the Expanded Afghan National Police.
- We judge the section on the Ministry of Defense Advisors (MoDA) Program and its positive contributions to NTM-A/CSTC-A's mission (as described in Observation 7) to be accurate and appropriate. We support the assessment's recommendation to provide additional MoDA Advisors to NTM-A/CSTC-A as needed.
- We agree that NTM-A/CSTC-A has requested 100 advisors and support providing them on an expedited basis.

Dr. James Schear  
Deputy Assistant Secretary of  
Defense for Partnership Strategy and  
Stability Operations



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THE VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

CM-1306-11  
8 February 2011

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, INSPECTOR  
GENERAL

Subject: Assessment of U.S. Government Efforts to Train, Equip, and Mentor  
the Expanded Afghan National Police (Project No. D2010-D00SPO-0198.000)

1. Thank you for the opportunity to review the subject Inspector General Assessment Report<sup>1</sup> on current U.S. Government efforts in supporting the expansion of the Afghan National Police. Your team's recommendation (15b) to provide the personnel required for NTM-A/CSTC-A to fulfill its oversight mission has resonated within the Joint Staff and facilitated the staffing of USCENTCOM Request for Forces 1216, currently requesting 272 training personnel to NTM-A/CSTC-A to assist in their complex oversight support of force development tasks.
2. We appreciate your efforts in assessing this key line of effort in our Afghan Campaign and look forward to your future assessment reports.
3. The Joint Staff point of contact is Major Nathan M. Hubbard, USA; PACC; 703-693-4447.

JAMES E. CARTWRIGHT  
General, United States Marine Corps  
Vice Chairman  
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Reference:

- 1 DOD/IG memorandum, 14 December 2010, "Assessment of U.S. Government Efforts to Train, Equip, and Mentor the Expanded Afghan National Police (Project No. D2010-D00SPO-0198.000)"

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    and Government Reform  
House Committee on International Relations

\*Recipient of the draft report

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## General Information

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